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The Soviet Union and Afghanistan share a long history of 
international relations. Afghanistan was the first nation to 
officially recognize the Soviet regime in 1919 and the two nations have 
actively interacted ever since. In 1978 a military coup took place 
which installed a communist regime in Afghanistan. Less than a year 
later Soviet troops invaded the country in order to suppress the rising 
tide of anti-government protest and rebellion. It is assumed that the 
Soviet decision to invade was primarily motivated by three factors: 1) 
Historic Sov'iet border xenophobia magnified by instability in Iran and 
Afghanistan. 2) Ideological commitments prescribed within the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and international treaties. 3) Fear of Islamic-nationalism in 
Iran and Afghanistan spreading to Moslem regions of the USSR.
Following the Soviet invasion, many political analysts interpreted 
the move as the latest step in the age-old process of Russian
imperialism. The validity of this viewpoint has been analyzed in this
project by investigating diplomatic, economic and military relations 
from 1919 to 1988. Evaluation of these factors reveals the extent to 
which Soviet policies were directed toward the eventual assimilation of 
Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere of domination.
Prior to the 1979 invasion, the Soviet Union pursued policies in 
Afghanistan which indicate that they sought to maintain Afghanistan's 
traditional role as a buffer state between itself and Western
interests. The Soviet Union dominated Afghanistan's economy, was the
sole provider of military equipment, and was Afghanistan's primary 
foreign aid and development benefactor. However, there is no 
substantial evidence to indicate that the Soviets were planning to 
annex Afghanistan into the Soviet empire. The 1978 coup in Afghanistan 
was not instigated, planned, or carried out by the Soviet Union.
After invading-Afghanistan the Soviet Union suffered, from a lack of 
effective policies which would bring a end to the Afghan civil war.
For its part, the Afghan populace has once again exhibited the same 
intolerance of foreign intervention which drove the British from 
Afghanistan in the nineteenth century. The Soviet decision to invade 
was based on political considerations. The decision to withdraw in 
1988 reflected changes in the political leadership under General 
Secretary Gorbachev and new political goals.
Withdrawal of Soviet troops from an allied Socialist country marks a 
significant shift in traditional Soviet foreign policy. The future 
ramifications of this action are unknown, but apparently the Gorbachev 
regime is prepared to link changes in foreign policy to changes in 
domestic policy. Future Soviet-Afghan relations will hinge upon the 
new Afghan leadership's ability to regain its historic role as a 
neutral buffer state. Afghans may never again trust the Russians, but 
close geographic proximity, and economic necessity will force continued 
interaction between the two nations.
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
The Russian and Afghan peoples have a long history of 
international relations. Among others, tsars, emirs, kings, 
presidents, premiers and bandits have a ll le f t  the ir mark on a co lorfu l 
history o f po litica l interaction. In the wake o f the 1979 Soviet 
invasion numerous books and artic les have been w ritten  which attem pt to 
analyze and explain the Soviet's fu ture intentions toward Afghanistan.
In my opinion, many o f these works have fa iled to investigate 
adequately the evolution of Soviet foreign policy toward Afghanistan 
and are biased by pre-conceived notions regarding the history o f 
Soviet-Afghan relations. This pro ject, therefore, investigates Soviet 
foreign policy toward Afghanistan over the last 70 years. The f irs t 
goal o f this project is to iden tify  long-term Soviet policy toward 
Afghanistan and assess the 1979 invasion w ith in  the context o f this 
policy. The second goal is to assess and analyze the foreign policy 
ram ifications o f declared Soviet intentions to withdraw the ir forces 
from  Afghanistan in 1988.
Method, Scope, and Subject M atte r 
This paper is a descriptive, h istorica l account o f Soviet-Afghan 
interaction from  1919 to 1988. Research has been conducted w ith in  two 
broad tim e frames: Soviet-Afghan relations before the 1979 invasion, 
and Soviet-Afghan relations a fte r the invasion. The years 1919, 1979 
and 1988 mark sign ificant events in both Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union. In 1919 Amanullah Khan seized control o f the Afghan government,
1
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and the consolidation of the old Tsarist empire continued under the new 
Bolshevik leadership in Russia. King Amanullah was the f irs t head-of- 
state to recognize the new Soviet regime, and the f irs t Afghan leader to
t i l t  Afghanistan in favor o f the Soviet Union. In 1979 the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan and have to this date been involved in the most 
protracted m ilita ry  co n flic t in Soviet history. The year 1988 has
witnessed the f irs t signs o f a end to the war w ith  the signing of
agreements which pave the way fo r a Soviet w ithdrawal o f forces beginning
on May 15, 1988.
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The analysis and conclusions o f the m ateria l presented in this paper 
focus on the fo llow ing questions: 1) From the beginnings o f form al 
Soviet-Afghan relations in 1919 to the invasion o f 1979, is there any 
evidence to support the proposition tha t Soviet policy toward 
Afghanistan, culm inating in the 1979 invasion, was designed to place 
Afghanistan d ire c tly  under Soviet control? 2) Was Soviet m ilita ry  
intervention consistent w ith  previous foreign policies toward Afghan
3
governments? 3) What have the Soviets been try ing to accomplish in 
Afghanistan fo llow ing the invasion, and how have they gone about it?
4) Do the Soviets actua lly have a consistent and cohesive foreign policy 
toward Afghanistan? This project is divided into eight chapters which 
provide a framework fo r the analysis and resolution o f these questions.
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two reviews Afghan 
history up through 1919 and provides the historical context fo r this 
project. Chapters three and four investigate o ffic ia lly  declared Soviet 
foreign policy pertaining to Afghanistan from 1919 to 1979. Chapter 
three investigates relations in the period from 1919 to 1945, and chapter 
four from 1946 to 1979. These chapters begin by providing the 
theoretical basis o f Soviet foreign policy w ithin M arxist ideology.
Major Soviet pronouncements, treaties and agreements pertaining to 
Afghanistan, and im portant Afghan po litica l dynamics having an e ffec t on 
Soviet-Afghan relations also are included. These chapters, w ith in  which 
sim ilar lines o f analysis are pursued, focus on identical topics and can 
be conceptually considered as a single chapter. They have been divided 
fo r two reasons. F irs t, chapters three and four investigate the longest 
period o f history and produce the greatest volume of research material, 
and second, from  a h istorica l perspective, World War II can be seen as 
the major watershed in world politics which thrust the Soviet Union to 
the fo re fron t o f international relations. Reviewing Soviet foreign 
policy before and a fte r World War II w ill help to determine the level of 
consistency Soviet policy toward Afghanistan has exhibited over the 
years.
Chapter five  reviews economic and m ilita ry  relations from  1919 to 
1979. This chapter b rie fly  looks at the levels and types o f trade, and
major trade agreements. Foreign aid is the primary subject o f this 
chapter. The rationale behind Soviet foreign aid, as well as the levels, 
types, and control over Soviet foreign aid to Afghanistan, is 
investigated. In regard to m ilita ry  relations, chapter five  reviews the 
role o f the m ilita ry  in Soviet foriegn policy and Afghanistan's place in 
Soviet m ilita ry  doctrine. The m ilita ry  ram ifications o f "non-m ilita ry"
Soviet aid projects (such as railroads, bridges and airports) are 
mentioned. Basic characteristics o f Soviet m ilita ry  aid to Afghanistan, 
including levels, types of training, and equipment, are provided.
Chapter six researches the evolution and po litica l fortunes of 
Marxist organizations in Afghanistan. This chapter investigates the role 
o f the COMINTERN in Soviet foreign policy, and its success in 
Afghanistan. The origins, organization, leaders, and structure o f the 
PDPA (People's Democratic Party o f Afghanistan) are included. The PDPA's 
role in the internal po litica l dynamics o f Afghanistan in the period 
1965-1979 and Soviet control over PDPA operations and policies are 
described in detail.
Chapter seven analyzes the period o f relations from 1979 to 1988. 
Research in this chapter focuses upon the invasion and subsequent nine 
years o f Soviet occupation. Chapter seven looks at the m ultiple aspects 
o f Soviet foreign policy in Afghanistan as covered in chapters 3-6, in 
addition to  new policy developments. The major focal points o f this 
chapter include: o ffic ia l Soviet statements explaining and jus tify ing  
the ir actions; Soviet-Afghan pronouncements, agreements and treaties;
Soviet economic and m ilita ry  aid; Soviet m ilita ry  policies; PDPA policies 
and changes o f leadership; new Soviet-Afghan policies intending to  gain 
popular support (such as po litica l indoctrination o f Afghan youth in the
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Soviet Union); the evolution o f the Geneva peace talks; the proposed 
Soviet w ithdrawal, and the future of Soviet-Afghan relations. This 
project closes w ith  an overall analysis o f the material, answers to the 
operational questions, and conclusions in chapter eight.
Basic Assumptions
This pro ject does not attem pt to prove or disprove a ll of the 
various theories which speculate about why the Soviets decided to invade 
Afghanistan. Much o f this speculation, though interesting, is usually 
determined by the ideological orientation and/or pre-conceived notions 
embodied w ith in the personality of individual commentators. Insofar as 
academicians attem pt to remain non-biased in the ir analysis of social 
science phenomena, i t  is my view that purely objective analysis can never 
be obtained. I have designed this project w ith  the intent o f calling 
into question the dominant underlying assumption upon which the m ajority 
o f po litica l w riters base the ir investigations and analyses o f the Soviet 
invasion. This assumption views the Soviet invasion as jus t the latest 
step in the centuries-old process o f Russian im peria listic expansion.
Thomas Hammond, professor o f History at the University o f V irginia and 
expert on Soviet foreign policy, sums up this viewpoint in his book, Red 
Flag Over Afghanistan: "The surprising thing about the 1979 invasion, 
therefore, is not that the Soviets did i t ,  but tha t they had not staged a 
major invasion o f Afghanistan earlie r."1 This viewpoint pre-supposes the 
concept that the Soviet Union has planned, and is planning, to invade and 
eventually conquer a ll o f its neighbors. The fac t remains tha t the 
Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan earlier; thus, the analysis o f
1Thomas Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, 
the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press,
1984), p. 137.
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Soviet-Afghan relations prior to 1979 presents an ideal case to
investigate the va lid ity  o f this viewpoint.
It  is suggested that in reviewing the history o f Soviet-Afghan
relations only three basic assumptions concerning Soviet motives can be
adequately supported. The firs t assumption regards Soviet perceptions of
increased U.S. economic and m ilita ry  involvement w ith  Iran as being
counter to the national interest o f the U.S.S.R. For many years the
2
Soviets promoted the concept o f "cap ita lis tic  encirclement," as the 
jus tifica tion  fo r any actions deemed necessary to insure security.
Following World War II, the Soviet concept o f cap ita lis tic  encirclement 
was o ffic ia lly  adopted as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy under the
O
tutelage of George F. Kennan's famous theory o f "containm ent." The 
manifestation of this policy in Iran was o f particu lar importance to the 
Soviet Union during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. The 
Soviet Union shares a 1250-mile border w ith Iran. In 1972 the U.S. 
substantially increased the number of m ilita ry  advisors and technicians 
in Iran and provided the Shah w ith  access to some o f the most 
sophisticated technology in the U.S. m ilita ry  arsenal. M ilita ry  
assistance and sales increased from  approximately 1.8 b illion dollars in 
the two decades from  1950-1970, to over 12.1 b illion  dollars in the 
fo llow ing six years.^ M ilita ry  sales continued v irtu a lly  unabated under 
the Carter adm inistration un til the Shah's overthrow in the 1979 Islamic 
revolution. Soviet policy makers were concerned w ith  the massive Iranian
2
A lvin Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy o f the Soviet Union (New 
York: Random House, 1966), pp. 11-14.
^George F. Kennan, "X ," Foreign A ffa irs , 54 (July 1947): 566-582.
^Barry Rubin, Paved w ith  Good Intentions: The American Experience 
and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 128.
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m ilita ry  build-up on the ir southern fron tie r, and more im portantly w ith 
the strategic role which Iran held fo r the United States in the East-West 
power struggle. Iran had made numerous policy overtures toward 
Afghanistan in the 1970s which, i f  implemented, could have changed the 
balance of power in the region by aligning Afghanistan w ith the pro- 
Western Shah.
The second major assumption stresses the importance o f ideological 
commitments as prescribed under the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine, 
which w ill be thoroughly discussed in chapter four, was formulated 
fo llow ing the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia in 1968. It prescribes 
the principle that once a communist regime is in power it  must remain in 
power, and i t  is the duty of the Soviet Union to preserve the existence 
o f any communist regime which is threatened. When the communists seized 
power in Afghanistan in A pril o f 1978, Afghanistan autom atically came 
under the protective umbrella o f the Brezhnev Doctrine.®
The th ird  major assumption is based upon h istoric Soviet border 
xenophobia. Border xenophobia was enhanced by the Islamic revolution in 
Iran and its potentia l fo r expanding into Afghanistan as well as Muslim 
regions in the Soviet Central Asia. Russian history is a history of 
invasions -  invasion by Russia into neighboring regions, and invasions of 
Russia by its enemies. The Soviets have inherited the Russian trad ition  
o f border paranoia, and view instab ility  on the ir borders as a threat to 
Soviet security. Internal disorders in Iran were seen as the major 
source of ins tab ility  in 1979. When the Shah o f Iran was overthrown in 
1979 Soviet border xenophobia manifested itse lf in two forms: F irs t,
there was the possibility that the United States would intervene on
®Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 135
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behalf o f the Shah, and the Soviet Union would have an additional U.S. 
m ilita ry  presence on its southern border to counter. Second, the 
possible spread o f Islamic nationalism into Central Asia. The Afghan 
rebels attem pting to overthrow the fledgling communist regime in Kabul 
viewed the Soviets as the major cause of the ir problems. I f  the Moslems 
in Afghanistan were able to fo llow  Khomeini's lead in Iran, the danger of 
Islamic unrest spreading to the Soviet Union was a potential problem to 
internal Soviet security.
The Soviet Union is presently undergoing major demographic changes 
which include a growth rate in the Moslem population 2.5 times that o f 
the national average. I f  present trends continue, i t  is projected that 
by the year 2000 Moslems w ill constitute 25% o f a ll Soviet citizens, 
compared to 17% at the present time. In view o f the fac t that the six 
Soviet Republics along the U.S.S.R.'s southern tie r  bordering Iran,
7
Afghanistan and China are presently home to over 45 m illion Moslems, 
Soviet planners could not ignore the potential threat to internal Soviet 
security posed by an additional revolution-oriented, anti-Soviet, Islamic 
theocracy on its fron tie r.
Soviets and Afghans have maintained basically stable relations over 
the years. The review o f how these relations have progressed, and what 
policies the Soviet Union has pursued in Afghanistan should reveal the 
magnitude o f Soviet plans aimed at the assimilation o f Afghanistan into 
its  contiguous sphere o f domination. We can never rea lly  know the 
absolute tru th  about why the Soviets decided to  invade Afghanistan, but a
6Ibid., p. 134.
n
Rosemarie Crisostomo, "Muslims o f the Soviet Union" Current 
H istory, 81 (October 1982): 327.
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review o f history should help to deliniate those theories which are based 
in fac t from  those based in rhetoric.
Chapter n
Afghanistan in World A ffa irs  Through 1919
Prior to the eighteenth century, Afghanistan did not exist as a 
definable nation. Po litica l consolidation into a viable nation-state 
occurred, into what we now know as "Afghanistan,” w ith the advent of 
British, and Russian imperialism. Afghanistan has been periodically 
subjected to numerous invasions, migrations and sh ifts in po litica l 
control. These events added to the varie ty o f communities and 
cultures, in the form  of various trib a l groups, but rarely did the 
region experience po litica l, economic or cu ltura l u n ity .*
The lis t o f invaders and conquerors who have influenced 
Afghanistan's past reads like a " Who's Who in the H istory o f Asian 
Aggression." The Indo-Aryans are the f irs t recorded people to have 
invaded the area, probably before the sixteenth century B.C. They were 
followed by the Persians, Greeks, Kushans, Huns, Turks, Mongols, again 
the Turks, again the Persians, and fin a lly  the B ritish and Russians.
U n til the nineteenth century Afghanistan was o f l i t t le  concern to 
the major po litica l powers in the Western world. When B ritish  rule
^Richard S. Newell, The Politics o f Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), p. 34.
The Turks are p rim arily  responsible fo r introducing Islam into 
the region. Their most s ign ificant accomplishment was the creation of 
the Muslim state o f Ghazni in 961 A.D. Under the leadership o f the 
Sultan Mahumud, Ghazni became the center o f an empire which dominated 
most o f centra l and western Asia and northern India fo r the next 300 years.
^Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan, pp. 35-38.
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expanded northward through India, the East India Company, acting as 
Britain 's representative in Asia, signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809 
w ith  Shah Shuja, the "King o f Caubul."4 However, Shah Shuja's control o f 
fghanistan was lim ited  and over the next two decades po litica l anarchy 
reigned in Afghanistan. Warring triba l factions, dominated by the Sikhs 
o f northern India, struggled fo r control in the early 1800s. Shah Shuja 
fled to Lahore in 1813 and remained under B ritish protection un til Dost 
Mohammad Khan consolidated Afghan triba l power in 1836. Dost Mohammad 
sought British approval of his new position as Am ir and appealed for 
British aid against Persia.^
The British denied the request on the grounds that Dost Mohammad had
previously sought aid from  the Russians. The B ritish were wary of the
independent-minded Afghan Am ir and went so fa r  as to replace him by force
o f arms w ith  the exiled Shah Shuja. B ritish occupation aroused a
country-wide trib a l revo lt which became known as the F irs t Anglo-Afghan 
£
War (1838-1842). Shah Shuja was eventually driven from  the throne and 
the British expedition which placed him there was defeated en tire ly  by
r j
Dost Muhammad's forces.
4Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan (New Haven: H raf Press, 1962), p. 175.
5Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1973), pp. 367-369.
®Wilber, Afghanistan, p. 175.
rj
This War is one o f the most hum ilia ting defeats in B ritish m ilita ry  
history. Most accounts by European historians report tha t o f over 4500 
figh ting  men and 12,000 camp followers who started the expedition, ONE 
person (the low ly but lucky assistant surgeon Dr. W illiam Brydon) made i t  
back to British controlled te rr ito ry  alive. These accounts are only 
pa rtia lly  correct. Actua lly , 86 B ritish o ffice rs  and over 2000 camp 
followers remained in Afghanistan as hostages, prisoners o f war, or 
refugees, and were la te r liberated by the B ritish  punitive expedition in 
September 1842. Nonetheless, Dr. Brydon was the only European to survive 
the entire length o f the orig inal expedition, and the magnitude o f the
12
In the autumn o f 1842 a British punitive expedition entered and 
destroyed Kabul and laid waste to other c ities upon leaving the country, 
but Afghanistan remained under Dost Muhammad's contro l and the fiasco of 
the war caused the fa ll o f Lord Melbourne's government in England.8 
Anglo-Russian r iva lry  in Asia and Europe increased, and Afghanistan was 
the key geographic playing fie ld  o f what has since become commonly known 
of as "The Great Game." The main concern o f Afghan leaders over the 
next half-century was to prevent their country from  being swallowed up 
either by the Russian Bear or the British Lion.
During the nineteenth century the zenith o f im peria l expansion 
occured fo r Tsarist Russia. Russia's foreign policy a t this time focused 
on the subjugation and annexation o f vast reaches o f te rr ito ry  in the 
East and South. As the British pursued the ir colonial endeavours in 
India, the Russians slowly moved south toward Afghanistan through Central 
Asia. The Russians viewed the British invasion o f Afghanistan (1838- 
1842) as a d irec t th reat to the ir interests. In response, the Russians 
continued to conquer and occupy the independent Asian Khanates, or reduce 
them to po litica l and economic control through treaties and trade. By 
1870, Russian influence extended to the banks o f the Amu Darya r iv e r.8
The B ritish and the Russians attempted to  se ttle  the ir differences 
over Afghanistan by dip lom atic means. The result was a number o f 
treaties and agreements which are worthy o f note. The firs t such 
agreement was the Granville-Gorchakoff Agreement o f 1873. This agreement
British defeat remains unscathed.
O
°Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan; A Study in 
the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy (Lexington: Lexington Books,
1986), p. 6.
Q
Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 404.
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established the Amu Darya river as the southern boundary o f the Russian 
sphere o f influence. Afghanistan was to be regarded as a 
de facto neutral zone between the B ritish and Russian empires. Lord 
Granville and Prince Gorchakoff reached agreement w ithout the input or 
support o f the Afghan Am ir Sher A li, a fac to r adding to the general 
confusion, distrust, and lack o f communication which eventually resulted 
in Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880).1®
Sher A li eyed the southern-moving Russian forces w ith  suspicion and 
apprehension. In 1873 he asked fo r a defin ite  British commitment to aid 
Afghanistan in case of Russian aggression. In July, an Afghan delegation 
met w ith  British representatives who advised the Afghans not to worry 
about Russian maneuvering because the Russians had agreed to honor the 
Amu Darya as the northern boundary o f Afghanistan. Sher A li viewed the 
British position w ith  distrust, and Anglo-Afghan relations became 
strained. **
In 1874, Benjamin Disraeli became Prime M inister o f Great B rita in .
Disraeli changed the character o f B ritish foreign policy toward Russia.
He implimented what had been known as the "Forward Policy." This policy
active ly sought to blunt Russian expansionism toward Indja w ith  a hands-
19on approach to Afghan affa irs . B ritish fears o f Russian encroachment 
in South Asia were often fueled by newspaper articles which did l i t t le  to
W illiam Habberton, "Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan 
(1837-1907)," University o f Illino is Studies in the Social Sciences, 21 
(1937): 32-34.
**  Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 408.
1 <y
W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study o f P o litica l Developments 
in Central and South Asia, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press,
1953), pp. 137-139.
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allay the ir suspicion. An a rtic le  appearing in the Moscow Gazette o f
July 19, 1878, re flects the Russian attitude a t the time:
The tim e has arrived fo r Russia to establish her influence over the whole
o f Central Asia, and this is a ll the more easy as the Ruler o f
Afghanistan is not on good terms w ith England -  our foe in Central Asia. 
The concentration of our influence on the fron tie rs o f the te rr ito ry  of
the Empress o f India would be a natural answer to the English seizure of
Cyprus and a ll the approaches to India.,..In Asia there are 
two po litica l Powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably 
come into collision...
In the summer of 1878 an event occurred which instigated the Second. 
Anglo-Afghan War. The Russians sent a dip lom atic mission to Kabul 
w ithout receiving prior permission from Sher A li. The B ritish demanded 
an explanation and in return sent the ir own delegation which was denied 
permission to enter Afghanistan. The B ritish considered Sher Ali's 
action as a national insult and decided to invade Afghanistan. Thus 
began the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Sher A li died of illness in early 
1879, and his son Yaqub Khan was forced to sign the Treaty o f Gandamak 
w ith the British. The major feature o f this trea ty  handed contro l o f 
Afghan foreign policy over to the British and subjected Afghanistan to 
internal British supervision.14 The Afghans soon revolted in protest 
over B ritish intervention and murdered the British envoy, Sir Louis 
Cavagnari, in July 1879. The B ritish w ithdrew from  Afghanistan, and in 
the shadow of the F irs t Anglo-Afghan war, lost a sizable force during 
the ir re tre a t .^  In retrospect, i t  is clear tha t in both wars the 
Russians never posed a s ign ificant threat to India, but that the 
suspicion and intrigue which characterized Great-Game relations magnified
1:1 C ited in Habberton, "Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning 
Afghanistan," pp. 42-43.
14Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 408-409.
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British fears o f Russian motives and resulted in the deaths of thousands
of British and tens o f thousands of Afghans.16
To the north, the Russians continued the ir policy o f expansion into
Central Asia. In 1881 Khiva was annexed, in 1884 Merv, and in 1885
Afghan and Russian troops fought over control o f an oasis 100 miles south
o f Merv in what is known as the "Panjdeh Incident". The British, fearing
that the u ltim ate  Russian goal was to seize the Afghan c ity  of Herat,
mobilized its forces in India. Only a successful a rb itra tion  by Denmark
prevented war and, in 1887, the Anglo-Russian Agreement o f St. Petersburg 
1 7was signed. The Russians agreed to make no fu rther te rr ito r ia l 
advances southward, and additional Anglo-Russian co n flic t was avoided 
un til 1895 when a sim ilar agreement was signed which fu rthe r defined
1 Q
Afghan borders.
The most s ign ificant diplomatic event a ffecting  the long-term
fortunes o f Afghanistan was the agreement a ffix ing  the Durand Line as the
1 9border between Afghanistan and the northern te rr ito ry  o f British India.
The problem w ith  the Durand Line is typ ica l of many such demarcations, 
which were created during the British colonial period and continue to 
plague form er B ritish colonies around the world. The border was drawn 
fo r reasons o f adm inistrative convenience and was based on a "m arket-
16 Arnold F letcher, Afghanistan: Highway o f Conquest, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 141.
17 Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan, p. 7.
16Wilber, Afghanistan, pp. 176-177.
19 This agreement is worthy o f some detailed explanation considering 
the numerous disputes i t  has caused throughout the years including 
Afghan-Pakistan tension resulting in Afghanistan's alignment w ith the 
U.S.S.R in 1953. I t  remains one o f the major stumbling blocks a t the 
Geneva Peace talks regarding the Soviet w ithdrawal from  Afghanistan and 
is problem which w ill not disappear even i f  the Soviets depart.
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watershed." Those people trading to the north at the tim e of Durand's
survey were regarded as under Afghan control, those trading south would
be under British jurisd iction. Subsequently, the indigenous tr ib a l
groups which populated the region were divided by the a rb itra ry  decision
of British surveyors.
In 1893, the British coerced the Afghan Am ir Abdur Rahman into
agreeing to the Durand line which has served as the border ever since.
It  has been debated whether or not the fina l agreement stipulates actual
boundary demarcations, or merely defines the respective spheres of
influence of the British government and the Afghan Am ir. The Durand Line
was designed to bring po litica l s ta b ility  to  the fro n tie r region but in
fac t has proven to be p o litica lly  destabilizing as well as geographically
20and stra teg ically unstable. This agreement is s t i l l  hotly debated by 
Afghans and Pakistanis in the 1980s and remains one o f the major points 
o f tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The la tte r part o f the nineteenth century saw the end o f the Great- 
Game between Great B rita in  and Russia. Both the B ritish and the Russians 
feared a reinvigorated Germany and turned the ir attentions away from 
Afghanistan. Russia was subdued a fte r its defeat in the Russo-Japanese 
War o f 1904-05 and occupied in te rna lly  w ith  the 1905 Revolution. In 
1905, the new Afghan A m ir, Habibullah, offered the B ritish contro l over 
Afghan foreign relations in return fo r  a subsidy o f 18 lakhs o f rupees a 
year (160,000 British pounds) and access to m ilita ry  supplies through 
India.2*
2®Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 426-428. 
21Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 179.
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The fina l major agreement o f the Great-Game period was the Anglo- 
Russian Convention o f 1907. This agreement had four important 
provisions:
1. Persia was divided into two zones of influence: Russian in the north 
and British in the east and south, thus protecting the western fron tie r 
o f Afghanistan from  Russian penetration.
2. B rita in  and Russia recognized China's contro l o f T ibet and agreed not 
to in terfere  in this area.
3. Russia agreed tha t Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of 
influence and agreed to confer d irec tly  w ith the British on matters 
relating to Afghan-Russian a ffa irs.
4. Brita in  was not to occupy or annex any part o f Afghanistan, nor 
in terfere  in any way in the internal a ffa irs o f Afghanistan.
A fina l a rtic le  stated that the Afghan A m ir must agree to the
Convention in order to make i t  legal and binding. Habibullah, who was
not consulted during deliberations, declared the Convention illegal. The
Am ir, bolstered by the Russian defeat at the hands o f the Japanese,
wanted the British to  jo in  him in an attack on Russian Turkestan to
recover lands lost to the Russians in the 1880s. The British refused,
along w ith  the Russians, in ignoring Habibullah's protests, and declared
the Convention legal.
In early 1912, Russian activ ities  precip itated a war scare in
Afghanistan when i t  was reported that attem pts were being made to build a
bridge across the Amu Darya R iver. The Russians were reportedly
frustrated by the minor benefits resulting from  the 1907 Convention and
blamed the B ritish fo r influencing the Afghan Am ir to regard Russian
overtures as untrustworthy. Russia also requested British aid in
extracting Russians held in Afghan prisons, basing the ir request on
90
Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 433.
23Ibid., pp. 434-435.
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A rtic le  III of the Convention. The British were reluctant to help foster
any sort o f Afghan-Russian reproachment and refused to pressure the Am ir.
Secret negotiations between Russia and Brita in  took place in which the
Russians were w illing  to make concessions in regional matters, such as
disputes over T ibet, in return fo r more influence in Afghanistan. These
negotiations continued u n til the outbreak o f World War I, at which tim e
24they were term inated.
During World War I, Afghanistan declared and maintained a s tr ic t 
neutra lity, despite German and Turkish attempts to draw it  to the ir side 
and to use Afghanistan as an instrument to undermine Russian and British 
influence in the region. Afghanistan nonetheless signed a trea ty  of 
friendship w ith  Germany in January, 1916. This treaty did not a lte r 
Afghanistan's position o f neutra lity , but it  marked the end o f the 
country's policy o f isolationism and the beginning o f a permanent 
presence o f German traders, diplomats and m ilita ry  personnel in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, i t  fueled the fe rvor o f Afghan nationalist- 
modernists who were convinced that Afghanistan would have to sever its 
ties w ith Great Brita in before any modernization programs could take
tyc
hold. Habibullah refused to be swayed from  his policy o f neutra lity
and pursued the "usual Afghan game o f positive neutra lity  -  waiting to
26see which side would win, and be prepared fo r any outcome."
^L u d w ig  W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A D iplom atic H istory 
(Berkeley: University o f C aliforn ia  Press, 1967), p. 82.
^ A lf r e d  L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institu te  fo r Public Policy Research,
1981), p. 7.
26 Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 434.
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A t the war's end, Habibullah tried to parlay his policy of
neutra lity  into international recognition of Afghanistan's independent
status a t the Paris Peace Conference. Brita in  and India refused,
granting only an increase in the Amir's annual subsidy. On February 20,
1919, an unknown assailant killed the Am ir, bringing to power his son
Amanullah, whose firs t task was to restore the independence of
Afghanistan -  a task which would bring him into close contact w ith  the
27newly victorious Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia. Amanulluh, in an attem pt 
to consolidate his own position and gain Afghanistan's independence, 
launched the Third Anglo-Afghan War in May, 1919. This short-lived 
a ffa ir was successful fo r the Afghans, and in August 1919 the Treaty of 
Rawalpindi was signed between the war-weary British and the Afghan Am ir.
This trea ty  le f t  Afghanistan free to conduct its own foreign a ffa irs, and
28marks the date o f Afghan independence from  British po litica l control.
In reviewing Afghan history through 1919, three im portant themes
emerge in regard to foreign affa irs. The f irs t  theme stresses the
importance o f Afghanistan geopolitica lly. Throughout history Afghanistan
has been at the crossroads o f a ll the major invasion routes in Asia and
the sub-continent. The prime concern o f Afghan leaders in relations w ith
foreign powers has been to keep them at arm's length, preventing any
country from  becoming too in fluentia l in Afghan affa irs , and to play them
29against each other to its own advantage. To a certain extent, the 
Afghans were successful in the nineteenth century despite the 
overwhelming power o f both the B ritish and Russian Empires. The British
27 Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan, pp. 7-8.
28Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 443; Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923, p. 135. 
28Wilber, Afghanistan, p. 174.
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and Russians would have liked to see Afghanistan remain as a neutral 
buffer-sta te  separating their respective spheres of influence, but as a 
result o f continued distrust o f each other's motives, both continued to 
in terfere  w ith  Afghan affa irs. This facto r leads to the second important 
theme -  the nature of British and Russian im peria listic expansionism and 
"Great-Game" politics.
British and Russian imperialism, by the ir very nature, attempted to 
control and explo it as much te rr ito ry  as possible. The B ritish expanded 
into areas o f the globe where they could project naval dominance and 
extend po litica l control. The Russians were not equipped to challenge 
the Royal Navy dominance and concentrated the ir expansion into contiguous 
land areas. Both the British and Russians had no regard fo r the wishes 
o f Afghanistan's rulers, thus Afghanistan was one o f many unwilling pawns 
caught in the Anglo-Russian power struggle. The many Anglo-Russian 
diplom atic agreements regarding Afghanistan clearly show tha t the most 
important factors influencing Afghan a ffa irs  were external events taking 
place in London and Moscow.
The th ird , and possibly most important fac to r, is the tenacity and 
w ill o f Afghans to  resist foreign intervention. Although British and 
Russian diplomats in the eighteenth century continually haggled over who 
would contro l Afghanistan, the question remains as to what degree these 
discussions and decisions actually related to rea lities w ith in  
Afghanistan. The Afghans continually negotiated out o f respect fo r 
B ritish power or fea r o f Russian domination, but when the Afghans decided 
to resist, the B ritish were forced to pay a high price. On three 
occasions the B ritish and Afghans fought wars, and on a ll three occasions 
strong arguments can be made that the Afghans emerged victorious. The
21
British were able to control Afghanistan only if  they did so from the 
safety o f India. Once the troops were sent in, the Afghans showed l it t le  
respect fo r the power o f the British Empire, and were more than w illing  
to fig h t, rather than be intim idated or subdued.
For the ir part, the Russians have exhibited great interest in the 
po litica l fortunes of Afghanistan. Despite numerous perceived threats to 
Afghanistan's te rr ito r ia l in teg rity  by Russian aggression, and Russian 
expansionism into Central Asia, the fac t remains that Tsarist Russia did 
not break its promise to regard Afghanistan as outside o f its  sphere of 
influence. In general, Russia's involvement in Afghanistan resulted more 
from  Anglo-Russian com petition in other regions of the world than from  
d irect Russian involvement south o f the Amu Darya River. The Russians 
were w illing  to consolidate the ir empire w ithout a ttem pting to annex 
Afghanistan. Why they chose to make this decision is a m atter of 
speculation.
Chapter m
Soviet Foreign Policy Pronouncements,Treaties, and 
Diplomatic Relations with Afghanistan (1919-1945)
Ideological Foundations
Soviet policy makers generally attempt to present new policies as 
logical by-products of the adaptation of Marxist-Leninist thought to 
contemporary circumstances. Failure to base soundly policies within 
Marxist ideology produces criticism and dismissal when such policies 
result in failure. The theoretical basis of Soviet foreign policy can 
be traced back to the early works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The first 
major document in any evaluation of Soviet ideology is usually the 
Communist Manifesto. A careful reading of the Communist Manifesto 
reveals the fact that Marx and Engels expected revolutions to take 
place in advanced industrial countries as a consequence of the 
internal breakdown of the economic and political system. As to the 
specific foreign policies a socialist country might pursue, Marx and 
Engels have little  to say.* However, this lack of specifics does not 
detract from the influence that the Communist Manifesto had on early 
Soviet foreign policy.
Marx viewed history as passing through successive epochs of social 
development: primitive-communist, slave, feudal, capitalist, and 
socialist. The Communist Manifesto was targeted to influence the
*Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet 
Foreign Policy 1917-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 13.
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working-class during the cap ita lis t phase o f development. Marx and 
Engels were anxious to see the development o f capitalism and the 
establishment of a bourgeois society in order fo r a socialist revolution 
to occur. The Manifesto was a document which called fo r revolution by 
the p ro le taria t in a ll countries. "In short, the Communists everywhere 
support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and 
po litica l order o f things...WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!"2
Marx and Engels called fo r revolution in a ll countries, but were 
restricted by the ir be lie f tha t societies must pass through each 
successive phase of development before reaching the stage o f communist 
utopia. The legacy which they le f t  to the ir followers was that of 
revolution. Karl Marx provided many o f the fundamental principles of 
Soviet ideology, but i t  was Lenin who adapted Marxist thought to the 
international arena and gave M arxist theory contemporary va lid ity .
Lenin insisted that "Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action," and 
tha t i t  must be adapted to changing conditions.4 Thus, he was able to 
explain how sem i-feudalistic Russia, which had developed only the 
rudimentary characteristics o f capitalism , was able to undergo a 
proletarian revolution. The Bolsheviks would simply skip the tedious and 
painful stage o f capitalism and create a socialistic society. Lenin's 
foreign policy exhibited the influence o f the Communist Manifesto in that 
i t  called fo r  world-wide revolution. Lenin focused his foreign policy on
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 120-121.
Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy o f the Soviet Union, 
pp. 6-7.
4R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice o f Communism: An 
Introduction (New York: The M acm illian Co., 1957), p. 7.
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the battle  against imperialism, and promoted uprisings in a ll nations 
which were dominated by cap ita lis tic  colonial powers. One of his most 
important works, f irs t published in 1916, was entitled "Imperialism: the 
Highest Stage o f Capitalism ." In this work Lenin attempts to extend the 
concept of the class struggle to the international arena, and to show 
that World War I was a result of the greed characterizing cap ita lis tic 
financial com petition. The most important element in this work regarding 
foreign policy hinges upon Lenin's view o f colonialism and the 
" ine v ita b ility " o f war:
The epoch o f modern capitalism shows us that certa in  relations are 
established among combines of capitalists based on the economic division 
o f the world; paralle l w ith  these relation, and in connection with them, 
certa in relations are established among po litica l alliances, among 
states, on the basis of the te rr ito r ia l division o f the world, of 
struggle fo r colonies, and o f the struggle fo r economic te rrito ry ...
The more capitalism  develops, the stronger the need fo r raw 
materials is fe lt ,  the more b itte r com petition and the hunt fo r raw 
materials become throughout the world, the more desperate the struggle 
fo r the acquisition o f colonies becomes...
Under capitalism , there can be no other conceivable basis fo r 
partition  of spheres of influence, of interests, o f colonies, etc., than 
a calculation o f the strength o f participants....Therefore, "in te r­
im peria list" or "u ltra -im pe ria lis t" alliances, given the rea lities of 
capitalism... no m atter what form they take, whether o f one im peria list 
coalition against another or of a general alliance embracing all the 
im peria list powers, are inevitably only "breathing spells" between wars. 
Peaceful alliances prepare the ground fo r wars, and in the ir turn grow 
out o f wars; one is the condition o f the other, giving rise to 
alternating forms o f peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on one and the 
same basis, namely, tha t o f im perialist connections and relations between 
world economics and world politics.
V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism : The Highest Stage o f Capitalism," 
Sochinenia, 2nd. ed. (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1929) vol. 19, pp. 
120-175, cited by A lv in  Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy o f the Soviet 
Union (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 17-21 (emphasis mine).
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This document is im portant in tha t it  established the Soviet view 
that imperialism is the major evil to be contended w ith in the world. 
Capitalism, as a social system, must be defeated because by its  very 
nature it  leads to wars o f competition. Thus, the appeal of socialism is 
made stronger by the message that only through socialism can world peace 
be obtained. The major focus of the revolutionary struggle would attack 
imperialism at its weakest link -  in the colonies. The capitalists 
relied on the ir overseas possessions to  survive, and Marxist ideology was 
most appealing to the down-trodden masses in these countries. The best 
way to create havoc in Great B rita in, fo r instance, was to destabilize 
the B ritish rule in India.
Following the successful October Revolution o f 1917, which brought 
them to  power in Russia, Bolshevik policies were centered around three 
issues: the C iv il War, foreign intervention and the attem pt to export 
revolution. The years 1918-1921 were known as the period o f "War
C
Communism." The f irs t foreign policy pronouncement o f the new 
government was entitled the "Decree o f Peace" which declared the 
Bolsheviks' intentions to take Russia out of World War I. Shortly 
thereafter the Soviets and Germans concluded the Treaty of Brest-L itovsk 
which o ffic ia lly  removed Russia from  the war. The allies (France, Great 
B rita in , United States, Japan) responded w ith  intervention on behalf of 
the White Russian armies which were contesting the Bolshevik's claim  to 
power fo llow ing the ouster o f the short lived Provisional Government.
Soviet foreign policy during the period o f "War Communism" is best 
described by the Commissar o f Foreign A ffa irs , Georgi Chicherin:
a
Rubinstien, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, p. 51.
^Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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During the period fo llow ing the conclusion of the Brest treaty, 
Russia's foreign policy has gone along d iffe ren t line from  those followed 
in the f irs t  months a fte r the October Revolution. A t the end o f 1917 and 
the beginning of 1918 the basic feature of our foreign policy was the 
revolutionary offensive... its strongly agitational offensives were 
calculated to s tir  up the revolutionary p ro le ta ria t of a ll countries to 
an international revolutionary struggle against imperialism, against the 
capita list system.
When the fa ilure of any immediate support from  the p ro le ta ria t of 
other countries led to the defeat o f the revolutionary Russian 
forces...the setting of Soviet Russia's foreign policy changed radically.
For the last four months i t  has been compelled to pursue the aim of 
pushing o ff  and postponing the dangers threatening it  from  all sides, 
try ing to gain as much tim e as possible, both in order to gain more time 
fo r the new forms o f po litica l and social relationships established by 
the Soviet Government to take root among the popular masses of Russia, 
and to tie  them more closely to the Soviet programme.
...(T)he revolutionary proletarian movement, which is growing 
everywhere, has not yet reached the point o f explosion, and therefore the 
report we have to give is a grave report, a report on our retreats, a 
report o f great sacrifices made in order to  give Russia the opportunity 
o f recuperating, or organizing its forces, and awaiting the moment when 
the pro le ta ria t o f other countries w ill help us to complete the socialist 
revolution we began in October...
By November, 1920 the last o f the White Russian armies and foreign 
forces had been defeated. Lenin outlined the essentials o f Soviet policy 
in two speeches presented in December 1920. He reaffirm ed his be lie f in 
the inev itab ility  o f world revolution and the triumph o f communism, but 
proposed a period o f accommodation w ith  the cap ita lis t world in order to 
rebuild the Russian economy and implement internal reforms. Soviet 
foreign policy would focus on preservation o f the Soviet Union, the 
improvement o f international connections, and the spread of communism 
through the activ ities  of the COMINTERN (discussed in chapter 6).®
O
"Report on Soviet Foreign Policy to  the F ifth  All-Russian Congress 
of Soviets," Soviet Documents o f Foreign Policy, 1917-1924, ed. Jane 
Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 83-85.
q
Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, pp. 54-55.
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Early Soviet-Afghan Relations
The most important Soviet policies a ffecting  early relations w ith 
Afghanistan centered upon the Bolshevik a ttitude toward the Moslems of 
Central Asia. The Bolshevik Revolution had released a number o f internal 
nationalistic forces in Central Asia that had been repressed under the 
Tzarist regime. While attem pting to consolidate power in Russia, the 
Bolsheviks faced the urgent demands and aspirations o f Moslems, who 
formed an important sector of the form er Tzarist empire. A t the tim e o f 
the 1917 revolution the entire fringe o f the Russian empire, from  Outer 
Mongolia to Crimea, was peopled by approximately th ir ty  m illion Moslems, 
a number which constituted about 14% of the Russian population.1® Most 
of these areas had been annexed by the Great Russians, and resentment ran 
deep among Moslem subjects.
Bolshevik policy was designed to pacify Moslems w ith  promises of 
independence or autonomy un til the Soviets were able to  fin ish dealing 
with other problems involved w ith  the c iv il war. Moslem nationalistic 
separatism would then be crushed by a combination o f diplomatic 
maneuvering and ou trigh t force. Lenin was aware o f the potential fo r 
using the nationality issue in helping to consolidate the Bolshevik 
position, as well as the need to pacify Moslem nationalists w ith  promises 
o f autonomy. The Soviets organized a Commissariat fo r Nationalities 
headed by Joseph Stalin. In December, 1917 Lenin and Stalin issued a 
jo in t le tte r  entitled "To A ll the Toiling Moslems o f Russia and the 
East," which was used to  gain Muslim sympathy to the Bolshevik cause:
10Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 223-224.
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Comrades! Brothers!
Great events are taking place in Russia! An end is drawing near to 
the murderous war, started by the bargaining o f the foreign powers. The 
rule of the plunderers who explo it the peoples of the world is 
to tte ring ... Revolutionary councils of workers', soldiers', and peasants' 
deputies are scattered over the whole of Russia. Power in the country is 
in the hands o f the people...
The empire o f cap ita lis t plunder and violence is fa lling  in ruins.
The ground is slipping from under the fee t of the im peria list 
robbers...In the face o f these great events, we turn to you, to iling  and 
disinherited Moslems of Russia and the East...Henceforward your beliefs 
and customs, your national and cu ltu ra l institu tions, are declared free 
and inviolable! Build your national life  free ly  and w ithout hinderance.
It is your righ t. Know that your rights, like those of a ll the peoples 
of Russia, w ill be protected by the might of the revolution, by the 
Councils of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasant' Deputies...
Moslems of Russia!
Moslems of the East!
We look to you fo r sympathy and support in work o f regenerating the 
world.
This document leaves l it t le  doubt regarding the Bolshevik attem pt to 
incite  revolution in the Moslem populated areas of Russia, the East, and 
India. Active interest in the East fa ltered under the impact o f more 
pressing concerns during the period o f "War Communism," but the knowledge 
o f the importance o f these areas did not. O f a ll the Bolshevik leaders, 
only Stalin remained continually involved in Asian affa irs.
Stalin managed to n u llify  the influence o f the greater part o f the 
Moslem leadership. He did so by gathering libera l inte llectuals under 
his bureaucratic contro l in Moscow. These leaders were promised power 
over a ll policies regarding Soviet Moslems. Most of these Moslem leaders 
were members o f a group which sought to modernize Moslem communities and 
saw an alliance w ith  communism as compatible w ith libera l Islamic
"Appeal o f the Council o f People's Commissars to the Moslems of 
Russian and the East." Soviet Documents o f Foreign Policy, 1917-1924, pp. 
15-17 (emphasis mine).
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thought. They had emerged largely from the reform  movement known as 
Jadists.12
In the end, none o f the promised freedoms was granted, and all 
attempts to gain autonomy were fo rce fu lly  repressed. Gradual 
Russification in Moslem areas was implemented un til the strong cries of 
Islamic nationalism faded into the past.
Despite reports o f Soviet m istreatment of Moslems in Soviet Central 
Asia, the Afghan King, Amanullah Khan, established relations w ith  the new 
Soviet government shortly a fte r gaining the Afghan throne in 1919. 
Ammanullah was impressed by the revolutionary nature o f the Soviet regime 
and was encouraged by Soviet promises o f Moslem autonomy.
Amanullah's Foreign Relations
As discussed in chapter two, Amanullah came into power fo llow ing the 
assassination o f his fa ther Habibullah in February, 1919. A fte r some 
in itia l confusion and indecision, Amanullah's foreign policy followed 
three d istinct paths: he established diplomatic relations w ith  Soviet 
Russia, gradually normalized Afghanistan's relations w ith  B rita in , and 
strove fo r so lidarity  w ith in  the Moslem world. More im portantly,
Afghanistan's new freedom, resulting from  the recent upheavals in Russia 
and the British re trea t from  Afghanistan fo llow ing the Third Anglo- 
Afghan War, allowed him to check both great powers by playing one against 
the other. ̂
Even before Afghanistan had gained its independence, Amanullah had 
communicated his desire to establish w ith Russia "permanent and friendly
12Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929, pp. 224-225.
1 1Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence o f Modern Afghanistan: Politics of 
Reform and Modernization 1880-1946 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1969), p. 231.
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relations." On A p ril 17, 1919, two le tte rs were sent to Moscow.
Amanullah stressed the fac t that Afghanistan was free and independent, 
and pointed out that the Afghan "psychology had always contained in it  
ideas of equality, humanity and lib e rty ."14
Lenin replied on May 27, 1919, congratulating the King and the 
Afghan people fo r the ir heroic defence of libe rty , and accepting the 
proposal to establish diplomatic relations. The Soviets saw great 
possibilities in an alliance w ith Afghanistan against Great B rita in , 
especially in view of Afghanistan's strategic position as the crossroad 
to Asia and the possibilities o f using Afghanistan as a base fo r 
fomenting revolution in India. Lenin encouraged Amanullah to continue 
pursuing Pan-Islamism as a goal. In a le tte r to the Afghan ru le r dated 
November 27, 1919, Lenin wrote that Afghanistan was the only independent 
Muslim state in the world, and tha t fa te  had set before the Afghan people 
the great h istoric task o f leading a ll the Mohammendan peoples to 
freedom.15
The two countries finalized a trea ty  o f friendship in 1921. This 
treaty called fo r the establishment o f regular diplomatic relations and 
respect fo r each other's independence (A rtic le  I). The Afghans were 
given free and untaxed transit through Soviet te rr ito ry  o f a ll goods
14Ibid
15Ibid., p. 232. It  is worthy to note this le tte r contains d irect 
contradictions w ith  Lenin's statements directed toward the 2nd Congress 
o f Communist International in 1920. In the th ird  point, o f part 11, of 
his speech regarding the role o f the COMINTERN in more backward states 
and nations, Lenin states, " . . . it  is necessary to combat Pan-Islamism and 
sim ilar trends, which strive  to combine the liberation movement against 
European and American imperialism w ith  the strengthening o f the positions 
o f the Khans, the landlords, the mullahs, e tc." C ited in "Prelim inary 
D ra ft Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions," V.I. Lenin 
Selected Works, 12 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1943) 10:
236 (emphasis mine).
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(A rtic le  6), and were promised financial and m ateria l aid (A rtic le  10).
The disputed areas of Bukhara and Khiva in Soviet Central Asia were
recognized as independent and autonomous regions (A rtic le  8). This
provision was a concession to the Afghans and greatly enhanced
Amanullah's position as a champion of Islamic so lidarity (despite this
agreement both regions remained under Soviet control). For their part,
the Afghans agreed not to enter into m ilita ry  or po litica l agreements
that might be construed as contrary to the interest o f e ither party
(A rtic le  3), and gave the Russians permission to open five  consulates in
Afghanistan in exchange fo r permission to open seven consulates in the
1 fiSoviet Union (A rtic le  4). The trea ty  placed Afghanistan in a much 
stronger bargaining position in its relations w ith  Great B rita in . The 
Afghans would no longer be forced to re ly  on British India as its sole 
conduit fo r trade.
Amanullah's Internal Problems and Soviet 
M ilitary Intervention
Amanullah considered himself a revolutionary, and was one o f many
leaders who attempted to  modernize Afghan society through extensive
reform  measures. Amanullah faced his f irs t internal problems in 1924.
Afghans opposed to his reform  policies rose up in rebellion. The Soviets
came to  Amanullah's rescue w ith warplanes, which bombarded the rebels
into submission. The Soviets also provided Amanullah wih m ilita ry  aid
and established telephone and telegraph lines connecting Kabul w ith  
1 7Moscow.
16|lTreaty Between the RSFSR and Afghanistan Signed in Moscow,” 
Soviet Documents of Foreign Policy, 1917-1924, pp. 233-235.
17‘Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 451.
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In August, 1926 the Soviets and Afghans signed a trea ty  of 
neutra lity  and non-aggression. The most important element o f this 
treaty, which was la ter c ited by the Soviets as jus tifica tion  fo r the ir 
demand that Afghanistan expel a ll German nationals from  Afghan soil, was 
A rtic le  II:
Each of the contracting parties undertakes to re fra in  from  any 
attack on the other, and on its own te rrito ries it  w ill take no steps 
which might in f lic t po litica l or m ilita ry  injury on the other contracting 
party. In particular, each o f the contracting parties undertakes not to 
take part in any alliances or agreements o f a m ilita ry  or po litica l 
character w ith another or several th ird Powers which might be directed 
against the other contracting party, or in any boycott or blockade of a 
financial or economic character directed against the other contracting 
party. Furthermore, should the conduct o f a th ird Power or o f third 
Powers toward one o f the contracting parties be o f in im ica l character, 
the other contracting party undertakes not only to re fra in  from 
supporting such conduct, but is bound on its  own te rr ito ry  to oppose it  
and the hostile designs arising therefrom.
Prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979, Soviet troops moved into
Afghanistan on three separate occasions. The firs t and th ird  Soviet
"invasions" were small-scale m ilita ry  incursions which occurred in 1925
and 1930. Both of these operations were directed against Afghan trib a l
insurgents who made repeated raids across the border into Soviet
te rrito ry , and then fled to the safety o f Afghan te rr ito ry . On both
occasions the Soviets w ithdrew the ir forces a fte r pressure from  the
1 QAfghan and British governments. The second Soviet invasion presented 
the Soviets w ith  a dilemma which p itted national interest against 
ideological consistency.
In response to Amanullah’s social reform  programs, a growing body of 
revolutionaries, consisting o f Islamic fundamentalists and an ti-
"T reaty o f N eu tra lity  and Non-Aggression Between the USSR and 
Afghanistan, and Final Protocol," Soviet Documents o f Foreign Policy,
1925-1932, ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 131.
^Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 12-18.
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government triba l groups, took form in Afghanistan. In January, 1929,
Amanullah was forced to flee Kabul as rebels, led by the bandit Bacha-i-
Saquo ("Son o f the Water Carrier"), invaded and took control o f the c ity .
The Soviets were forced into choosing between the pro-Soviet autocratic
king and the "poor, oppressed masses." The Soviets, doubting that a
peasant revolution could hold power fo r very long in a country that had
been trad itiona lly  ruled by monarchs of the Pushtun tribe, decided i t  was
20in their best national interest to support the King.
Ghulam Nabi, Amanullah's ambassador to the Soviet Union, had 
convinced the Soviet government to aid Amanullah's cause by perm itting 
him to raise a force in Russia equipped w ith  Russian arms and aided by 
Soviet advisors and Soviet Moslems. The theory was that such a move 
would bring about a spontaneous rising in northern Afghanistan in support 
o f Amanullah and Bacha would be overthrown. In other words, the Soviets 
were persuaded to support a Bay o f Pigs type operation. I t  was no more 
successful.21
Amanullah had apparently lost the stomach fo r  revolution. He
abdicated the throne and fled to India. The Soviets withdrew the ir army
in order to  appease the British, who at that tim e were considering the
22re-establishment of d ip lom atic relations w ith  the Soviet Union. A fte r 
a series o f tr ib a l battles one o f King Amanullah's re latives, Nadir Khan,
20Ibid., pp. 13-18.
21Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929, pp. 184-
185.
OO
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 13-14.
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defeated Bacha and regained the throne w ith British aid in October,
1929.23
Despite British alarmists, who had regarded Amanullah's relations
w ith  the Soviets negatively, Afghanistan's foreign policy remained
largely independent o f Russian influence. The Afghan Am ir had insisted
throughout his reign that a ll Russian arms sent to Afghanistan fo r
eventual use in a national liberation movement in India be transported by
the Afghan government, and that a ll Indian revolutionaries be disarmed
upon entering Afghan te rr ito ry . According to Indian communist M.N. Roy,
the Afghans made it  clear that they had no intention o f perm itting  any
Soviet force to enter the ir te rr ito ry  to conduct operations against 
24India. For the ir part, the Soviet's decision to aid Amanullah in 1929 
can be compared w ith  earlier actions in Turkey and Iran. In a ll three 
countries the communist movements were e ither weak or nonexistent, and 
the prospects fo r communist revolutions were correspondingly poor. A ll 
three of these countries were ruled by men who wished to reduce B ritish 
influence in the region, an aim shared by the Bolsheviks. The Soviets 
postponed the goal o f communizing the ir neighbors and made peace w ith  the 
existing regimes. The cause o f world revolution was subordinated to the
OC
national interests o f the Russian state. Soviet policy during the 
early years o f the regime was conditioned not by any sincere regard fo r 
the welfare or independence o f Afghanistan but by the need to suppress 
the nationalistic aspirations o f Soviet Moslems and intentions o f using
23Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929, pp. 194-
195.
24Gregorian, The Emergence of a Modern Afghanistan, p. 238.
25Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 15-18.
35
Afghanistan as a bargaining chip in the Anglo-Soviet power struggle.
Adherence to  M arxist-Leninist ideology in foreign a ffa irs  would be
postponed un til a fte r World War II.
Nadir Khan and Quiet Neutrality
Following his accession to the Afghan throne, Nadir Khan pursued a
policy of d ip lom atic neutra lity and minimal internal reforms. The
government, he said, should not impose upon the Afghan people new ideas
and institutions. He also thought that new programs ought to develop
naturally, and he was careful to avoid co n flic t w ith the Islamic
2 ficommunity and urged a ll Afghans to be good Moslems.
As Nadir pursued a cautious modernization program at home, he 
followed an equally delicate foreign policy based upon trad itiona l Afghan 
attitudes toward B rita in  and Russia. His most d if f ic u lt task was to make 
Afghan neu tra lity  a rea lity  and to convince a ll elements, including the 
Soviets and Moslem nationalist-modernists, tha t he was not a tool of 
British imperialism . Unlike Amanullah, he adhered to a policy o f non­
involvement in India and Soviet Central Asia. He saw "positive- 
neutralism" as the best means of survival. Such a policy made it
essential fo r him to remain on friendly terms w ith  both the Soviets and 
27the British. The Soviets reacted in a positive manner to Nadir's newly
28won position as A m ir and recognized his government on October 19, 1929.
Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics o f Reform 
and Modernization 1880-1946, p. 293.
27Ibid., p. 322.
28 "Reply from  Karakhan to the Afghan Foreign M inister on the 
Formation o f the New Afghan Government," Soviet Documents o f Foreign 
Policy, 1925-1932, pp. 400-401.
In 1931 the two nations signed a new Treaty o f N eutra lity and Non- 
Aggression which basically restated the 1926 accord. The Afghan 
government, in an e ffo rt to demonstrate its good w ill, showed a marked 
sympathy fo r the Soviet viewpoint at the Disarmament Conference in 1932. 
More im portantly, from the Soviet point o f view, the Nadir adm inistration 
not only prevented any anti-Soviet activ ities , but also expelled the last 
insurgents which had caused the f irs t and th ird  small-scale Soviet
O Q
invasions into Afghan te rrito ry . On September 13, 1932, the Afghans
agreed to a Soviet proposal which called fo r appointing a number of
border contro l o fficers to help prevent such incidents from reoccurring.
These o fficers would be responsible fo r patro lling the ir own sides o f the
30fron tie r, but any incidents would be investigated jo in tly .
Soviet influence was by and large elim inated in Afghanistan by 1933
0 1
as S ta lin ist Russia turned toward "building socialism in one country."
E fforts to instigate revolutions in other nations were given low p rio rity
as the Soviets struggled w ith the in it ia l Five Year Plans. Maintenance
of the status quo was in the Soviet Union's national interest. Karl
Radek, ed itor o f Izvestiia , and member of the Central Committee o f the
Communist Party, sums up the Soviet view in 1934:
The attem pt to represent the foreign policy o f the Soviet Union as a 
continuation o f Tsarist policy is ridiculous. Bourgeois w riters who do 
so have not grasped even the purely external manifestations o f this 
policy. I t  is used to be an axiom o f Tsarist policy that i t  should 
strive by every available means to gain possession o f the Dardenelles and
29Gregorian, The Emergence o f a Modern Afghanistan, p. 332.
"Note From Stark, Soviet Envoy to Afghanistan, to the Afghan 
Foreign M inister, on the Appointment o f F rontier Commissioners to Settle 
Frontier Incidents," Soviet Documents o f Foreign Policy, 1925-1932, pp. 
535-541.
^ J a n  F. Triska, and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New 
York: The Macmillian Company, 1968), p. 3.
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of an ice-free port on the Pacific. Not only have the Soviets not 
attempted to seize the Dardenelles, but from a very beginning they have 
tried to establish the most friend ly relations with Turkey...
The Soviet Union takes no part in the struggle fo r the re­
distribution of the world.
The words o f Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union -  "We do not want a single b it of foreign land; but 
at the same time not an inch o f our land shall ever be yielded to anyone 
else" -  these words are the exact expression of the policy o f the Soviet 
Union...
Despite its neutral proclam ations, the Soviet regime had 
demonstrated, nonetheless, that i t  was w illing to use m ilita ry  force to 
back its interests in Afghanistan. A t the same tim e, the Soviets also 
had exhibited a large degree of restra int in dealing w ith  Afghan border 
raiders, and had attempted to prevent future problems through diplomatic 
means instead o f m ilita ry  force.
The World War n Period
Prior to the outbreak of World War II many small nations fe ll v ic tim  
to the im peria listic appetites o f the ir stronger neighbors. Following 
the Japanese invasion o f Manchuria in 1931, and increased tension in the 
South Asia region as a whole, Afghanistan became apprehensive about a 
s im ila r Soviet takeover of its te rrito ry . In order to help strengthen 
its  position the Afghans saw m erit in gaining security through 
partic ipation in international organizations such as the League o f 
Nations. However, the Soviet Union was not yet a member o f the League, 
and the advantages o f jo in ing such an organization were lim ited . Moscow 
could well have regarded Afghanistan's application fo r membership as a 
hostile gesture. The issue was settled when both the Soviet Union and
*^K arl Radek, "The Bases o f Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign A ffa irs , 
12, (January 1934), pp. 193-206.
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Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934.33 The Afghans sought 
to maintain the ir neutra lity  in a delicate situation.
Nadir Khan was assassinated on November 8, 1933, while attending a 
soccer game in Kabul. He was replaced by his son, Mohammed Zahir. The 
Soviets reacted w ith indifference to Nadir's death and accepted the 
change in government w ithout incident. Within Afghanistan at this time 
anti-B ritish  sentiment was at a peak, as was fear of Russian imperialism. 
Therefore, the Afghans approached Germany to provide foreign assistance. 
From the Afghan point of view Germans were welcome foreigners. Germany 
had no history of imperialism in the region and was on unfriendly terms 
w ith both the Soviet Union and Great B rita in .3^ By the mid-1930s Germany 
was the th ird  most powerful foreign influence inside Afghanistan.
Japan's development into a major m ilita ry  and commercial power also 
made an impact on Afghanistan. Japanese commercial interests in 
Afghanistan were powerful factors in influencing the Afghan strategy of 
d iluting British and Soviet power. In 1934 the Afghan Foreign M inister,
Faiz Muhammad, priva te ly stated that the usefulness o f Japan to
or
Afghanistan lay in the fac t that Japan was the natural enemy of Russia.
A t the same tim e, the Afghans sought avoid provocing the Soviets.
In Moscow the Afghan Foreign M inister signed a ten-year extension o f the 
Soviet-Afghan Non-Aggression Pact of 1931. Also in Moscow, the 
prelim inary talks fo r the 1937 Saadabad Non-Aggression Pact among 
Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran took place. This Pact (la ter signed
Cyriac Maprayil, B rita in  and Afghanistan in H istorica l Perspective 
(London: Cosmic Press, 1983), pp. 71-73.
3^Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway o f Conquest (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1965), pp. 233-236.
*ic
''Maprayil, Britain and Afghanistan in Historical Perspective, p. 74.
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in 1937) represented a small but decisive step towards the resurgence of 
Islam in regional po litics in general, and the consolidation o f Islamic 
policy along the southern borders of the Soviet Union in pa rticu la r.3®
When relations between Germany, the Soviet Union, and the British 
grew increasingly hostile, Afghanistan became concerned that co-operation 
w ith Germany might draw the country into international conflic ts. In an 
e ffo rt to avoid possible violations o f Afghan te rr ito ry  by e ither the 
British or the Russians, King Zahir issued a decree on September 6, 1939, 
o ffic ia lly  proclaim ing Afghan neutra lity . The decree also restric ted the
o 7
activ ities  o f belligerent powers on Afghan soil.
Soviet-Afghan relations were tense during the summer o f 1940. Large
numbers o f Soviet troops were stationed along sections o f the Afghan 
border. In the autumn o f 1941 the Soviet and British Governments sent 
requests to the Afghan government fo r the expulsion o f a ll Axis nationals 
except those on diplomatic missions. The Soviet M inister in Kabul 
justified  the demand on the basis o f the Afghan-Soviet Treaty o f 1926.
The Afghans were angry at the jo in t Anglo-Soviet request. They knew 
they had in fact maintained s tr ic t neutra lity , and that neu tra lity  tended 
to favor the Allies. The Afghans fe lt  tha t the rough treatm ent they were
receiving was undeserved, and, being independent by nature, did not 
appreciate being told what to do by the ir neighbors regardless o f how 
powerful they might be. However, the Afghan Prime M inister knew his 
country was in no position to challenge the B ritish and Russians. He
36Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
37Ibid., p. 76.
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decided that Afghanistan had no choice but to comply w ith  the requests, 
no m atter what the eventual outcome of the war in Europe might be.3®
By the closing months of 1943, it  became evident that the Allies 
were slowly gaining an upper hand against the Axis powers. The Afghans, 
never ones to back a losing side in a p o litica l fig h t, began to regard 
the Soviet Union, Brita in  and India in a more favorable ligh t.
Afghanistan became increasingly dependent on India which, at considerable 
cost to its own lim ited  resources, did everything possible to provide 
Afghanistan w ith supplies during the war. B rita in  thus managed to keep
O Q
Afghanistan neutral and out o f the war. Afghan neutra lity  during the 
war served the purpose of both the Allies and the Afghans. In 
retrospect, there was l it t le  tha t the Afghans could have accomplished in 
supporting the Axis powers and much could have been lost by confronting 
the British and Russians.
38Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
39Ibid., pp. 84-85.
Chapter IV
Soviet Foreign Policy Pronouncements, Treaties, 
and D ip lom atic Relations w ith  Afghanistan 
(1945-1979)
Ideological Foundations
In the period 1945-1979, Soviet foreign policy can be broken down
into two major categories. These categories are defined as Stalinist
(1945-1953) and post-Stalinist (1953-1979). During the S ta lin ist years
the Soviet Union was distracted from  pursuing relations w ith
Afghanistan by more im portant world issues, such as the Cold War in
Europe, the Korean War, and postwar reconstruction o f the Soviet Union.
Soviet foreign policy was based on the continued battle  against
imperialism. Soviet w riters focused the ir a ttention upon the huge
numbers o f newly independent nations in Asia and A frica , and stressed
the ir continued opposition to any form of colonialism.
In the early years fo llow ing the war (1945-1947), before U.S.-
Soviet relations had entered the Cold War phase, local communist
parties were instructed to in f iltra te  national-liberation movements and
support any anti-colonial forces. These policies reaffirm ed orthodox
M arxist-Leninist ideology which called fo r cooperation between
communist forces and other groups in early stages o f anti-colonia l
liberation movements. The Soviet press widely proclaimed these
policies. An a rtic le  by E. Zhukov, a leading Soviet au thority  on
underdeveloped areas, typ ifies the o ff ic ia l Soviet line:
The Soviet Union on the colonial question d iffe rs  rad ica lly  from  the 
capita lis t countries. The Soviet Union was always the implacable enemy 
o f a ll forms and appearances o f colonial suppression. Soviet
41
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democracy, as the most advanced form, does not accept any kind of 
racial or national suppression...
Soviet policy was modified fo llow ing a speech in September, 1947 
by Stalin's chief aide, Andrei Zhdanov. A t this point Soviet foreign 
policy adopted the "two-camp" thesis. This policy divided the the 
world into two antagonistic camps -  one of "peace, socialism and 
democracy" and the other o f "capitalism , imperialism, and war." The 
Soviet leadership viewed the newly independent states of Asia and the 
Middle East as victim s o f neo-colonialism. Under Stalin there was no 
room fo r non-aligned states, and countries were either pro-East or pro- 
West. The past policy o f cooperating w ith  indigenous bourgeoisie in 
order to rid  a nation of colonial subjugation, before progressing 
onward to socialism, was replaced by a program o f armed insurrection.
In Stalin's view, only a revolutionary movement founded on the broad 
base o f the masses could ever a tta in  real independence.
The post-Stalin era is marked by s ign ificant changes in Soviet 
foreign policy. In speeches to the Twentieth Party Congress o f the 
CPSU (1956), the new Soviet premier, N ik ita  Khrushchev, form ulated a 
number o f categorical shifts in various areas o f Soviet foreign policy.
A fte r rea ffirm ing  the Leninist theory o f peaceful coexistence,
Khrushchev breaks new ground when discussing the possibility of 
preventing war. He states:
*E. Zhukov, "The Colonial Question A fte r  the Second World War," 
Pravda, 7 August 1947, cited by A lvin  Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy 
o f the Soviet Union, pp. 398-399.
2
Andrei Zhdanov, "The International S ituation (Report to a Meeting 
o f the Cominform), September 1947," For a Lasting Peace, For a People's 
Democracy, November 10, 1947, p. 2, c ited by Roger E. Kanet, The Soviet 
Union and Developing Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1974), p. 16
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Millions of people a ll over the world are asking whether another war is 
really inevitable, whether mankind which has already experienced two 
devastating world wars must s t il l go through a th ird  one? Marxists 
must answer this question taking into consideration the epoch-making 
changes o f the last decades.
There is, of course, a M arxist-Leninist precept that wars are 
inevitable as long as imperialism exists. This precept was evolved at 
a tim e when (1) imperialism was an all-embracing world system, and (2) 
the social and po litica l forces which did not want war were weak, 
poorly organized, and hence unable to compel the im peria list to 
renounce war...
In that period this precept was absolutely correct. A t the 
present tim e, however, the situation has changed radically. Now there 
is a world camp of socialism, which has become a mighty force. In this 
camp the peace forces find not only the moral, but also the material 
means to prevent aggression...
In these circumstances certa in ly the Leninist precept that so long 
as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars w ill also 
be preserved remains in force. That is why we must display the 
greatest vigilance...But war is not fa ta lis tica lly  inevitable.
In the age of nuclear weapons this policy indicated a s ign ificant 
a lteration o f the Soviet view o f warfare and acknowledged the 
possibility that both socialism and capitalism could be defeated by the 
destructive power o f the new technology. In this speech Khrushchev 
also reintroduced the Leninist concept that d iffe ren t nations could 
reach socialism through d iffe ren t means. Khrushchev continued to 
stress the idea that radical changes had occurred in the world since 
Lenin's time and that non-violent social revolutions were also indeed 
possible.
In regard to developing areas, i t  also became apparent tha t Soviet 
policies were undergoing sign ificant changes. In a d iffe ren t speech at 
the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev emphasized the importance o f the 
uncommitted, developing nations. This policy was in d irec t contrast to
O
JN.S. Khrushchev, "Some Fundamental Questions of Present-Day 
International Development-Report o f the Central Committee o f the CPSU 
to the Twentieth Party Congress," cited in Readings in Russian Foreign 
Policy, ed. Robert Goldwin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 
p. 439 (emphasis mine).
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Stalinist hos tility  toward non-aligned nations as explained earlier in
the "two-cam p" theory. Khrushchev states:
...The forces o f peace have been considerably augmented by the 
emergence in the world arena o f a group o f peace-loving European and 
Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a 
principle o f the ir foreign policy. The leading po litica l circles of 
these states r ig h tly  hold that to partic ipate in closed m ilita ry  
im peria list alignments would merely increase the danger to the ir 
countries o f becoming involved in the aggressive forces' m ilita ry  
gamble and being drawn into the ruinous maelstrom of the arms race...As 
a result, a vast "peace zone," including both socialist and non- 
socialist peace-loving states in Europe and Asia, has emerged in the 
world arena. This zone embraces tremendous expanses of the globe, 
inhabited by nearly 1.5 b illion people — that is, the m ajority o f the 
population o f our planet...International relations have spread beyond 
the bounds of relations between the countries inhabited ch ie fly  by 
peoples o f the white race and are beginning to acquire the character of 
genuinely world-wide relations.
As w ill be seen in chapter five , Afghanistan was one o f the 
primary beneficiaries o f new Soviet policies which followed the 
Twentieth Party Congress, and Soviet relations w ith  Afghanistan would 
be used as a model fo r new Soviet policies toward the Third World.
A s ign ificant component of Soviet ideological w riting  in the 
period from  1945 to 1979 having an a ffe c t on Soviet-Afghan relations is 
the Brezhnev Doctrine. "The Brezhnev D octrine," as i t  was la te r 
labeled in the Western press, was a statement appearing in Pravda on 
September 26, 1968. This statement was w ritten  by an unknown author,
S. Kolalev, and represented the Soviet response to Western outrage over 
the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia. Kolalev justifies  Soviet 
intervention in the fo llow ing manner:
In connection w ith  the events in Czechoslovakia the question of 
the relationship and interconnection between the socialist countries'
N.S. Khrushchev, "The D isintegration o f the Im peria listic 
Colonial System." Report of the Central Committee o f the CPSU to the 
Twentieth Party Congress (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1956), c ited by Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy o f the Soviet Union, pp. 
404-406.
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national interests and the ir in ternationalist obligations has assumed 
particu lar urgency and sharpness. The measures taken jo in tly  by the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend the socialist 
gains o f the Czechoslovak people are of enormous significance fo r 
strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main achievement 
of the international working class...
There is no doubt that the peoples o f the socialist countries and 
the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine the ir 
country's path of development. However, any decision o f theirs must 
damage neither socialism in the ir own country, nor the fundamental 
interests of the other socialist countries, nor the worldwide workers' 
movement, which is waging a struggle fo r socialism. This means tha t 
every Communist Party is responsible not only fo r its  own people but 
also to a ll the socialist countries and to the entire communist 
movement...
Kolalev continues by u tiliz in g  Leninist doctrine:
Just as, in V.I. Lenin's words, someone liv ing in a society cannot 
be free o f that society, so a socialist state that is in a system of 
other states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be free of 
the common interests o f that commonwealth...
World socialism as a social system is the common achievement of 
the working people o f a ll countries, i t  is indivisible...
Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev would personally
elaborate on this policy seven weeks later:
I t  is quite clear that an action such as m ilita ry  assistance to a 
fra te rna l country to end a threat to the socialist system is an 
extraordinary measure, d ictated by necessity; i t  can be called fo rth  
only by the overt actions o f enemies o f socialism w ith in  a country and 
beyond its boundaries, actions ih a t create a threat to the common 
interest of the socialist camp.
The Brezhnev Doctrine would la te r be used to ju s tify  Soviet
S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations o f 
Socialist Countries," Pravda, 26 September 1968, pp. 1-2, Cited in 
Current Digest o f the Soviet Press, 39 (October 1968): 10-12. 
H ereafter cited as CDSP (emphasis mine).
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intervention on behalf o f the fa lte ring  communist regime in Afghanistan 
and has become a sign ificant component o f Soviet foreign policy.
Soviet-Afghan Relations 1945-1979 
Relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were 
inconsistent w ith Soviet policies toward other developing countries 
both during and shortly a fte r the war. The Soviets made no te rr ito r ia l
demands on the Afghan government, nor did Soviet troops attem pt to
occupy any part o f the country. In general, Soviet-Afghan relations in
the late Forties were very cordial. Minor boundary differences
regarding disputed islands in the channel o f the Amu Darya R iver were
O
solved by a Soviet-Afghan boundary commission in 1948. The bulk of 
relations fo llow ing World War II centered upon trade, foreign aid and 
m ilita ry  relations, and w ill be covered in chapter five . Remaining 
Soviet-Afghan interactions were closely tied to Afghanistan's foreign 
affa irs  and the internal dynamics o f the Afghan government.
The Issue o f Pushtunistan 
The Pushtunistan issue has caused many problems fo r Afghanistan 
since its  genesis a t the demarkation o f the Durand Line (see Chapter 
One). The Pushtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and 
many Pushtuns inhabit the Northwest Frontier o f Pakistan. The Pushtuns 
are pastoral, nomadic tribesmen who move across the border in seasonal 
migrations. They have been a perpetual source o f unrest and po litica l 
instab ility  since the days o f British rule. Afghanistan has laid claim
7
I t  should be noted how a ll Soviet theorists, including Stalin, 
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev constantly u tilize  Lenin's works to 
ju s tify  what would appear a t times to be contradictory policies.
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to Pushtan regions on the basis o f h istoric and cu ltura l ties, and 
there have also been calls fo r a completely autonomous Pushtunistan.
Ever since the form ation o f Pakistan in 1947, the issue has repeatedly
Q
poisoned relations between the two countries.
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased in the 1950s because 
of the ir support fo r Afghanistan in regard to Pushtunistan. In 1950, 
when Pakistan denied Afghanistan transit rights fo r goods entering and 
exiting the country, the USSR offered free transit rights and started 
supplying the Afghans w ith essential items under embargo by Pakistan.10 
The Soviet position was fu rther enhanced by the United States' 
re jection o f Afghan arms requests in 1948, 1951 and 1954. In a ll three 
instances the U.S. supported the position o f Pakistan in regard to the 
Pushtunistan issue as the basis fo r re jecting Afghan arms requests.11
Another flare-up o f the Pushtunistan problem in 1955 led to a 
closing of the Pakistan border. The Soviets again provided essential 
imports such as gasoline and construction materials. In December,
1955, Khrushchev and Soviet Premier Bulganin stopped in Kabul on the ir 
tour o f Asia. The Soviet leaders publicly supported Afghanistan fo r 
the f irs t  tim e. "We sympathize w ith  Afghanistan's policy on the 
question o f Pushtunistan," said Bulganin. "The Soviet Union stands fo r 
an equitable solution o f this problem, which cannot be settled 
co rrectly  w ithout taking into account the v ita l interests o f the people
Q
Wilber, Afghanistan, pp. 182-185., and Hammond, Red Flag over 
Afghanistan, pp. 24-25.
10Wilber, Afghanistan, p. 184.
^H e n ry  S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham:
Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983), pp. 19-20.
^8
. 1 2 .inhabiting Pushtunistan.” On this v is it the two governments signed a
ten-year extension o f the 1931 Afghan-Soviet Treaty o f Non- 
1 3Aggression.
Internal events in Afghanistan, which would la te r give rise to the
formation o f Afghan communist organizations and increased Soviet
involvement, also affected relations. Afghanistan pursued its firs t
democratic reforms in 1950. A free press was allowed, and three
newspapers c r it ic a l to governmental policies appeared. A le ft is t-
oriented student union was formed, and student c ritic ism  of the
government began in earnest. In 1951, the government closed the
student union, and in 1952 shut down the last opposition newspaper. In
1953, Prince Daoud was appointed Prime M inister by King Zahir. Daoud
governed e ffec tive ly  through a re la tive ly  loyal, well-paid army.
Daoud's willingness to exercise authority also enabled him to enforce
reforms which would have been beyond the power o f any progressive
movement at tha t tim e. Daoud's close relations w ith  the Soviet Union
earned him the nickname "the Red-Premier." In 1959 Daoud's reforms
included the enforcement of the tax laws and the encouragement of women
to abandon the Moslem trad ition  o f veiling the ir faces in public. In
typical fashion, Afghans protested against these non-traditional
practices. Daoud term inated any objections w ith ja il terms, and the
14more zealous protesters were simply shot.
12 N.A. Bulganin, and N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in 
India, Burma and Afghanistan, November-December 1955 (New Delhi: 1956), 
p. 175, cited in Ibid., p. 25.
^W ilb e r, Afghanistan, p. 185.
14John C. G riffiths , Afghanistan: Key to  a Continent 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 159-161.
In the 1950s and 1960s Afghan and Soviet representatives exchanged 
a series o f visits. In 1958 Marshal K.Y. Voroshilov visited Kabul and 
in 1960 Khrushchev followed up his 1955 v is it by returning to 
Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah travelled to Moscow in 1957, Prime 
M inister Daoud and Foreign M inister Naim made separate visits to the 
Soviet Union in 1959, and Daoud was back in Moscow in 1960 and 1961. 
During each v is it Soviet leaders reiterated the ir support fo r 
Afghanistan's struggle over the Pushtunistan region. ̂
Afghanistan's second e ffo rt w ith democracy began in 1963. Prince
Daoud was forced to resign by King Zahir, who feared his nephew was
gaining too much control over Afghan affa irs. King Zahir then
deliberately abandoned two hundred years of autocratic dynastic rule
w ith the implementation o f the 1965 Afghan constitution. This
constitution shrewdly barred the most o f the royal fam ily  (Daoud in
particular) from  both po litics and government. The constitution set up
a representative system which included a parliament consisting o f both
d irec tly  elected and appointed members. The King, however, retained
extensive reserve powers which severely lim ited  the scope and power of
the democratic reforms. Among the King's prerogatives were the
dissolution and summoning o f parliament, the appointment of the Prime
Minister and other cabinet members, and the naming of the ch ie f justice
1 fiand senior c iv il and m ilita ry  o ffic ia ls .
Problems arose immediately w ith  the new parliament. In the true 
sp irit o f democracy, i t  rejected the King's appointment fo r Prime 
M inister, Dr. Yussuf, and accused him and many other government
^ W ilb e r, Afghanistan, p. 185.
^ G r if f i th s ,  Afghanistan; Key to a Continent, pp. 162-163.
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1 7o ffic ia ls  o f bribery and corruption.1 ' Certain le ft-w ing  members lead
by Nur Mohammed Taraki continued to protest, and rio ts ensued in which
three people were killed. Yussuf was forced to resign to quell the 
18disturbances. In 1968, a fte r much delay and fierce debate, a b ill 
legalizing po litica l parties (but not the non-Islamic, atheistic,
Communist Party) was passed by parliament. The King refused to sign 
the b ill, and the elections o f 1969 passed w ithout legal po litica l 
parties. These elections were sligh tly rigged in favor o f pro- 
government candidates. The le ft is t faction in parliament was reduced 
from  five  to three. Among the le ftis ts  was a new member, H affizu llah 
Amin, who, along w ith  Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, formed the 
leadership nucleus of Afghanistan's f irs t communist party -  the 
People's Democratic Party o f Afghanistan (PDPA).19
Although the Soviets lost a valuable asset when Daoud was removed 
in 1963, relations between the two countries remained unchanged. High- 
level visits continued to fa c ilita te  neighborly relations. In 1963 
Brezhnev visited Kabul, and in 1965 King Zahir was in Moscow. In 1966 
and 1967 Prime M inister Maiwandwal and Soviet President Podgorny 
exchanged visits. Other exchanges continued through 1973 and both 
sides praised the quality o f b ila te ra l relations. The Afghans voiced
support fo r the Soviet position on disarmament, the progress o f de-
*  20 colonialism, the Vietnam war, and the Arab-Israeli dispute.
17Yu. V. Gankovsky et al., A H istory o f Afghanistan, trans. V ita ly  
Bashakov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), pp. 267-268.
18G riffiths , Afghanistan: Key to a Continent, p. 166.
19Ibid., pp. 168-170.
20 Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, pp. 34-35.
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Daoud's Return
The numerous fa iled or unwanted reforms policies institu ted by
King Zahir gave rise to various opposition forces in Afghanistan. The
le ft is t ac tiv ities continued to increase and so did the concern o f the
21nationalistic and religious circles in Afghan politics. Having run
the country fo r ten years, form er Prime M inister Prince Daoud probably
found i t  frus tra ting  to s it on the sidelines and watch the monarchy's
power usurped by commoners. Daoud discussed rebellion fo r more than a
year w ith  various opposition elements, but he concentrated his plans
among le ft is t m ilita ry  o fficers.
The m ilita ry  was by fa r the most im portant revolutionary element,
and i t  supported Daoud fo r a number o f reasons. He had obtained large
quantities o f modern arms from  the Soviet Union. Daoud brought about
closer ties to the USSR, which appealed to many Soviet-trained officers
in the Afghan o ffice r corps. Daoud was a form er army o ffice r and had
obtained the rank o f lieutenant-general. In addition, progressive
Afghans had been antagonized by the King's on-again, off-again reform
program. Having been promised change, many p o litica lly  active Afghans
22were determined to have it.
Daoud, w ith  the aid o f m ilita ry  o fficers, took contro l of the 
government v irtu a lly  w ithout resistance in a near-bloodless coup on 
July 17, 1973. The King was conveniently out o f the country at the 
tim e, and loya lis t resistance was thus minimized. Daoud went on radio 
and announced tha t the monarchy was being replaced by a republican
21 Syed S. Hussain, Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation (Islamabad: 
World A ffa irs  Publications, 1980), p. 95.
22Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 35-36.
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system of government. Daoud became founder, president, and Prime
91Minister o f the new Republic of Afghanistan.
I t  was Daoud's choice o f "friends" which led to speculation that
the July coup in Kabul was pro-Soviet, communist-directed or even
planned from  the Soviet embassy. Daoud's close relations w ith  the
Soviet Union as Prime M inister in 1953-1963 added to this speculation.
In actua lity  the coup had been executed prim arily  by junior army
94officers trained in the Soviet Union.
On July 19, 1973, the Soviet Union became the f irs t nation to
recognize the new Afghan republic. Identical texts in Pravda and
Izvestiia on July 21st read: "Guided by its unchanging feeling of
friendship fo r the Afghan people, the Soviet government has o ffic ia lly
recognized the Republic o f Afghanistan."2^
Many of Daoud's several hundred backers were members of, or
associated w ith, Afghanistan's fledgling communist organization -  the
Peoples Democratic Party o f Afghanistan. A number o f Daoud's cabinet
ministers were members o f the Parcham faction  of the PDPA (see chapter
six), yet the nature of the new republican regime was neither communist
nor exclusively pro-Soviet. I f  the Soviets had aided Daoud in his
coup, he soon demonstrated that gratitude did not lim it  his 
9 6independence.
23Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 
1964-1981 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1982), p. 64.
24Ibid., p. 64.
■^"Protocol Signed," Pravda, 21 July 1973, p. 1, cited in CDSP, 29 
(August, 1973): 25.
26 Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 1964-1981, p. 64.
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Before long Daoud began to reduce the power of the le ftis ts  in the
government and to move his regime somewhat to the righ t. L e ftis t
o ffic ia ls , one by one, were either dismissed outright or assigned to
harmless diplomatic posts abroad. The le ft-w ing  minister o f the
in te rio r was replaced by a righ tis t, and Daoud was even reported to
have threatened some of the le ftis ts  w ith  castration! However, He
refrained from  publicly taking an anti-communist stance. Daoud also
disappointed the le ftis ts  by changing Afghan foreign policy. He
lessened somewhat his dependence on the Soviet Union and strengthened
27ties w ith other countries, particu la rly  Pakistan and Iran.
Depending on the situation, Daoud's conduct in foreign a ffa irs  
served both to please and disturb the Soviet Union. Since its 
inception in 1968, Moscow's proposed form ation o f a co llective security 
system in Asia had been received coolly by Soviet allies in the region.
In 1974 Daoud pleased the Soviets by giving a qualified endorsement of 
the plan, but he also re -affirm ed Afghanistan's policy o f non-alignment
t )Q
and neutra lity. A t the same tim e, however, Daoud increased his 
involvement w ith  other Arab states and reduced tensions w ith  Pakistan 
over the Pushtunistan issue. The most troublesome aspect o f Afghan 
foreign policy, from  the Soviet perspective, was Daoud's increased 
contacts w ith  Iran.
The Shah of Iran attempted to lure Daoud away from  his close 
contacts w ith  the Soviet Union by offering  large sums o f foreign aid.
In October, 1974 the Shah promised to  provide $2 b illion  in economic
97'Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 38.
^®"In a Friendly Atmosphere,'1 Pravda, 6 June 1974, p. 4, c ited in 
CDSP, 23 (July, 1974): 11-14.
5^
29aid over a period of ten years. This huge sum was roughly equal to
a ll foreign assistance received by Afghanistan since 1953. Very l it t le
of this aid was ever received (approx. $10 m illion), due to the Shah's
30own economic problems. In addition to attem pting to replace the 
Soviet Union as Afghanistan's primary benefactor, the Shah's proposal 
included plans fo r the construction of a railroad from  Kabul to Iran, 
which would eventually decrease Afghan dependence on Soviet trade. The 
Soviets could only view the Shah's proposal as a threat to their 
economic and po litica l ties w ith Afghanistan, and any policies put 
fo rth  by the Shah were interpreted as an extension o f U.S. meddling in 
the region.
Under a new constitution in 1977, Daoud appointed a cabinet 
comprised o f personal supporters and known anti-communists. The 
communists, along w ith  other le ftis ts , had been passed over in choosing 
the new government. Daoud had apparently abandoned earlier attempts to 
reform  the Afghan government and was system atically reducing a ll 
potential sources o f opposition to his rule. He removed Soviet 
m ilita ry  advisors from  the lower levels o f the Afghan m ilita ry  and cut 
the ir number s ligh tly . He sent men to tra in  on Soviet m ilita ry  
equipment in India and Egypt to remove them from  Soviet influence. A ll 
o f these actions followed Daoud's v is it to  Moscow in A p ril, 1977. The 
o ffic ia l record o f the v is it, however, shows no sign o f discord between
Ol
the Soviets and Afghans.
OQ
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 39.
"^Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p.38.
31 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 65.
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The level of Soviet annoyance w ith  Daoud is unclear. His
independent actions would logically make them annoyed, but Soviet-
Afghan relations were satisfactory, and Daoud was fa r from even
indicating that he did not look to the Soviet Union as his prim ary a lly
in the region. One account o f Daoud's A pril v is it to Moscow indicates
serious problems did in fa c t exist. A widely held story reports that
Brezhnev addressed Daoud in a rude manner and presented him w ith  a long
lis t o f complaints about Daoud's foreign and domestic policies. Daoud
reportedly rose to his feet and replied: "I want to remind you that you
are speaking to the President of an independent country, not one of
your Eastern European sate llites. You are try ing  to in terfere w ith  the
internal a ffa irs of Afghanistan, and this I w ill not perm it.”
Whereupon Daoud and his entourage marched out o f the room. One
associate said to Daoud, "Did you see the look on Brezhnev's face when
09
you said that? Mr. President you are a dead man."
Despite reports o f fr ic tio n  between Daoud and Brezhnev, there is 
no evidence to suggest that o ffic ia l Soviet-Afghan relations were under 
strain. From 1975 to 1978 no critic ism s o f Daoud appeared in the 
Soviet media, nor was there any reduction in trade, aid or m ilita ry  
assistance. A t the Tw enty-F ifth  Party Congress in 1976, the fa m ilia r 
favorable reference to  Afghanistan was repeated and in 1976 and 1977 a 
number o f positive articles on Soviet-Afghan relations, which included 
personal praise o f Daoud, were published in International A ffa irs  
(Moscow).'*'*
09
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 42.
**■*Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, pp. 39-40.
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On the home fron t Daoud received less positive reviews. His
heavy-handed polices had alienated many of his closest supporters. By
1978 Daoud's policies had played into the hands of rebellious forces.
He had incurred not only the displeasure of the le ftis ts  but also of
Moslem fundamentalists. Daoud had firm ly  suppressed any dissident
Islamic groups, such as the Muslim League, tha t objected to the degree
of his involvement w ith  the Soviet Union.34 He had also alienated
students, inte llectuals, army officers, and some members o f the middle
and upper classes. There were also serious economic problems;
unemployment was high, and several hundred thousand Afghans were forced
to find jobs in Iran and other gu lf states. Daoud had trouble making
payments on the many loans he had made w ith  foreign countries.
Meanwhile, dissent spread as a result o f severe food shortages and 
isincreased taxes.
On A pril 27, 1978, Daoud was killed in a m ilita ry  coup. There has 
been a wide varie ty o f speculation regarding the Soviet role in the 
coup, and of Soviet contro l of the Afghan communists who came to power 
fo llow ing the incident. The Soviet role w ill be investigated in 
greater deta il in chapter six. A t this point, i t  is safe to say that 
claims o f d irect Soviet involvement are purely speculative, and i t  is 
like ly  tha t the tru th  w ill never be known.
The Soviet Union was the f irs t country to recognize the new regime 
in Kabul on May 1, 1978. Relations between the two countries soon 
exhibited "fra te rna l" characteristics. On May 2, Brezhnev sent his
•^G riff ith s , Afghanistan: Key to a Continent, p. 180.
35Ibid., p. 182.
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personal greetings to the new Afghan leader Nur Mohammed Taraki. 36 The 
Soviet press explained the reasons fo r Daoud's downfall as resulting 
from  the fa c t that, "...contrad ictory tendencies of Afghanistan's 
po litica l development in recent years...le ft hopes fo r radical changes 
un fu lfilled  by Daoud." Daoud quickly became the v illa in  in the 
Soviet analysis o f the coup.
The most significant d iplom atic agreement between the Soviets and 
the new regime was the "Treaty o f Friendship, Good Neighborliness and 
Co-Operation" signed in Moscow on December 5, 1978. Although there are 
few specifics in the treaty, it  contains an im p lic it security 
commitment which would be used in 1979 to ju s tify  the lega lity  of 
Soviet intervention:
A rtic le  4 The high contracting parties, acting in the sp ir it of the 
traditions o f friendship and good-neighborliness, as well as the UN 
Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate 
measures to  ensure security, independence, and te rr ito r ia l in teg rity  o f 
the two countries. In the interests o f strengthening the defence 
capacity o f the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop 
co-operation on the m ilita ry  fie ld  on the basis o f appropriate 
agreements concluded between them.
The trea ty  fu rther enhances the Soviet proposal fo r establishing a 
South Asian security alliance:
A rtic le  8 The high contracting parties shall fa c ilita te  the 
development o f co-operation among Asian states and the establishment of 
relations o f peace and good-neighborliness and mutual confidence among 
them and the creation of an e ffec tive  security system in Asia on the 
basis o f jo in t e ffo rts  by a ll countries on the continent.
Og
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December 5, 1978. Translated by Cyriac Maprayil, The Soviets and 
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Taraki again visited Moscow on his way home from  a non-aligned 
movement conference in Cuba. He met w ith  Foreign Minister Gromyko and 
Brezhnev on September 10 in a "cordial, comradely atmosphere," complete 
w ith front-page photos in both the Kabul and Moscow news media. Much 
to  the chagrin of the Soviets, Taraki was overthrown in a coup on
•3Q
September 14 by his Defense/Prime Minister H affizu llah  Amin.
The Soviet reaction to Taraki’s ouster remains unclear. Publicly, 
relations between the new Afghan leader and the Soviets displayed no 
overt differences from earlier policies, and the Soviets congratulated 
Amin on his new position. Privately, i t  would appear as i f  relations 
were under severe strain resulting from Soviet embarrassment over 
Taraki's abrupt removal from  o ffice  (Chapter 6 w ill cover these 
relationships in more deta il). Despite personality conflic ts  among 
Afghan and Soviet leaders, relations remained friend ly . The new Afghan 
regime had active ly pursued a pro-Soviet alignment, and increasingly 
called fo r greater Soviet involvement in Afghan a ffa irs . As the tempo 
o f Soviet involvment increased, the new regime also faced steadily 
increasing internal tu rm o il and rebellion. By late in 1979, i t  became 
clear that the Amin regime would soon be overthrown by forces opposing 
Marxist rule. As late as December 23, 1979, the Soviet news media was 
denying Western claims tha t Soviet troops were mobilized fo r  an 
invasion o f Afghanistan. Pravda referred to these claims as "pure 
fabrications," and quoted Hafizu llah Amin as saying, "The Soviet Union 
has never infringed on our sovereignty...is not doing so, and never
^Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 66.
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w il l . " ^  With the benefit of hindsight, i t  would seem that these 
statements were used as a deception in an a ttem pt to deflect a ttention 
away from  Soviet m ilita ry  ac tiv ities close to the Afghan border. On 
Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan.
^ Pravda, 23 December 1979, p.5, c ited in CDSP, 51 (January, 
1980): 4.
Chapter V
Soviet-Afghan Economic and M ilita ry  
Relations 1919-1979
This chapter marks a break in the linear h istorica l review of 
Soviet-Afghan diplomatic relations which has characterized chapters 
three and four. This chapter returns to 1919 and follows the evolution 
o f economic and m ilita ry  relations up through the year 1979. The 
analysis of economic and m ilita ry  interaction between Afghanistan and 
the Soviet Union enhances the ab ility  to determine the overall 
character o f Soviet foreign policy and provides specific examples of 
how the two nations in teract in the "rea l world." Economics are the 
foundations o f M arxist-Leninist philosophy, and decisions regarding 
trade and foreign aid can be viewed as integral components o f Soviet 
foreign policy. The manipulation o f economic interactions and m ilita ry  
relations are two sign ificant indicators which w ill aid in determining 
whether or not the Soviets had planned to take contro l o f Afghanistan 
prior to the 1979 invasion.
Early Relations
As stated in Louis Dupree's landmark book, Afghanistan, "Contrary
to popular belie f, Soviet aid to Afghanistan did not begin in 1950, but
w ith several subsides, in 1919."1 As mentioned in chapter three, in
1924 the Soviets sent Amanullah a g if t  o f th irteen airplanes, pilots,
2
mechanics, transportation technicians, and telegraph operators. In
1 Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 451.
2Ibid
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1925, the firs t Soviet "invasion" o f Afghanistan occurred. Soviet troops 
occupied the island of U rta Tagai in the Amu Darya River. Control of 
this te rr ito ry  was disputed by Kabul and Moscow, but the apparent reason 
fo r the Soviet maneuver was to disrupt raids into Soviet te rr ito ry  by 
tribesmen inhabiting the island. The action was taken by local m ilita ry  
commanders w ithout the approval of authorities in Moscow, and Soviet 
troops were withdrawn in 1926 when the two sides signed an agreement
9
recognizing Afghan ownership o f the disputed area.
In November 1927, the two governments signed an agreement which
4
established a ir service between Tashkent and Kabul. This agreement 
marks the f irs t o f many mutually beneficial commercial ventures between 
the Soviets and Afghans, but only one o f very few such agreements before 
World War II.
As mentioned in chapter three, Soviet troops "invaded" Afghanistan 
on two more occasions in 1929 and 1930. The 1929 invasion in support of 
Amanullah was apparently a fa ir ly  serious a ffa ir, even though the degree 
o f Soviet involvement remains disputable. Estimates of troop strength 
range from  800 to  6000, but most experts agree that the Soviets were at 
least (or perhaps at most) responsible fo r supplying weapons fo r the 
venture. In any event, the troops were withdrawn before the year's end 
in 1929, and the second Soviet "invasion" had come to a close. The 1930 
"invasion" occurred when Soviet troops crossed the Amu Darya "in  hot 
pursuit" o f the bandit leader Ibrahim Beg, fo llow ing his repeated raids 
into Soviet te rrito ry . Afghan forces shortly thereafter drove the
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 12-13.
^"Agreement w ith  Afghanistan on the Kabul-Tashkent A ir  L ine," Soviet 
Documents o f Foreign Policy, 1917-1924, pp. 283-286.
62
bandits back across the border where they were destroyed by the Soviet 
Army.**
In the area o f trade, Soviet-Afghan relations were steadily 
strengthened. A varie ty o f Soviet-manufactured goods found the ir way 
into Afghanistan in return fo r livestock, wool and cotton -  goods often 
quite unobtainable on the Russian home market. Soviet-Afghan trade was 
fac ilita ted  by the fa c t that the Soviet ra ilway touched the Afghan 
fron tie r at two points. The situation w ith in  Afghanistan was not 
conducive to large-scale foreign investment capital by the Soviet Union 
or, fo r that m atter, anyone else. Even in the 1980s Afghanistan remains 
one of the most technologically p rim itive  nations on earth, and in the 
early part o f the tw entie th  century it  lacked the most basic in fra­
structure characteristics such as roads and bridges, communications 
systems, banks, and trade legislation necessary to a ttra c t foreign 
investment. Amanullah was also wary o f foreign contro l o f his economy
n
and forbade any large-scale foreign investment. N either the Afghans nor 
the Soviets closely regulated trade in among the tribes which migrated 
across the border, therefore, no complete and accurate statistics are 
available fo r the volume o f trade in years prio r to World War II. The 
fo llow ing figures provide a rough picture of Soviet-Afghan trade in the 
period from  1928 to 1938.
c
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 16-18.
6Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy o f Soviet Russia 1929-1941 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 208-210.
7Gregorian, The Emergence of a Modern Afghanistan, p. 254.
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AFGHAN TRADE WITH SOVIETS8 
(in m illions o f rubles)
Year Exports to Afghanistan Imports from Afghanistan
1928 7.0 11.7
1929 7.3 10.3
1930 7.8 9.2
1931 11.5 11.6
1932 14.6 11.8
1933 7.1 5.6
1934 3.1 2.8
1935 3.5 3.9
1936 3.7 5.0
1937 3.8 3.8
1938 3.4 3.1
The drop in these figures in 1933 can be a ttributed in large part to 
Nadir Khan's policy o f isolationism, combined w ith  the Soviet policy of 
"building socialism in one country." From time to time Nadir accepted 
some technical advice and help from  the Soviets and British, but the 
activ ities  o f the old rivals were sharply curta iled w ith in Afghanistan's 
borders. Nadir insisted that a ll Soviet personnel be withdrawn from  the 
Afghan a ir force. Nadir perm itted a Soviet trade exhibition in Kabul in 
1933, but he refused to allow the Russians to establish commercial
Q
missions in various regions o f Afghanistan.
During the term  o f King Zahir, the Soviets and Afghans completed a 
commercial agreement in 1936. This agreement provided fo r a two-way 
exchange o f goods to the value o f 38.5 m illion rubles.*® Under this 
agreement the Afghans seem to have assured the Soviets tha t in the 
economic development o f cotton in northern Afghanistan the Kabul
8Ibid
®Ibid., p. 323.
*°B e lo ff, The Foreign Policy o f Soviet Russia, p. 210.
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government would u tilize  Soviet technology and expertise. To achieve 
this end, the Afghans purchased various types o f Soviet cotton processing 
equipment. However, both sides apparently were leary of each others 
motives. In an attem pt to allay mutual fears of interference in each 
other's internal a ffa irs , both sides agreed to close the ir respective 
consulates in the c ities of Tashkent and M azar-i-Sharif. 11
The early period o f Soviet-Afghan trade relations is characterized 
by small-scale interaction and lim ited involvement in each others 
economies. Goods exchanged were lim ited to raw materials, agricu ltural 
commodities and rudimentary manufactured items. Economic relations 
reflected the lack o f overall diplomatic a c tiv ity  between the two 
countries. Major changes in relations would come a fte r World War II.
Post-War Relations 1945-1979
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan fo llow ing World War II was
d irectly  related to the East-West power struggle. The United States
in itia ted com petition over Afghanistan by providing aid in 1945 fo r the
construction o f an extensive water management system in what was known as
1 2the Hilmand Valley Project. Other U.S. projects were begun on a wide- 
scale a fte r the war. Peter Franck, d irector o f the National Planning 
Association's analysis o f Afghanistan, describes the situation:
In the wake o f Western involvement in Afghanistan through growing 
aid programs, normalcy in Afghan-Russian relations did not prevail long.
To the Soviet Union, economic commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
had po litica l overtones as well. Certainly, in Soviet eyes, the 
rebuilding in 1947 by an American contractor o f a modern high-speed road
11 Gregorian, The Emergence o f a Modern Afghanistan, p. 376. The 
consulates had been opened in 1921.
1 2Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 482-485.
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from  the Pakistan border to the second-most-important business center of 
its neighbors had strategic importance.
Franck's analysis o f the m otivation behind Soviet aid to Afghanistan 
was confirmed by the major a rch itect of post-war Soviet policies toward 
the Third World fo llow ing the death o f Stalin. In his memoirs, N ik ita  
Khrushchev provides the most complete statement o f foreign policy goals 
in Afghanistan and leaves l i t t le  doubt regarding Soviet motives:
The Americans also put pressure on another neighbor to the South. 
They started pouring material and technological assistance into 
Afghanistan, giving credits, building roads, and undertaking a ll kinds o f 
projects at the ir own expense.
In its desire to encircle us w ith  m ilita ry  bases, America threw 
itse lf a ll over a country like Afghanistan...
The Afghans asked us to help build several hundred kilometers o f 
road near the Iranian border. It cost us a he fty  sum since we had to 
tunnel through the mountains. However, because Afghanistan didn't have 
railroads, such a highway would be a main artery, carrying the economic 
lifeblood of the country. The road also had great strategic significance 
because it would have allowed us to transport troops and supplies in 
event of war with Pakistan or Iran...
Some people of lim ited  vision may say there's no point in getting  
gas and o il from  Afghanistan since we have these same resources in our 
own country. My reply to that is: i f  we don't assist our neighbors, 
they 'll remain in abject poverty and, sooner or la te r, turn against us. 
Besides, American capitalists would be only too glad to take our place if  
we didn't assist the Afghans...The amount of money we spent on gratuitous 
assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the ocean compared to the price we 
would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American 
m ilitary base on Afghan territory...
Khrushchev's statement typ ifies the Soviet position regarding the 
most important factors in foreign policy considerations. The three major 
factors o f any decision regarding the Third World are po litics, economics 
and m ilita ry  power. The correla tion o f these forces is very im portant to 
Soviet theorists, and m ilita ry  power, although important, is not regarded
1
Peter Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West (Washington D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1960), p. 9.
^ N ik i ta  Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 
trans. and ed. by Strobe Ta lbott (Boston: L it t le , Brown and Company,
1974), pp. 298-300 (emphasis mine).
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as more sign ificant than the po litica l or economic deminsions. Thus,
m ilita ry  v ic to ry  is not possible w ithout po litica l support and economic
s ta b ility . 1 The Soviet policy in Afghanistan would seek to enhance the
"corre lation of forces." Soviet aid would seek to strengthen po litica l,
economic and m ilita ry  interaction.
Economic Relations
Even before the death of Stalin and the advent o f new policies
toward the Third World under Khrushchev, the Soviets and Afghans were
moving ahead on economic relations. In July 1950, they signed a four-
year barter agreement under which the Afghans agreed to exchange raw
cotton and wool, fo r Soviet petroleum, cloth, sugar and other
commodities. The Soviets also guaranteed a much higher rate o f exchange
than any Western nation. The 1950 agreement was augmented by an o ffe r to
construct several large gasoline storage tanks, and to  take over o il
explorations in northern Afghanistan from  a Swedish company. By 1952,
Afghan-Soviet trade had doubled, and fo r the f irs t  tim e the Afghans
1
perm itted the Soviets to establish a trade o ffice  in Kabul.
In 1953 the Soviets advanced Afghanistan a $3.5 m illion cred it fo r
the construction o f two grain silos, a flou r m ill and a bakery under
17generous terms bearing a three percent interest rate. This e ffo r t was 
followed in July 1954 w ith  a technical aid and c red it agreement o f $1.2 
m illion fo r  construction o f a gasoline pipeline across the Amu Darya from
^R a ja n  Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986), pp. 22-23.
16Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 493-494.
17Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, p. 37.
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the U.S.S.R. Both o f these projects had clear ram ifications on
Afghanistan's ab ility  to sustain itse lf (w ith Soviet assistance) in the
event o f future discord w ith  Pakistan over Pushtuistan. In August, 1954,
the Soviets increased the ir popularity among the Afghan populace by
agreeing to finance the paving o f Kabul's streets. This pro ject had
1 8previously been rejected tw ice by the U.S. Import-Export Bank.
Following the Khrushchev/Bulganin v is it in May, 1955, Soviet-Afghan
relations entered a fundamental new phase o f increased d ip lom atic,
economic and m ilita ry  relations. The Soviets announced the g if t  o f a
100-bed hospital, an 11-14 transport plane fo r King Zahir and a loan fo r
the enormous sum of $100 m illion -  w ith low interest and a th irty -yea r
repayment schedule. This loan produced one m ilita ry  and one c iv ilian
a irport, two hydroelectric plants, a road maintenance plant, a road over
the Hindu Kush w ith a tunnel which would connect northern and Southern
Afghanistan fo r the f irs t tim e, and three irriga tion  projects. By 1956
19there were over 460 Soviet technicians in the country.
A sampling o f the more im portant aid projects should be noted. One 
of the Soviet's most innovative and successful programs in Afghanistan is 
the joint-production o f raw materials. A fte r  Soviet geologists 
discovered rich  natural gas deposits in Afghanistan, an agreement was 
signed in 1965 fo r aid in extracting  the gas and construction o f a 
pipeline to the Soviet border. In May 1967, just before the pipeline was
1 ftAnthony Arnold, Afghanistan? The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, 
2nd ed., (Stanford: Hoover Institu tion  Press, 1985), p. 34.
1 QCollins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 21.
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opened, Afghanistan agreed to supply the U.S.S.R. w ith  gas through 1985
O ft
in exchange fo r debts incurred in this venture.
Following the return o f Daoud in 1973, Soviet aid to Afghanistan 
steadily increased from  $120 m illion in 1972 to $150 m illion  in 1974.
This aid, when coupled w ith  a Soviet moratorium on debt repayments and 
increased earnings from exports, provided fo r favorable economic
conditions in Afghanistan through the f irs t four years o f Daoud's
21regime. Despite Daoud's independent foreign policy and the huge sums
promised by the Shah o f Iran mentioned in the last chapter, Soviet aid to
Daoud's regime increased every year un til its overthrow in 1978. In 1975
the Soviets gave Afghanistan $425 m illion fo r Daoud's Seven-Year Plan
(1976-1983), and in 1977 a twelve-year agreement on economic cooperation 
22was signed.
A review o f Daoud's Seven Year Plan provides some interesting 
insights regarding the amount o f aid the Afghans expected to receive from
the Shah. O ffic ia l Afghan documents lis t the sources o f expected monies 
fo r specific new projects. The Soviet Union is listed as the source fo r 
over 60 projects, in comparison to less than 20 fo r Iran. However, the
o n
Elizabeth K rid l Valkner, ''Soviet Economic Relations w ith  the 
Developing Nations," in The Soviet Union and Developing Nations, ed.
Roger Kanet (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 222. I t
is interesting to note tha t this agreement is not mentioned by those 
scholars who claim  that one o f the reasons fo r the Soviet invasion in 
1979 was to exploit Afghanistan's rich resources. This agreement would 
indicate that the Soviets and Afghans were working together to develope 
Afghanistan's fledgling petroleum industry, and any gas flow ing to the 
Soviet Union through 1985 was legally jus tified  by trade agreements 
decided 12 years before the Soviet intervention.
2*Collins, The Soviet Invasion:of Afghanistan, p. 36 a
22Ibid., p. 41.
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combined Iranian sources of aid amounted to approximately $634 m illion .23 
I t  is apparent from  these documents that the Afghans had great fa ith  in 
the Shah's a b ility  to pay, a belie f which would soon be dispelled. The 
vast m ajority o f the Shah's money was designated fo r the construction of 
over 1800 kilometers of railroads linking Herat and Kabul to Iran. The 
stated purpose o f the railroad was to:
...link im portant agricultural and industrial regions of the country and 
make it  posible to exploit coal and other mineral deposits....Futhermore, 
construction o f important transport in frastructure w ill considerably 
fa c ilita te  the transit trade w ith neighboring and other countries..
The plan fo r this railroad concerned the Soviets fo r two reasons.
F irst, i t  would lessen the Afghan's dependency on the USSR as a market 
fo r the ir goods. I t  has been the case in Afghanistan fo r many years that 
i f  the Russians did not buy Afghan goods, they would not be purchased at 
a ll. For decades the Soviets have continued to puchase Afghan goods at 
very favorable prices (to themselves) and would look upon the possiblity 
of competion w ith Iran, a state w ith  vast amounts o f petro-dollars, w ith 
great disfavor.
The trade problem, however, was the least o f the Soviet's concerns. 
The real problem was the strategic influence a Iran-Afghanistan railroad 
may have had on Soviet-Afghan relations, and on the balance o f power in 
the South Asian region as a whole. Iran was closely aligned w ith  the 
United States prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in that country. Any 
large-scale Iranian involvement in Afghanistan was viewed by the Soviets
Government o f the Republic o f Afghanistan: F irst Seven Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan 1355-1361, vol. II annex (Kabul: 
M inistrv o f Planning, 1355), pp. 39-140.
24Government o f the Republic o f Afghanistan: F irst Seven Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan 1355-1361, vol. I te x t (Kabul: 
M inistry o f Planning, 1355), p. 195.
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as having implications on the overall world stra teg ic balance in the 
region. A sh ift in Afghanistan's alignment in favor o f the Iranians, and 
the construction o f a sign ificant in fra-structure component in the form 
of a railroad, were seen as threats to the Soviet Union.
A fte r increasing its ties in the 1950s, the Soviet's position as 
Afghanistan's major economic benefactor was never challenged seriously, 
despite the Shah's proposals. By the time o f the communist coup which 
overthrew President Daoud in 1978, a to ta l o f $1,265,000,000 in Soviet 
economic aid had been extended to Afghanistan. An additional $110 
m illion had been provided through East European countries as part o f a 
coordinated Soviet Bloc program. In addition to aid, some 5,000 Afghan 
students had been trained in Soviet academic institu tions and 1,600 in 
technical institutions by 1979.
M ilitary Relations
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the m ilita ry  has an important 
role in Soviet foreign policy. In addition to so lid ify ing economic and 
po litica l ties to Afghanistan, the Soviets completed the th ird  prong o f 
the "correlation o f forces" by entering into m ilita ry  re lations w ith  the 
Afghans. Shortly fo llow ing World War II, the Soviet bloc became 
Afghanistan's sole supplier o f m ilita ry  hardware and tra in ing.
M ilita ry  assistance, mainly in the form  o f arms transfers, advisory 
support, and tra in ing were begun in 1955 w ith  an agreement between 
Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia fo r $3 m illion. The f irs t d irec t Soviet- 
Afghan arms agreement was signed in 1956. This agreement provided fo r
^ C e n tra l Intelligence Agency, "Communist A id A c tiv itie s  in Non- 
Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-1979," (Washington 
D.C., 1980), p. 17. C ited by, Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union, pp. 24-25.
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the sale o f $25 m illion worth o f m ilita ry  equipment, including MiG-15 
jets. By 1965, the value of m ilita ry  equipment stood at approximately 
$275 m illion, under repayment terms which required only 50% reimbursment 
by the Afghans. This m ilita ry  equipment included 100 tanks and 100 
airplanes. Over 200 Afghan m ilita ry  cadets had been sent to the Soviet 
Union fo r tra in ing by 1962, and during the period 1953-1963 the Soviets 
had bu ilt or were building m ilita ry  a irfie lds in Bagram, near Kabul; 
Mazar-i-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan; and at Shindand in the centra l 
part o f western Afghanistan.
In 1969, the Soviet m ilita ry  newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)
reported on the v is it of Soviet Marshal Grechko to an Afghan m ilita ry
academy. This report re flects upon the Soviet tra in ing o f Afghan
officers: "In most cases the officers teaching the classes reported to
Marshal A .A. Grechko in Russian: many o f them having studied in Soviet 
27m ilita ry  schools." Opinions regarding the effects o f this tra in ing on 
Afghan o fficers are mixed. Many post-invasion analysts have regarded the 
tra in ing period as evidence o f Soviet indoctrination and subversion o f 
Afghan m ilita ry  personnel. They point to  the fa c t that Soviet-trained 
m ilita ry  o fficers would la te r engineer the 1979 coup. Many o f these 
analysts overlook the point tha t some of these same o fficers also aided 
in bringing Daoud to power in 1973. Thus, the degree o f Soviet contro l 
is tru ly  speculative. Louis Dupree, one o f the most highly respected 
Western authorities on Afghanistan, addressed this point in his classic 
book, Afghanistan, in 1973:
^®Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan, p. 23.
^ 7 Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 December 1969, p. 1, c ited in CDSP, 52 
(January, 1980): 25.
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Many Western observers worried about the po litica l orientation o f 
Afghan o fficers trained in the U.S.S.R. and the fa c t that Soviet 
personnel served as advisors to Afghan m ilita ry  schools. The Afghan 
government however, maintained its b i-ta ra fi ("without-sides") pattern 
and dispatched some officers to the U.S.A. fo r training...Afghan 
o fficers, trained in Russia and U.S., o ften compare the ir experiences and 
find them reasonably sim ilar...
Neither the U.S.A. not the U.S.S.R. turned out to be the paradises 
painted by the ir respective propaganda...The end result of Soviet (and 
American) m ilita ry tra in ing tends to make the m ilita ry  even more pro- 
Afghan than pro-Soviet...
Thus, Dupree sees the tra in ing in foreign countries as having a 
positive e ffe c t on the nationalistic sentiments of the Afghan m ilita ry  
o fficers. A fte r travelling to  the Soviet Union, most o fficers returned 
home w ith  a clearer view o f the rea lities of life  in Russia, and were 
glad to be citizens o f the ir own nation. In any event, the penetration 
and control of the Afghan o ffice r corps by the Soviets remains debatable.
M ilita ry  relations continued in consistent fashion fo llow ing the 
return o f Daoud in 1973. Arms transfers from  the Soviet Bloc increased 
from $66 m illion in the period 1971-1972 to $137 m illion in 1973-1974. 
These arms transfers included such re la tive ly  modern equipment as armored 
personnel carriers, modern a rtille ry , T-62 main battle  tanks, and MiG-21
9Q
a irc ra ft. From 1975 to 1977, during the years o f increased fle x ib il ity  
in Afghanistan's foreign relations, Soviet arms transfers continued 
unabated w ith  record deliveries o f 127 m illion dollars worth o f equipment 
in 1977.30
Soviet m ilita ry  and economic aid policies in Afghanistan served 
mutually beneficial needs through 1979. As mentioned earlier 
Afghanistan's requirements fo r defensive weapons had been rejected by the
^D upree, Afghanistan, pp. §25-526.
9Q
^Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 36.
30Ibid., pp. 40-41.
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United States a fte r repeated requests fo r aid in the 1950s.
Afghanistan's ho s tility  toward Pakistan and its perception of a Pakistani 
threat (whether real or imagined) served the Soviet interests as well.
Since 1954 Pakistan had been part of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty 
Organization), and had joined CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) a year
O 1
la tte r. These two alliance systems are known as the "northern tie r"  in 
the U.S. defence plan to contain communism. Afghanistan and India, both 
Soviet allies, are the major breaks in the chain o f U.S. allies on the 
Soviet southern border. The Soviets served the Afghans' needs by 
providing aid and weapons used to deter Pakistan. The Afghans served 
Soviet needs by providing a buffer between Pakistan and Soviet Central 
Asia.
Economic and M ilitary Relations 1978-1979
Many Afghan experts maintain that s ign ificant signs o f Soviet 
com plic ity are evident in the A p ril 1978 communist coup. These analysts 
have pointed to  the high number of economic and aid agreements signed in 
1978 as evidence o f prior Soviet planning. One analyst, David C haffetz 
states:
The scale on which they have backed Daoud's le f t is t successors speaks 
volumes. Immediately tw en ty-five  agreements w ith  Comecon countries were 
signed by the new regime; an unusual burst o f diplomacy on the part o f a 
government scarcely secure in its  own capita l. While street figh ting  
went on in Kabul, the government began contracting fo r Bulgarian 
television and East German prin ting equipment, together w ith  an 
additional $22 m illion  from  the Soviet Union to exploit natural gas...
This description is only true on a superfic ia l level. C haffetz
fa ils  to point out tha t almost a ll of the 60 post-1978 agreements had
Ol
Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, p. 35.
^ D a v id  C haffe tz, "Afghanistan in Turm oil," International A ffa irs  
(London), (January 1980), p. 20.
7^
been negotiated w ith the Daoud regime, and approximately s ix ty -five
percent o f the funding fo r these projects came from pre-1978 credits.
There is no tru th  to the statement tha t agreements were signed while
*}*>
figh ting  continued in the streets o f Kabul.
Included in these 60 agreements w ith  the new regime was one to build 
a bridge over the Amu Darya R iver, and new loans from  East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. Later in 1979, Afghanistan signed a trade agreement w ith 
the Comecon (the Soviet bloc equivalent o f the European Economic 
Community). The Soviets also announced a 10-year moratorium on 
Afghanistan's substantial debt. In exchange fo r these agreements, the 
Soviets received a steady supply o f high-grade cement and nearly 3 
b illion cubic meters o f natural gas at about one-quarter of the world 
price. Also, by the end o f 1978 the Soviets had more than doubled the ir 
pre-coup 350-man m ilita ry  advisory contingent.34
The new regime was soon faced by country wide opposition to  its 
drastic reform  policies (these policies w ill be outlined and discussed in 
chapter six). As the rebellion spread, the communist regime was 
progressively less able to suppress it ,  and the Soviets increased the ir 
supportive role. By the middle o f 1979 there were approximately 4,500 
m ilita ry  advisors in the country, and Soviet pilots began fly ing  
helicopter gunships and je t fighters in attacks on the rebels. The 
Soviets also sent a special unit o f airborne troops to assume contro l of
OC
Bagram a irfie ld , the major m ilita ry  base north o f Kabul.
q q
Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan, p. 52.
34Ibid., p* 54*
33Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 75.
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In a Soviet history o f Afghanistan published in 1981, the historian,
Ghulam Muradov, Senior Researcher at the Institu te  of O riental Studies, 
justifies the increase in troops:
The real danger that loomed over the April revolution and the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan was fu lly  realized by M.N. Taraki and H. Amin. 
That is why firs t N.M. Taraki and then H. Amin, proceeding from the 
Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation 
o f December 5, 1978, as well as A rtic le  51 o f the UN Charter, asked the 
USSR several times in 1979 to send units o f the Soviet Arm y to 
Afghanistan. A fte r numerous requests o f the Afghan Government, a lim ited  
contingent o f Soviet troops was sent to Afghanistan.
Later in the year, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev would echo 
these sentiments fo llow ing the invasion.
Invasion Plans
The Politburo may have begun to consider the possibility of m ilita ry  
intervention as early as the spring of 1979. General Ivan G. Pavlovski, 
a specialist on intervention, visited Afghanistan and surveyed the 
situation from  August to October 1979. He had made a tr ip  to 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 prior to the Soviet invasion of tha t country and 
had commanded the invading Eastern-bloc troops. Personnel and equipment 
began to accumulate in Soviet Central Asia. Reserve units were 
mobilized, and additional troops were transferred from  the western 
USSR.37
Statements appearing in Soviet m ilita ry  journals in early 1979 
indicate that Soviet m ilita ry  theorists were considering the v iab ility  of 
war as a tool o f state policy. They may may have been intentionally 
w riting  a pre-invasion jus tifica tion  fo r Soviet intervention w ith in
Ghulam Muradov, "The Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan: Second 
Stage o f the A p ril Revolution,” Afghanistan: Past and Present, (Moscow: 
USSR Academy o f Sciences, 1981), p. 185.
0 7
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 97.
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contemporary m ilita ry  doctrine. Colonel V. Vorobiev reported in Red 
Star:
Force can be employed because it  is derived from the ruling class, and 
based on the higher principles of Socialism, on order and organization. 
Such force can be justified  only i f  i t  overcomes the resistance o f 
reactionary forces and promotes the progressive developments o f 
society.
In another a rtic le  Colonel K. Vorobiev stated:
Experience shows that only by using armed force can one defend the 
revolutionary conquests from  the attacks o f im peria list interventionists, 
surprise the attacks o f the
enemies o f social progress, and assure the development o f a country 
proceeding along a socialist path.
According to the Soviet perception, the above course o f events was 
occurring in Afghanistan, and the Soviets may have wanted a m ilita ry  
doctrine based in Leninist principles to ju s tify  their actions. A rtic les 
in the Soviet press spoke o f increased in filtra tio n  by counter­
revolutionary forces and warned that the U.S.S.R. could not remain
ind iffe ren t to Pakistani and Chinese cooperation directed against 
40Afghanistan. Soviet journalist Lenoid Teplinsky would la te r w rite :
By the end o f 1979 the situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan had sharply aggravated. The imperialists and the ir henchmen 
had v irtu a lly  started an undeclared war against the revolutionary Afghan 
people. Thousands upon thousand o f rebels armed and trained abroad, 
whole armed units were sent over to Afghan te rrito ry . In 1979 alone,
Colonel V. Vorobiev, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sept. 6, 1979, cited by, 
A lfred  L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, p. 42 (emphasis 
mine).
OQ
Colonel K. Vorobiev, "The Incarnation o f Leninist Ideas on the 
Armed Defense of Socialism," Kommunist Voorushennykh S il, 1 (January 
1980): 22, cited in Ibid.
^®A. Petrov, Pravda, 1 June 1979, p. 5, cited in CDSP, 
21 (July, 1979): 20.
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about 15,000 mercenaries were trained at 70 special centers in 
Pakistan...
As mentioned earlier, fo llow ing the downfall o f Taraki as PDPA
chairman, relations between the Soviets and the new PDPA Chairman
Hafizullah Amin were strained. Despite personal animosity between Amin
and the Soviets, the rapidly deteriorating internal situation in
Afghanistan forced the two sides to work together fo r a short time.
Brezhnev and Kosygin publicly offered Amin the ir support. They offered
Amin an additional $6.7 m illion in m ilita ry  equipment as well as KGB
experts to help him improve the effic iency o f the Afghan secret police.
O ffic ia lly  economic relations continued much the same as before. For
example, the f irs t session o f a new Afghan-Soviet Economic Commission was
held in Moscow on October 27, and sim ilar meetings between o ffic ia ls  of
42the two countries continued throughout the last days of Amin's rule.
Economic and m ilita ry  relations between the two countries prior to
the communist coup o f 1978 are summarized well by Richard Newell:
The Soviet Union's m ilita ry  role and its domination o f many fie lds of 
economic development have inspired alarm that Afghanistan was about to 
lose its independence e ither to d irect Russian d icta tion or through 
internal manipulation o f its  p o litica l system. The USSR accounts fo r 
more than one-half o f Afghanistan's imports and exports and an even 
larger share o f the countries overland trade. In fa c t, however, the 
Russians have not used the ir m ilita ry  or economic leverage to in terfere  
more than peripherally w ith  Afghan affa irs. This forbearance probably 
stems from  the realization tha t the benefits to the Russians from  control 
over Afghanistan would be outweighed by the costs o f pacification and 
international resentment, especially among other Muslim countries w ith  
which the Russians desire to have close relations.
Lenoid Teplinsky, "Soviet-Afghan Cooperation: Lenin's Behest 
Implemented," Afghanistan: Past and Present, (Moscow: USSR Academy o f 
Sciences, 1981), p. 218.
42Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 88-89.
^R ic h a rd  Newell, "Foreign Relations," in Afghanistan in the 1970s, 
ed. Louis Dupree and L ine tte  A lbert (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 
p. 85.
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Newell's analysis o f the history o f Soviet-Afghan relations is true 
to a great extent because the Afghans' a b ility  to deal w ith the ir own 
internal d ifficu ltie s  w ithout asking fo r outside assistance. Each 
successive Afghan ru ler was able to maintain Afghanistan's independence, 
and at the same tim e u tilize  the USSR and other countries fo r aid. The 
Afghan communists under Taraki and Amin destroyed this tenuous balance by 
d irec tly  aligning themselves w ith the USSR. Asking fo r increased Russian 
assistance and d irec t involvement by Soviet m ilita ry  personnel in 1978- 
1979 fundamentally shifted the basis o f relations from  one o f friendship 
and cooperation under Daoud, to alliance under the PDPA.
Chapter VI
The Evolution of Marxism in Afghanistan
Capitalism w ill not perish o f itse lf; i t  w ill be overthrown by the 
victorious proletarian revolution. For the leadership of this 
revolution there are needed Bolshevist parties which know how to place 
themselves at the head of the working masses and to win fo r the ir 
struggle the sympathy and support of the broad masses of the peasantry, 
the urban bourgeoisie, and the oppressed colonial peoples.
-  On the Task of the Communist Parties 
Pravda, April 24, 1931
The Communist International -  Comintern
One o f the most important elements in early Soviet foreign policy
was the Communist International -  the Comintern. The Comintern was
organized to function as the operational spearhead fo r the spread of
world-wide revolution. Revolution was to  be instigated by local
communist parties in various nations under the guidance o f the Soviet
Union. Soviet policy utilized the Comintern fo r two basic purposes: to
exploit antagonisms w ith in  the cap ita lis t world in order to breed
dissent among the working class, and, to safeguard the security o f the
Soviet Union by keeping cap ita lis tic  nations o f f  balance in suppressing
the ir own internal disorders.*
*
The "Manifesto o f the Communist In ternational," w ritten  by Leon 
Trotsky in 1919, re flected the optim ism of Lenin and the rest o f the 
Bolshevik leaders. The concept tha t the nations dominated by 
imperialism could be transformed d ire c tly  from  the pre-cap ita lis t stage 
of development to socialism was an integral part o f early Comintern
*Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, pp. 51-52.
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philosophy. This transformation in South Asia would take place w ith in  
the context o f a European social revolution in which the once dominant 
colonial powers would aid the newly independent form er colonies. Trotsky 
writes:
The emancipation o f the colonies is possible only in conjunction w ith the 
emancipation of the metropolitan working class. The workers and peasants 
of Annam, Algiers, and Bengal, and also o f Persia and Armenia, w ill gain 
the ir opportunity fo r independent existence only when the workers of 
England have taken state power in the ir own hands...If cap ita lis t Europe 
fo rc ib ly  dragged the backward section of the world into the cap ita lis t 
whirlpool, a socialist Europe w ill come to the aid o f liberated colonies 
w ith  its technology, its  organization, its  sp iritua l forces, in order to 
fa c ilita te  the ir transition to a planned organized socialist economy.
The only manifestation o f the early Comintern policies re lating to
Afghanistan was the "F irs t Congress o f the Peoples o f the East," held in
Baku in 1920. Following the 1921 peace trea ty  between the Soviets and
Amanullah, and sim ilar agreements w ith the leaders o f Turkey and Persia,
the Comintern’s ac tiv ities  in the East were p rim arily  focused on China,
O
and the Arab states were le f t  to the ir own devices. By the late 1920s 
a ll foreign Communist Parties were under control of the Communist party 
o f the Soviet Union and accepted the leadership role o f the Soviets.
Thus, the Comintern became a instrument of Soviet fore ign policy.4
The Comintern in Afghanistan 
The presence o f communist organizers in Afghanistan date back to 
King Amanullah's reign. The Comintern had made some fu tile  attem pts in 
1919 to generate revolutionary cadres in the country. Afghanistan had
2
Leon Trotsky, "Manifesto o f the Communist In ternational," The 
Communist International, 1919-1943, ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951), pp. 42-43.
Richard L. Levengood, "The Soviet Doctrine o f National Self- 
Determination in Theory and Practice," (M.A. dissertation, Montana State 
University, 1964), p. 97.
^Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, p. 53.
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been one of the targets o f a general propaganda campaign that the 
Comintern had launched from  Germany. As part of that e ffo r t, lithographed 
pamphlets w ritten  in native languages and calling fo r national and social 
liberation movements had been widely distributed in Asia. An Afghan 
representative had attended an Eastern Communist Central Committee 
meeting held in Berlin in 1919, and Afghans had participated as well in 
the Comintern-sponsored Congress o f Eastern Peoples in Baku in 1920.
Some reports also indicate that a few communist agitators were active in 
Herat and M azar-i-Sharif, one of the sites chosen by the Comintern 
Executive Committee in the 1920s as a propaganda center. However, there 
were few, i f  any, Marxists in Afghanistan before the form ation of the 
PDPA in 1965. H is torica lly , Afghan governments energetically resisted 
the dissemination o f Bolshevik propaganda on Afghan soil, even as they 
sought to maintain friend ly d ip lom atic relations w ith  the Soviet Union. ̂
The PDPA
On January 1, 1965 the People's Democratic Party o f Afghanistan 
(PDPA) was formed. PDPA members were identified as '’comrade,”  fo llow ing 
Soviet organization and style . A seven member centra l com m ittee, which 
included Taraki and Karmal, was chosen and Taraki was elected as general 
secretary. This body o ff ic ia lly  adopted orthodox M arxist-Leninist 
ideology, and its organizational structure s tr ic tly  im ita ted  o f the
7
Soviet model.
The largest problem facing the PDPA leadership was (and is) the lack 
o f popular support drawn from  the working class in Afghanistan.
'’ Gregorian, The Emergence o f Modern Afghanistan, pp. 237-238.
£
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Approximately 20,000 people, (only .07% of the population), could be
Q
considered industria l workers in the mid-1960s. A Soviet w rite r would 
la ter comment on sim ilar problems facing the revolutionary movement in 
1978:
The backwardness of pre-revolutionary Afghanistan was also 
manifested in:
- the unequal development of the various regions of the country.
-  the presence o f numerous groups o f the rural and urban population 
closely connected w ith precapitalist economic structures, and which 
retained many features of a trad itiona l social organisation <sic>.
- the small number and weakness of the modern industrial p ro le taria t, 
which hardly reached 50,000.
- ...traditions o f communal and patriarchal (triba l) organisation <sic>, 
especially among the Pushtuns and Baluchis liv ing  in the southern regions 
of Afghanistan, and the considerable influence of the so-called 
trad itiona l leaders (Khans, maliks and sardars o f tribes and Moslem 
dignitaries) on the local population. -
The orig inal PDPA leadership included doctors, administrators, 
students, and w riters, but no workers or peasants. The task o f expanding 
the original membership was d if f ic u lt , but the communists found Kabul 
University to be the most fe rtile  ground fo r recru itm ent.1®
Early ac tiv ities  o f the PDPA appear to have been lim ited  to leading 
the aforementioned student demonstration in protest o f the appointment o f 
Dr. Yussuf as Prime M inister in 1965, as well as publishing Marxist 
propaganda attacks against the government. Taking advantage o f the 
freedom of the press that King Zahir had granted as part o f his "New 
Democracy," the PDPA started a newspaper called Khalq (meaning "masses"). 
Six issues were published during A p ril and May, 1966. Some readers who
8Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 44.
®Muradov, "The Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan: The Second Stage 
of the A p ril Revolution," p. 179.
10Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, pp.45-46.
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studied the papers in deta il found the form at and phraseology untypical
o f usual Kabul writings and more like materials from  Soviet Tajikistan.
The government soon thereafte r closed Khalq under provisions o f the press
law fo r protecting public security. The extent o f Soviet involvement in
the publication is unclear, but some degree o f aid is probable. 11
In 1967 the PDPA sp lit into several factions, the two largest being
Khalq, headed by Taraki, and Parcham (meaning "banner"), headed by
Karmal. Taraki favored a Leninist-type party based on the working class,
while Karmal wanted to form  a broad based national-democratic front.
Much to the annoyance o f the Khalq faction, Karmal was able to publish
the newspaper Parcham fo r more than a year fo llow ing the governments
closure of Khalq. The sp lit between the communist leaders was caused
1 2more by b itte r personality con flic ts  than by ideological differences.
The two other le f t is t factions were more Maoist than Marxist in
character. Shu'la-i-Jawed (Eternal Flame) was a Parcham splinter group
which accused Karmal o f revisionist views. I t  was known as "chup-i-ehup"
in Kabul, meaning " le ft -o f- le ft" .  Setem-i-Meli ("against national
oppression") was an outspoken Maoist organization which promoted the
interest o f a ll non-Pushtun ethnic m inorities, and worked to organize the 
11peasant population.
The early breakdown o f the PDPA is evidence o f its weakness as a 
viable po litica l organization. During this moment in Afghan history, 
M arxist-Leninist ideology appears to  have been l i t t le  more than an 
appealing anti-government p la tform  fo r a small number o f disgruntled
11Ibid., p. 49.
12“ Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 32.
13Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-81, p. 59.
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urban inte llectuals to ra lly  behind. Marxist a ffilia t io n  and 
understanding was in fantile  at best.
Apparently the Russians maintained ties w ith  both major factions, 
keeping its options open, and waiting to see how events would unfold.
They did not regard either faction as a fu ll-fledged communist party.
For over five  decades prior to the 1978 revolution, no Afghan delegate 
was invited to any international communist conference, nor were 
statements by Afghan communists ever published or announced outside of 
Afghanistan. Perhaps the Krem lin did not take the PDPA seriously, and 
the Soviet's perceived best interests lay w ith  the more trad itiona l 
powers in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Afghan communists looked to the 
USSR as the ir mentor, model and friend . 14 Despite the early internal 
conflicts faced by the communist organization, the PDPA managed to 
survive and remained active ly  involved in s tirr in g  up anti-government 
sentiment over the next decade.
The Communists Seize Power 
A fte r years o f b itte r riva lry , the two communist factions fina lly  
agreed to unite in 1978. This merger is believed to  have resulted from  
Soviet pressure. This pressure was exerted through other communist
1 C
parties in the region, including the Communist Party o f India.
Although Parcham had closer ties to  Moscow, Taraki was chosen as leader 
o f the unified party because the Khalqis had more supporters in the 
m ilita ry  a t tha t tim e. I t  is unknown whether the Soviets intended the 
PDPA to  seize power, or only to put more pressure on Daoud to  m odify his
14Ibid., pp. 32-33.
^ F re d  Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," New L e ft Review, 112 
(November/December 1978): 31.
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increasingly independent foreign policies. The best Soviet e ffo rts ,
however, where not able to do more than paper over the differences
1 fibetween the riva l PDPA factions fo r a short time.
Apparently neither the communists nor anyone else expected Daoud's 
government to crumble as quickly as i t  actually did. The sequence of 
events leading up to the communist coup began on A p ril 17, 1978. On this 
date M ir Akbar Khyber, a form er leader o f Parcham, was assassinated. The 
k ille r was never discovered, although the CIA, KGB, and PDPA itse lf, came 
under suspicion. Khyber's death made him a m artyr fo r the communist 
cause. A crowd estimated between 15,000-30,000 people turned out fo r the 
funeral on A pril 19, which evolved into a PDPA orchestrated anti-Am erican 
ra lly. Taraki and Karmal both made strong speeches aimed at the American 
embassy. Daoud was alarmed at the unusually large crowd, and he ordered
i 7
the arrest o f PDPA leaders. The fo llow ing week Daoud's security police 
made a midnight raid that netted seven ranking PDPA Central Committee 
members, including Taraki, Karmal, and Amin. A ll were jailed immediately
IQ
with the exception o f Amin who was loosely held under house arrest.
The actual coup began on A p ril 27. Experts have disputed who 
actually organized the coup. The o ff ic ia l version holds that Amin was 
able to d irect the coup while under house arrest. Others speculate that 
pro-PDPA m ilita ry  o fficers, namely Major Waranjar and Colonel Quadir -  
the same commanders that aided Daoud in the 1973 overthrow o f King Zahir, 
planned the coup. Waranjar and Quadir knew tha t the combination o f the ir
16°Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and 
Khalq (Stanford: Hoover Institu tion  Press, 1983), p. 56.
1 7Bradsher, The Soviets and Afghanistan, p. 73.
1 Q
°Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, p. 57.
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roles in overthrowing the old regime, the ir fa lling  out w ith  Daoud over
his fa ilure to implement reforms, and the ir connections w ith  the illegal
PDPA put them at risk o f being purged from the m ilita ry  and government.
They decided to move firs t. The general consensus o f Afghan observers is
that a combination o f PDPA activ ists and dissatisfied jun io r m ilita ry
personnel were mutually responsible fo r the planning and execution of the 
19coup.
Unlike the 1973 a ffa ir, the 1978 coup was fa r from  being bloodless.
A combination of daring, improvisation and sheer luck on the side o f the
rebel o fficers won the day against formidable odds. Far from  having mass
support in the army and a ir force (as the post-coup propaganda claimed),
the PDPA only controlled a few hundred members in the o ffic e r corps.
They were well placed, however, to be brought into action. Also on the
PDPA side was the general lack o f commitment to the Daoud government
which served to paralyse senior m ilita ry  o fficers when they were called
on to bring the ir troops to support Daoud. Inertia on the part of almost
the entire Afghan m ilita ry  eventually allowed the rebel troops to
overcome those few Daoud loyalists who chose to figh t. Daoud and almost
20twenty of his relatives were k illed  a fte r refusing to surrender.
Analysis o f the coup, even by most o f the hard-line anti-Soviet 
w riters, points to lim ited  Soviet involvement at best. I f  the Soviets 
gave the PDPA orders or suggestions that they overthrow Daoud, they did 
not choose A p ril 27 as the pa rticu la r date. L it t le  prior consultation 
w ith  the Soviets could have occurred while the PDPA leadership was under 
arrest. I t  is possible, however, tha t the Krem lin had to ld  PDPA earlie r
1 Q
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to take power whenever a favorable opportunity presented itse lf. The
Soviets most like ly  knew something about the coup and approved it  in
advance, but the ir prior notice was probably minimal. A t the time there
were 3000 Soviet advisors in Afghanistan, and the KGB and GEU had
extensive contacts in the Afghan m ilita ry . The arrest of PDPA leaders,
and not Soviet pressure, caused the wary m ilita ry  commanders to in itia te  
21the coup. When the coup erupted, the Soviet embassy acted as surprised
as other embassies. Soviet Ambassador Aleksander M. Puzanov was o ff
trou t fishing in the Hindu Kush -  hardly the most strategic position from
22which to d irect a rebellion.
The New Regime 
Once they had ousted Daoud, the revolutionaries immediately 
established a new government and started ruling by decree. Taraki was 
named both President and Prime M inister, and he retained the post o f PDPA 
Secretary General. The cabinet consisted o f eleven members o f Khalq and 
ten Parchamis. Amin was named the Deputy Prime M inister and Foreign 
M inister, and Karmal was named Vice-President. The m ilita ry  men,
Waranjar and Quadir, were promoted and also given cabinet posts.
Afghanistan's new leaders insisted they were non-aligned and repeatedly
23denied to the foreign press that the PDPA was even Marxist.
The actions and statements o f the new regime clearly defined its 
M arxist orientation. Afghanistan could only be considered non-aligned in 
the same sense as Castro's Cuba. Taraki drew Afghanistan even closer to 
the Soviet Union. As previously mentioned, on December 5, 1978, a
21 Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 54.
22 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 83.
^**New York Times, 30 A pril 1981, p. 10.
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twenty-year trea ty  of friendship and cooperation was signed in Moscow 
(sim ilar to the one Moscow had concluded w ith Vietnam the previous 
month), which called on Afghan communists to increase the ir contacts w ith 
the Soviets.
The new regime began a series o f purges, imprisonments and
executions. Thousands of Daoud’s c iv il servants, diplomats, governors,
police, professors, and the like were tossed into ja il, and the ir
positions were fille d  w ith  party fa ith fu ls  who possessed l i t t le
24experience in government. The honeymoon also ended between Parcham and 
Khalq. Most o f the Parcham is were purged from  the cabinet by Taraki in 
July, 1978. Some of these Parchamis were demoted and assigned to 
dip lom atic posts abroad. Karmal was one o f Taraki's v ictim s. Following 
his ordered recall as ambassador to Prague, Karmal refused to  re turn to 
Kabul. Apparently the Soviets kept him safe in Moscow in case he should 
ever be needed. Lesser members o f Parcham, including hundreds o f
9Q
m ilita ry  o fficers, were also purged from important positions.
Along w ith  the po litica l purge, Taraki pursued an ambitious plan of 
rapid social and economic reforms. These reforms were pressed forward 
w ith  revolutionary zeal. The f irs t  months o f the PDPA regime appear to 
have gone re la tive ly  well. The mass of the rura l population seemed to be 
adopting a cautious position toward the new policies o f spreading 
educational and health opportunities and granting cu ltu ra l rights to 
nationalities.^®
^ H a llid a y , "Revolution in Afghanistan," pp. 37-38.
aHammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 68.
^®Fred Halliday, "War in Afghanistan," New L e ft Review, 3 (Jan-Feb
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Keeping w ith  trad ition , the Afghans soon became weary of government
o ffic ia ls  in te rfe ring  in the ir lives. The m ajority o f the new PDPA
reforms were seen as an ti-trad itiona l and thus were very unpopular. As
in other communist-led nations, the attem pt to impose rapid and a rb itra ry
change by brute force, against the wishes o f the people, produced not
progress but chaos, bloodshed and c iv il war. Programs addressing land
reform, marriage laws and other social issues threatened the foundations
of trad itiona l Afghan social behavior, and were implemented so quickly
that even the Soviets la te r critic ized  them. Although the fa iled reform
policies had been introduced under Taraki, fo r p o litica l reasons the
Soviets would la te r place the m ajority of blame on Amin:
Great harm to the revolution has been done by Hafizullah Amin who wormed 
his way to power by intrigues and deceit. H. Amin used impermissible 
methods in implementing such major transformations as the agrarian 
reforms and the liqu idation of adult illite ra cy , which distorted the ir 
progressive essence. People's traditions and religious convictions were 
ignored, there were crude violations o f revolutionary lega lity , arrests 
and executions, w ithout tr ia l or investigation, of innocent people, 
including honest members o f the PDPA.
The single fa c to r tha t probably did the most to create antagonism 
toward the communist regime was its lack o f Islamic religious credentials 
and apparent adherense to atheism. To make matters worse, the Moslem 
green was replaced by the communist red in the Afghan flag. In a country 
consisting o f v ir tu a lly  10096 devout Moslems, a the istic communistic 
leaders were bound to command very l i t t le  respect. I t  almost appears 
that the Taraki regime system atically planned to alienate every segment 
o f the Afghan populace by implementing radical policies in a society
OQ
bound by trad ition .
27 Muradov, "The Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan: Second Stage of 
the A pril Revolution,”  p. 183.
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As a result of this endless string o f blunders by the new regime, 
the Afghans rebelled. By the fa ll o f 1978 the uprisings had spread to 
a ll 29 provinces. The revolt cut across almost every segment of Afghan 
society. The opposition included not only religious leaders and 
landlords, but also v irtua lly  a ll classes and occupations w ith in the 
general population. In March 1979, Afghan soldiers in the c ity  o f Herat 
joined in the rebellion. In the bloodbath that followed, many government 
o ffic ia ls  as well as a number of Soviet advisors and the ir fam ilies were 
beheaded. Their heads were stuck on poles and paraded around the c ity  in 
triumph. Soldiers also mutinied in Kabul, and in a ll these instances 
brutal countermeasures were used by the government forces.
As the rebellion grew and the communist government showed itse lf 
less able to suppress it ,  the Soviets w[ere forced to increase the ir role 
in the con flic t. By November, 1979 there were more than 4500 m ilita ry  
advisers in the country. As mentioned in chapter five , increased 
supplies o f modern m ilita ry  equipment were sent into Afghanistan, and 
Soviet p ilots in helicopter gunships and je t a irc ra ft began to f ly  combat 
missions against rebel positions. The Soviets sent troops to assume 
control o f strategic a irfie lds, roads, and bridges. Step by step, Moscow
OQ
was moving toward massive intervention.
The Soviets were clearly worried about the country holding together 
under PDPA leadership. In addition to  o ffering weapons and ideological 
advice, Moscow attempted to strengthen the PDPA government among the 
people. The main agent fo r  this policy was Vasily S. Safronchuk, who 
arrived in Kabul a few weeks a fte r the Herat uprising. Safronchuk was a 
career diplomat who had been the Soviet ambassador to Ghana and the
OQ
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deputy permanent representative to the United Nations from 1971 to 1976. 
Taraki and Amin were shown attending prayer services and were pressed to 
patch up relations w ith  the remaining Parcham leaders. The Khalq 
leaders, however, rejected the Soviet sponsored-proposal fo r another 
reunion. Safronchuk urged Taraki to broaden the government's base by 
including some non-communists, a suggestion which was as ine ffective  in 
generating popular support as were the m ajority of Safronchuk's
O A
suggestions, which were ignored by the Afghan leaders.
The Soviets focused the ir displeasure w ith the upstart Afghans on 
Amin, who was the real mover of Afghan policy. Apparently Taraki had 
taken more o f a figurehead role while Amin actually controlled the 
government. The Soviets attempted to undermine Amin from  w ithin. Amin 
was somehow able to thw art a ll Soviet attem pts to remove him. Taraki, 
a fte r returning from  a tr ip  to Cuba, stopped in Moscow fo r in form al talks 
w ith  Brezhnev. He was instructed to manuever Amin out o f the Afghan 
government. Shortly a fte r his return to Kabul a gun battle  occurred at 
the presidential palace in which the target, Amin, escaped unharmed.
Taraki, however, was not so lucky; he became the f irs t communist leader 
to be added to the long lis t o f Afghan leaders who experienced violent 
death in o ffice . Amin was immediately proclaimed President and took over 
a ll of Taraki's duties.'*1
The Soviets had been caught by surprise again. The man they wished 
removed was now in charge. Amin in turn did not trust the Soviets and 
went so fa r as to  accuse publicly the Soviet ambassador o f helping to 
p lo t against him. The Soviets were asked to  replace Ambassador Puzanov,
to Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, pp. 103-104.
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and were fu rthe r insulted by Am in’s absence from  a reception in
celebration of the Great October Revolution at the Soviet embassy in 
32Kabul. Amin had embarrassed the Soviets by ousting the man so recently
seen w ith Brezhnev. The Soviets decided, fo r the time being, to work
w ith  Amin. Amin pacified the Soviets somewhat by carrying out one of the
main policies that Moscow had been advocating: broadening the base of
popular support. Amin also made e ffo rts  to pacify his Moslem subjects by
promising them religious freedom, repairing mosques and re fe rring  to
passages in the Koran in his speeches. Most Afghans paid no attention to
these feeble attem pts by Amin to convince them he was a good Moslem and
the representative of Allah. Amin's e ffo rts  were too l i t t le  too late,
00
and his 100 days of rule were soon to be abruptly term inated.
The Politburo sent a Soviet general o f the KGB to Afghanistan to 
take over the direction o f the secret police. This o ffice r, General 
V ic to r Paputin, disappeared under strange circumstances and was believed 
to have com m itted suicide a fte r fa iling  in his real mission of 
assassinating Amin. Paputin was never seen again a fte r a mysterious 
shooting incident at the presidential palaee in mid-December 1979.34
The Soviet Invasion 
There are no clear and consistent accounts of what actua lly occurred 
in the last days o f December 1979. Western analysts were skeptical of 
Soviet claims tha t Amin called fo r  Russian assistance. However, i t  would 
appear as i f  this may actually have been the case. What seems to have 
caused the confusion is the widely held Western view that 100,000 Soviet
on
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93
troops invaded the country a ll at once, killed Amin, and began the 
occupation. Actually, Soviet forces intervened in two phases, the f irs t 
o f which may have been w ith  Amin's approval. It was these f irs t troops 
which paved the way fo r the massive infusion of Soviet forces which 
followed the ir a rriva l, and these troops were responsible fo r Amin's 
demise.
Available evidence suggests that Amin did issue some kind o f request
fo r a lim ited contingent o f Soviet m ilita ry  forces to be used in sm all-
scale engagements and detached from  the Soviet army chain o f command.
The Soviets apparently would not agree to put the ir forces under Afghan
command or even some sort o f jo in t Afghan-Soviet s ta ff. For the ir part
the Soviets allegedly offered to  provide 5,000 troops i f  Amin would agree
to le t them build the ir own bases and function autonomously from  Afghan
control, an o ffe r Amin rejected. As late as December 26, Amin is
supposed to have told an Arab journalist that the Soviet Union respected
Afghan independence and that Soviet forces were coming to help him put 
“isdown the rebellion.
From December 24-26, approximately 5,000 Soviet airborne troops 
landed in a steady stream o f transport a irc ra ft at the Bagram m ilita ry  
airbase north o f Kabul. There was no reaction by Afghan ground forces 
which would indicate tha t the Soviet troops were unexpected arrivals. The 
Afghan forces did not oppose the Soviet forces and apparently had 
received approval o f the Soviet landing in advance. The actual figh ting  
began on the evening o f December 27. Western reports describe an 
explosion at the Kabul M in istry o f Communication as the signal fo r  Soviet 
troops to move into action. Soviet forces apparently quickly seized a ll
OC
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strategic points in the c ity , and Soviet speciail forces units attacked 
and killed Amin and his small contingent o f personal supporters.
In the early morning hours follow ing Amin's death, Kabul Radio 
broadcast a message from  Babrak Karmal which announced the form ation o f a 
new government under his leadership. On this date, 27 December 1979, he 
o ffic ia lly  asked the Soviet Union fo r assistance:
Because o f the continuation and expansion o f aggression, intervention, 
and provocations by the foreign enemies of Afghanistan and fo r the 
purpose of defending the gains o f the Saur Revolution, te rr ito r ia l 
in tegrity, national independence and preservation of peace and security, 
and on the basis o f the trea ty  o f friendship, good-neighborliness and 
cooperation date 5 December 1978, the Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan 
earnestly demands tha t the USSR render urgently po litica l, moral, and 
economic assistance, including m ilita ry  aid, to  Afghanistan. The 
government of the USSR has accepted the proposal o f the Afghan side.
Western sources claim  this message was brodcast from  a powerful 
transm itter inside the Soviet Union operating on the Kabul radio 
frequency. Karmal would la tte r claim that he had returned before the 
Soviet troops entered the country and had directed the coup against Amin.
Soviet sources present the coup aganist Amin as an internal Afghan 
a ffa ir which did not involve Soviet troops. Soviet historian Ghulam 
Muradov tersely summarizes what occurred:
The situation tha t was taking shape in Afghanistan at the end of
1978 and in 1979 caused the alarm and indignation on the part o f many 
leaders and rank-and-file members of the PDPA, as w ell as among non-party 
patriots in a ll the sections o f Afghan society. Discontent caused by the 
activ ities o f Hafizullah Amin and the mass repressions carried out on his 
orders were spreading. More and more people became convinced tha t only 
the liquidation o f the Amin regime and re c tifica tion  o f his mistakes and 
crimes could open the road to realizing the ideals of the A p ril 
revolution and improve the situation in the party and country as a whole.
H. Amin lost support in the party, among the people and by the end of
1979 found himself completely isolated. On December 27, 1979, the
^B radsher, The Soviets and Afghanistan, p. 179-181.
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patriotica lly-m inded m ajority of the PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and 
the armed forces of the DR.A overthrew the crim inal regime of H. Amin.
The Soviet account presents the coup as s tr ic tly  a PDPA a ffa ir  and 
does not acknowledge the involvement, or even the presence, o f Russian 
troops. Soviet troops were claimed to have only entered Afghanistan in 
large numbers a fte r Karmal's request, and Soviet forces already in Kabul 
had not taken part in the figh ting  un til a fte r Amin's death. The tru th  
of the m atter w ill probably never be known. The only confirmed fa c t is 
that the Afghan government was under the leadership o f the Parchamis 
faction o f the PDPA, and that Babrak Karmal was fu lly  supported by the 
firepower of the Red Army. The history o f Soviet-Afghan relations had 
entered a fundamentally new phase.
**®Muradov, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Second Stage of 
the April Revolution,” p. 185.
Chapter VII 
Soviet-Afghan Relations 1979-1988
Soviet assistance to Afghanistan has just one objective: to stop 
the armed intervention against the Afghan revolution and a ll forms of 
im peria list interference in Afghanistan.
-  L.I. Brezhnev
Pravda, 17 October, 1980
Soviet Justifica tion
Within one hour o f the Kabul Radio report announcing the new 
Afghan government on December 28, 1979, the Soviet news agency TASS 
reported that Brezhnev had sent Karmal a congratulatory message on his 
new position as Afghanistan's leader:
I heartily  congratulate you on being elected as general secretary of 
the central committee...and to the senior state positions of 
Afghanistan.... I am sure that in the present conditions the Afghan 
people w ill succeed in defending the gains o f the A pril Revolution, the 
sovereignty, independence and national d ign ity o f the new Afghanistan.*
Brezhnev would shortly thereafter present the o ffic ia l Soviet line 
on the Afghan situation. He would ju s tify  the Soviet action by two 
sources o f international law: firs t, A rtic le  51 o f the U.N. Charter 
which guarantees a ll nations the righ t to individual or co llective  self 
defense when threatened by outside aggression (in this case the Afghan 
communists accused the United States, Pakistan, and China); and second, 
A rtic le  4 o f the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978 which called fo r m ilita ry  
co-operation to ensure security and te rr ito r ia l in tegrity  (see pp. 65- 
66). In a statement on January 13, 1980, in Pravda, Brezhnev spoke of
* Cited by Bradsher, The Soviets and Afghanistan, p. 185.
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the "forced nature" of the Soviet m ilita ry  aid to Afghanistan and its
9
temporary character. His statements remained as the basic Soviet view 
o f the situation during the course of the Brezhnev regime, and were le ft 
unchanged by the short-lived Andropov and Chernenko governments.
Brezhnev states:
It  was no simple decision fo r us to send Soviet m ilita ry  contingents to 
Afghanistan...But the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet 
Government acted in fu ll awareness of their responsibility and took into 
account a ll the relevant circumstances. The sole task o f the Soviet 
contingent is to assist the Afghans in repulsing the aggression from  
w ithout. They w ill be fu lly  withdrawn from Afghanistsm once the reasons 
fo r the Afghan leadership's request fo r them disappear.
The Soviets also attem pted to fu rther separate themselves from any
connection w ith  the ouster o f Amin. They went so fa r as to claim that
the introduction o f Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and Amin's death, were
mutually exclusive events:
The fa c t tha t the removal o f Amin took place concurrently w ith  the 
beginning o f the introduction o f the Soviet contingent is a pure 
coincidence in tim e and there is no causal relationship between the two 
events. The Soviet troops had nothing to do w ith  the removal of Amin and 
his accomplices. That was the doing o f the Afghans themselves.
Thus the Soviet position was established and would remain unchanged
un til the election o f M ikhail Gorbachev fo llow ing Chernenko's death. The
Soviets perceived the ir action as a legitim ate response to an allie's
ca ll fo r help. They were under trea ty  obligations to do so, and were
fu rthe r jus tified  by the charter o f the United Nations. Whether or not
the Soviet claims are valid is a m atter o f debate and speculation. What
is o f real interest, however, is the evolution o f events w ith in
9
Teplinsky, "Soviet-Afghan Cooperation: Lenin's Behest Implemented," 
p. 219.
^Pravda, January 13, 1980, cited in Ibid.
^New Times (Moscow), 17 (April, 1980): 18, cited by Hammond, Red
Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 100 (emphasis mine).
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Afghanistan and the USSR which have apparently led to a fundamental 
change in how the Soviets view the ir role in Afghan affa irs.
The Karmal Regime 
The new Afghan regime under Babrak Karmal immediately began to 
change the outward appearance o f the PDPA in accordance to Safronchuk's 
pacification policies. He sought to lessen the Marxist character o f the 
regime in order to appeal to the greater masses o f trad itiona l Afghan 
society. Karmal emphasized moderation in the goal o f socializing 
Afghanistan, and attempted to establish a broad based national fron t 
which included non-communist elements in his government. Karmal paid 
special a ttention to eradicating the perceived atheistic character o f his 
government. The fo llow ing lis t includes some of the o ffic ia l po litica l 
and social goals of the new administration:
-  The strengthening o f unity o f a ll -  big and small -  peoples and tribes 
of Afghanistan; complete elim ination o f a ll d iscrim ination o f Afghan 
citizens connected w ith  the ir nationality, language, race, tribe , sect, 
origin, education, sex, way o f life , property status;
-  the provision o f a ll Afghan Moslems w ith the necessary conditions, 
complete freedom and reliable protection in perform ing the religious 
rites required by Islam; the rendering o f assistance to the ulema (Moslem 
theologians) in discarding the ir duties;
-  the development and consolidation o f democracy on the principles of 
co llective leadership and democratic centralism.
-  s tr ic t adherence to the principles o f peaceful coexistence, non- 
alignment, positive neutra lity  and international so lidarity and 
cooperation w ith  the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and 
revolutionary forces o f our tim e.
Karmal's greatest e ffo r t was to convince the people that he was a
devout Moslem. His speeches opened w ith  the trad itiona l incantation, "In
the name o f Allah, the compassionate and m erc ifu l." Mullahs were brought
to Kabul fo r conferences and were sent on free tours of Soviet Central
5Muradov, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Second Stage of 
the A p ril Revolution," p. 187-188.
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Asia to convince them that the USSR was not suppressing Islam.® Karmal 
also announced a "to ta l amnesty for a ll those po litica l prisoners who 
have survived the bloody Amin regime." Many o f the prisoners were 
Parcham o ffic ia ls  who had been jailed fo llow ing Amin's rise to power and 
would take part in the new government. The government announced it  had
O
released 15,000 prisoners by July, 1980.
In spite o f these e ffo rts  to put a new face on the communist regime, 
and the fac t that his programs were more moderate than those o f his 
predecessors, Karmal had l i t t le  success in winning "the hearts and minds" 
of the Afghan populace. Karmal was looked upon as a weak tool o f the 
Russians, a greater sin than either Taraki or Amin had committed. They 
were hated fo r the ir policies and atheism, but they at least, were 
Afghans who had risen to power through the ir own devices. Karmal was
Q
viewed as a mere puppet o f the Soviet invaders.
The PDPA
One part of the Soviet plan to strengthen Karmal's regime was to end 
the bloody sp lit between the Khalq and Parcham factions o f the PDPA. 
Babrak Karmal was supposed to engineer this reunion, but was only 
m inimally successful in some areas, and was a complete fa ilu re  in others. 
Along w ith  Amin, the Khalqi leadership was a ll but wiped out under the 
new regime, but Khalqis s t i l l  outnumbered Parchamis by a considerable 
number in the lower echelons of the party, especially among the various
g
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 149.
*7
Kabul Radio, 1 January 1980, cited in Bradsher, Afghanistan and the 
Soviet Union, p. 186.
O
Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, pp. 187-188.
9Ibid., p. 151.
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branches of the armed forces. Remaining Khalqis resented Karmal's use of
Soviet m ilita ry  strength which allowed Parcham to return to power.
Neither had the Parcham is forgotten the ir persecution by the Khalqis, nor
were they inclined to forgive and fo rge t. 10
In June, July and October o f 1980 three m ilita ry  rebellions occurred
when Khalqi commanders were replaced by Parchami officers. These
rebellions were suppressed by force. The Parcham faction attempted to
increase its size through recruitm ent, and, by PDPA accounts, more than
40,000 new members were added. Despite numerous changes in o ffices by
Khalq and Parcham members, s trife  between the two factions continued.
The greatest divisions lie among the various branches of the m ilita ry ,
secret police (KHAD) and security police (Sardandoy). The m ilita ry  had
the lowest number o f party members as a percentage o f its ranks, most o f
whom were sp lit equally along factional lines. Sardandoy is dominated by
Khalqis, and KHAD is made up of Parchamis. 11 In 1983, a fire fig h t broke
out between Khalqi policemen and Parchami Army o fficers in Herat which
12resulted m over one hundred dead.
The only PDPA policy that has been marginally successful is the 
form ation o f the National Fatherland Front (NFF). The NFF was designed 
to appeal to the nationalistic sentiments o f the Afghan populace, and to 
supplement the PDPA organization fo r those people leery o f communism. 
This was one o f many attempts to broaden the base o f popular support 
under the Karm al regime. By mid-1983 the o ffic ia l claim  stated NFF 
membership a t 600,000 in 410 committees. A la te r news release may have
10Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, p. 112.
^ A rn o ld , Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, p. 104
1^New York Times, 7 September, 1983, p. 1-4.
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mistakenly given the correct membership when it  claimed 55,000 members in
13over 1000 committees. Despite the continued e ffo rts  o f the new regime 
to heal its internal r i f t  and appear less Marxist in character, these 
policies had l i t t le  e ffe c t on the progress of the c iv il war. Although 
the Soviets dictated PDPA policy and completely controlled Babrak Karmal, 
even they could not force an end to the factional blood-feud w ith in  the 
PDPA.
Soviet Policies
Ever since the invasion troops landed in Kabul on Christmas Eve 
1979, the only real source of policy in Afghanistan has been the Soviet 
Union. Although the Karmal regime has attempted to make gains on the 
po litica l fron t at the urging of its Soviet advisors, i t  soon became 
apparent from  the complete lack o f cooperation by the vast m a jority  o f 
the Afghan populace, and the fie rce resistance put up by the Afghan 
freedom fighters (Mujahideen), that m ilita ry  solutions would need to  be 
employed on a vast s c a le .^
By the end of the f irs t week of January 1980, over 50,000 Soviet 
troops were in Afghanistan. By the end o f March, six fu ll divisions, 
to ta ling  85,000 personnel, were in various positions around the country.
By 1984, this number had steadily increased to approximately 115,000 
where i t  has remained constant through lgSS.1^ As the Soviet forces 
increased in size, there was a corresponding decrease in Afghan forces.
1^,,Facts and Figures," Kabul New Times, 25 A pril 1984, c ited in 
Arnold, Afghanistan's Two Party Communism, p. 105.
1 ̂ Soviet m ilita ry  policies and sta tis tics have been taken solely 
from  estimates by western sources. The Soviet Union has released no data 
on the Afghan War.
^Arnold, Afghanistan, p. 98.
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Because o f a small number of deaths, and a huge number of desertions
which at times included entire divisions, the Afghan army has shrunk from
an estimated 100,000 troops in 1978 to 30,000 in 1981. Mutinous Afghan
units have been credited as one o f the best sources of rebel weapons in
1 fithe early months o f the war.
Soviet forces in Afghanistan include approximately 80,000 ground 
troops, 30-40,000 support personnel and 10,000 a ir force personnel.
These forces are supported by 50,000 ground and air force personnel in 
the southern USSR. Troops are deployed geographically w ith  about one- 
th ird  o f ground forces in the Kabul area w ith  other major deployments at 
M azar-i-Sharif and Qunduz in the north, Herat and Farah in the east, 
Kandahar in the south, and Jalalabad in the east. Major a ir bases are 
located in Jalalabad, Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Shindand, and 
Farah.1^
To date, Soviet strategy has focused upon holding the major centers 
o f communication and transportation, while carrying out a war of 
a ttr it io n  against the Mujahideen. The Soviets have sought to  in f lic t  as 
much damage as possible on rebel forces at minimum cost to the ir own 
troops. They have used the ir superior tac tica l m obility  and firepower to 
make up fo r an insuffic ient number o f troops and to hold casualties to a 
minimum. Control over te rr ito ry  has remained more or less constant over 
the last eight years. The Soviets have day tim e control over the major 
c ities and strategic garrisons, while the rebels have n ight-tim e control 
over v irtu a lly  the entire country. The Soviets have attempted to reduce 
rebel controlled areas by pursuing a combined "scorched-earth," and
1 fi Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 206.
1 7Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 144.
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"m igratory-genocide" policy. Migratory-genocide is a plan to depopulate
rebel-held te rrito ry  and thus remove the Mujahideen's base of support.
The Soviets have forced huge numbers of people in the countryside to flee
to Iran and Pakistan by deliberately burning crops. They have used high
level carpet bombing and a " fre e -fire "  zone approach in rebel infested
18areas where all people are considered targets.
The Soviets have also u tilized  small anti-personnel mines in the
form  of watches, ballpoint pens, books and dolls. These devices have
reportedly caused enormous damage among the civ ilian  population, and many
1 9women and children have lost fee t or hands as a consequence. There 
have also been reports by the U.S. State Department tha t the Soviets have
used chemical weapons in at least fifteen  provinces of
20Afghanistan. The Soviets have categorically denied a ll such claims.
The immediate physical and human costs to the Soviets have been
considerable. As o f 1984, casualties were estimated conservatively at
30,000 killed and wounded. Over $12 b illion had been spent, and over
3500 vehicles, including tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks had
been destroyed. Also, over 600 a irc ra ft were estimated to have been shot 
21down. These numbers have proportionately risen over the last four 
years as the Mujahideen received greater numbers of increasingly more 
e ffec tive  anti-tank and a n ti-a irc ra ft weapons.
18Ibid., p. 145.
19Ibid., p. 147.
20U.S. Department o f State, Chemical Warfare in South Asian and 
Afghanistan, p. 23, c ited in Ibid.
21 Arnold, Afghanistan, p. 100.
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Economic and P o litica l Policies
In addition to a ttem pting to increase membership in the PDPA and the 
NFF, the Soviets have promoted increased economic and trade ties, as well 
as new policies w ith socio-po litica l ram ifications. A ll of these 
measures have been instigated to help the Afghan communists remain in 
power, and attem pt to build long-term economic, po litica l and social ties 
between the Afghans and Soviets.
The economy in Afghanistan has been devastated by the c iv il war. In
1984 crop production was estimated to be at on e -fifth  o f pre-1978 levels.
The Soviets have been forced to im port massive amounts o f food, and
22rationing has been implemented in Afghan cities. Soviet involvement in 
the Afghan economy has also increased. More than 140 industrial 
fa c ilitie s  are being bu ilt (or repaired from  war damage) w ith  Soviet 
assistance, and i t  is estimated that the value o f Soviet aid since 1978 
has more than doubled. Total trade figures between the two nations have 
also doubled since 1977, and the Soviets are responsible fo r more than 80
percent o f Afghan trade. The Soviets claim to have trained over 60,000
Afghan workers o f a ll vocations, and there are more than 9,000 Afghan
college students in Soviet schools.
The Soviets have also been accused o f exploiting Afghanistan's rich  
mineral and natural gas resources. An estimated one percent o f Soviet 
natural gas consumption is being met through deliveries o f Afghan gas.
The Soviets pay fo r the gas at approximately one-half o f the world price, 
a point on which some analysts accuse the Soviets o f outrigh t robbery of 
Afghan resources. However, two facts should be pointed out in this case.
22Arnold, Afghanistan, pp. 109-110.
OO
Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 141.
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F irst of a ll, as discussed earlier in chapter five , the gas produced
through 1985 was earmarked fo r sale to the Soviet Union under the Daoud
regime, and was not part of any new policies by the Afghan communists.
Second, as Peter Franck pointed out in his 1960 Afghan survey fo r the
National Planning Association, "geographic proxim ity involving the saving
of internal transportation cost to the northern border represents a net 
24gain." In other words, there is nobody else who can buy the Afghan 
gas. It  would be too expensive to ship it  south, there is no pipeline 
network to do so, and the last thing Iran needs is more natural gas. I f  
the Soviets did not provide a market fo r Afghan gas, there would be none. 
Soviet geologists have also conducted surveys o f Afghan minerals, but 
because of the continued figh ting , l it t le  work has been done to develop 
these resources.
A more subtle and possibly much more im portant policy w ith  long- 
range effects, is the education o f school age children. There are 
presently over 20,000 young Afghans who are being raised and educated in 
the Soviet Union. A fte r returning to Afghanistan, these students 
potentia lly  w ill form  the nucleus o f a new m ilita ry  and party e lite  w ith
OC
extremely strong ties to the Soviet Union. Special Russian-language 
courses have been developed w ith in  the Afghanistan school system which 
has been expanded to  reach rura l areas. However, the success o f these 
programs has been blunted by rebel attacks on government schools, and the 
long-range consequences of this policy remain to  be seen.
On the po litica l fron t the most im portant changes which have 
occurred focus upon the po litica l leadership o f Afghanistan, and the rise
t } A
Franck, Afghanistan: Between East and West, p. 33.
25Collins, p. 146.
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to power of M ikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU.
Following the death o f Konstantine Chernenko on March 10, 1985, Gorbachev
was selected as the new Soviet leader. By the spring o f 1986, rumors
suggesting that Gorbachev was serious about withdrawing Soviet forces
from  Afghanistan were alive in diplomatic circles. Apparently the Soviet
Union was preparing to partake in a number of drastic domestic policy
adjustments which would require a change in the Afghan situation.
The Peace Process in Afghanistan (1980-1988)
Since February, 1980 the Soviets have been seeking a diplomatic way
to extract themselves from  Afghanistan. The Soviets have suffered from
world-wide condemnation fo r the ir action, and relations w ith Third World
countries, as well as Superpower relations, rapidly deteriorated
fo llow ing the invasion. In each o f six separate United Nations votes the
Soviet Union has received a to ta l number o f negative votes ranging from
2fi104 to 123 in number. Despite the ir inab ility  to defeat decisively the
Mujahideen on the ba ttle fie ld , and failures to find an internal po litica l
solution, the Soviets did not exhibit much fle x ib ility  in the ir position
27through the f irs t  six years of occupation.
The Soviet peace position began to emerge in Brezhnev's speech of 
February 23, 1980, at the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet election.
Brezhnev accused the Chinese and U.S. o f causing Soviet intervention and 
said that "the need fo r Soviet forces would no longer exist" when outside
^Arnold, Afghanistan, p. 110.
^7Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 147.
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interference ended. Brezhnev's ideas were broadened by Karmal's "May 
fourteenth Proposals." Karmal outlined the fo llow ing five  proposals:
1) Separate b ila tera l talks between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.
2) The immediate cessation of armed interference during these talks.
3) The return of refugees and granting o f amnesty.
4) U.S. and Soviet guarantees to b ila te ra l agreements.
5) The w ithdrawal o f Soviet troops, depending "on the resolution o f the
question of e ffective  guarantees fo r b ila tera l accords."
Early peace proposals put fo rth  by the United States,
France and the European Community in the summer o f 1981 were rejected
because they failed to include the Afghan government in early
discussions. They did include d irect representation by rebel forces, and
they spoke of "neutra lization," which the Soviets viewed as an
Oft
unacceptable a lteration of Afghanistan's non-aligned status. These
proposals would have called fo r the end of the Karmal regime, and they
violated Brezhnev's pledge that the gains o f revolution were permanent.
Brezhnev stated at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981:
We do not object to the questions connected w ith  Afghanistan being 
discussed together w ith  the questions o f Persian Gulf security.
Naturally, this applies only to the international aspects of the Afghan 
problem, and not to internal Afghan affa irs. Afghanistan's sovereignty, 
like  its  nonaligned status, must be fu lly  protected.
The United Nations, in accordance w ith  a General Assembly resolution
in November 1980, began negotiations w ith  Pakistan and Afghanistan.
These negotiations were known as "prox im ity  ta lks" which were held
through U.N. mediators. The two sides would not correspond d irec tly ,
28Pravda, 23 February 1980, p. 1, cited in CDSP, 8 (March, 1980): 1-
4.
28Pravda, 2 July 1980, p. 4, c ited in CDSP, 26 (August, 1980): 6.
30Pravda, 5 August 1981, p. 4, cited in CDSP, 31 (September 1981):
5-6.
3*Pravda, 24 February 1981, pp. 2-9, cited in CDSP, 8 (March, 1981):
13.
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thus relieving the Pakistanis of the need to recognize o ffic ia lly  the 
Karmal regime, or adm itting to the Soviet charge of outside interference. 
The Pakistani position was clear. It wanted a complete w ithdraw l o f 
Soviet forces, a restoration o f Afghanistan's nonaligned and independent 
status, freedom from  outside interference, and the safe re turn of the 
Afghan refugees. The refugee problem is of special concern fo r 
Pakistan which has been forced to provide fo r over three m illion Afghans 
since 1982.33
When Brezhnev died in November 1982, there was hope that Andropov, 
who was rumored to have been against the invasion, would move to end the 
war. President Zia of Pakistan noted tha t there was "a h in t of 
f le x ib ility "  in the Soviet a ttitude toward Afghanistan.34 The chief 
editor o f Pravda, V ictor Afanasyev, a Central Committee member, to ld a 
Japanese newspaper that a po litica l settlem ent was desired which did not 
require an Afghan government to "be a Soviet-type socialist
o c
government." The Soviet press soon denied Afanasyev's statements and
retorted that the USSR's position remained unchanged. Andropov
personally laid to rest any rumors of change in the Soviet view:
Our plans fo r a po litica l settlem ent o f the Afghan problem are no 
secret....We consider that as soon as outside interference in the a ffa irs  
o f Afghanistan has been term inated and non-resumption o f such 
interference guaranteed, we shall w ithdraw our troops. Our troops are 
staying in that country and are there at the request o f the law fu l Afghan 
government...headed by Babrak Karm al....It is, however, fa r from  being a
d*Collins, The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan, pp. 157.
33New York Times, 22 November 1982, p. A5.
34New York Times, 10 December 1982, p. 8.
3®Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 157.
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m atter of indifference to us what is happening d irectly  on our southern 
border. 6
Overall, Soviet e ffo rts  to resolve the Afghan problem remained 
unchanged from  1979 to 1986. The Soviets were w illing  to bear the brunt 
of fighting, the cost in money, lives and equipment to support the Karmal 
regime, and the international diplomatic damage caused by intervention. 
Under the Gorbachev regime the USSR began to modify its  postion in an 
attem pt to extract itselves from  the con flic t.
The Period o f "New Thinking"
Shortly fo llow ing the selection o f M ikhail Gorbachev as the General 
Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, real changes began to occur in the 
Soviet position toward Afghanistan. On the ba ttle fie ld  things remained 
unchanged, but at the diplom atic table major changes began to take place. 
The sh ift in the Soviet position can be d irec tly  linked to  Gorbachev's 
domestic policies which where attem pting the "restructuring" o f the 
Soviet economy. Gorbachev's plan, known as "perestroika," calls fo r 
major changes in the Soviet economy as well as increased po litica l 
freedoms.
In the realm of Gorbachev's foreign policy, statements regarding 
development in the Third World are worthy o f note. Although the Soviet 
view of Western imperialism remains an important part o f the ir c ritic ism  
o f Western nations, Gorbachev softens the revolutionary aspect of Soviet 
policy:
I have explained on many occasions that we do not pursue goals in im ical 
to Western interests. We know how im portant the Middle East, Asia, Latin  
America, other Third World regions and also South A frica  are fo r American 
and Western European economies, in particu la r as raw m ateria l sources.
**®Tass, 24 April 1983, cited in Collins, The Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan, p. 158.
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To cut these links is the last th ing we want to do, and we have no desire 
to  provoke ruptures in h is to rica lly  formed, mutual economic interests.
In regard to po litica l freedom Gorbachev states:
Every nation is entitled to choose its own way o f development, to dispose 
o f its fa te , its  te rr ito ry , and its human and natural resources.
International relations cannot be normalized i f  this is not understood in 
a ll countries. For ideological and social differences, and differences 
in po litica l systems are the result of the choice made by the people. A 
national choice should not be used in international relations in such a 
way as to cause trends and events that can trigger conflic ts  and m ilita ry  
confronta tion ....it is high tim e to recognize tha t the Third World 
nations have the righ t to be th e ir own bosses.
Gorbachev's policy can be interpreted as a rebutta l to the Brezhnev
Doctrine's policy of "once socia list, always socia list." I f  a nation
were to decide a new form of government, even i f  i t  meant changing from  a
socialist government to some other form , it  would appear as i f  the
Soviets would be prepared to accept the change.
"New Thinking" on the Afghan Question
The new Soviet policies were soon reflected in the Soviet
relationship w ith  Afghanistan. Three days a fte r returning from  a tr ip  to
Moscow, Babrak Karmal was peacefully replaced by Dr. Najibullah, the head
of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). Karmal's replacement coincided w ith
a new round o f ind irect U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Geneva between
Afghan and Pakistani negotiators. Karmal's removal brought about
demonstrations in Kabul on his behalf which caused the Soviets to
surround key government buildings and army barracks w ith  tanks. Karmal
did retain his membership in the Afghan Politburo, and the ceremonial
39post as president, but his tenure as Afghanistan's leader was over.
37Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking fo r Our Country and 
the World (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987). p. 178 (emphasis mine).
^®Ibid., pp. 177-178 (emphasis mine).
Afghanistan: Bad to Worse Newsweek, May 19, 1986, p. 50.
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In July, 1986 the Soviets announced its intention to remove six
regiments o f troops by December of that year. Although these troops
consisted mainly of a n ti-a irc ra ft personnel, and were useless in figh ting
the Mujahideen, when completed i t  was the f irs t instance of a Soviet
reduction in forces. On the ba ttle fie ld  the Soviets began to suffer
substantial losses in a irc ra ft due to  the steady supply of sophisticated,
U.S.-made Stinger a n ti-a irc ra ft missiles reaching the rebels. The Soviet
dominance o f the a ir was reduced considerably, and rebel forces were able
to consolidate the ir hold on many areas which had previously been
40subjected to Soviet aerial bombardment.
In December, 1987, one week prior to the U.S.-Soviet Summit in 
Washington D.C., Najibullah announced the Afghan version of ’’new 
thinking." The policy was called "National Reconciliation." This 
program offered amnesty to  a ll rebels, and called fo r  a coalition 
government made up o f a ll elements o f Afghan society. For the f irs t  
tim e, the Mujahideen were recognized as leg itim ate groups w ithin 
Afghanistan.41 One week la te r, a t the summit meeting w ith President 
Reagan, M ikhail Gorbachev would announce in regard to the Soviet 
withdrawal from  Afghanistan tha t, "The po litica l decision has been taken.
4 0
We’ve named the tim e l im it  -  12 months, maybe less."
Following Gorbachev's announcement, high level talks between the 
Soviet Foreign M inister Edwaurd Shevardnadze and General Secretary 
Najibullah soon produced results. Shevardnadze explained that the Soviet 
decision to withdraw its forces was based on the Afghan version o f "new
4^Wall Street Journal, 16 February 1988, p. 18.
41,'Show 'em a Way to  go Home," Time, 14 December 1987, p. 52.
4^U.S. News and World Report, 21 December 1987,p. 25.
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th inking." The Soviet press reported on the Afghan-Soviet talks of 
January 7, 1988:
Weapons in hand, Afghan patriots have been wholeheartedly defending the 
gains of the A p ril revolution. Soviet in ternationalist figh ting men have 
been at the ir side....But the new po litica l thinking has persistently 
sought ways and means tha t rule out a m ilita ry  solution to the problem. 
This is how the d ra ft p o litica l settlem ent around Afghanistan and the 
policy o f national reconcilia tion came into being....When the outside 
interference has ended, we w ill leave Afghanistan w ith  a clear conscience 
and w ith  the awareness tha t our duty has been fu lfille d .
Although i t  would appear that the Soviet position regarding the
cessation o f outside interference was unchanged, in fac t, i t  had changed
tremendously. The Afghan policy of "National Reconciliation" changed the
o ffic ia l view of the Mujahideen from being im peria list "bandits" into
"in terna l opposition forces." Therefore, what was considered before by
the Soviets as "outside interference," could now be interpreted as an
internal Afghan problem which would be dealt w ith  by the Afghan
government. Thus, the need fo r Soviet troops no longer existed.
The Soviet W ithdrawal
On February 8, 1988, Gorbachev announced that the Soviets would
begin removing the ir forces from  Afghanistan on May 15, i f  an agreement
was signed in Geneva by March 15. He proposed that a ll Soviet troops
would be withdrawn w ith in  ten months a fte r an agreement was signed.44
Following a Soviet announcement on March 17 that they would withdraw
45troops even i f  no agreements were reached, the Geneva peace talks, 
which had been stalled by demands from  both sides, soon ironed out the 
numerous technical d ifficu ltie s  that were delaying an agreement.
Pravda, 7 January 1988, p. 14, cited in CDSP, 1 (February, 1988):
13 (emphasis mine).
44New York Times, 9 February 1988, p. 1, 7.
4**New York Times, 18 March 1988, p. 7.
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Apparently the Western interests decided it  was better to bend a small
degree to accomodate Soviet demands than to have no agreement at a ll.
On March 31, Najibullah's government announced the creation o f a new
northern province on the Afghan-Soviet border. The new province was
formed by sp litting  o ff the mountainous portions o f two other provinces
into the new province called Sari Pull. This new province is
geographically formed to provide easy defense and is speculated to be a
possible future stronghold fo r the Afghan communists in the event of a
re trea t from Kabul. This new province could help insulate the Moslem
areas o f Soviet Central Asia from  Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan.
In recent months the northern provinces o f Afghanistan have been
displaying signs o f independence, and new Soviet-Afghan cu ltu ra l and
economic agreements have been signed. I t  is unknown what the
significance of this new province w ill hold fo r the fu tu re , and no
explanations have been put forward by the Afghans or Soviets.
On A pril 6, Gorbachev and Najibullah met in the Soviet Central Asian
c ity  o f Tashkent. In a jo in t statement issued the next day, both sides
agreed, "tha t the last obstacles to concluding the agreements have now
been removed thanks to the constructive cooperation o f a ll who are
47involved in the settlem ent, and favor the ir immediate signing." On
A pril 14, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the United States
signed agreements providing fo r the w ithdrawal o f Soviet forces from
4fiAfghanistan and the restoration o f a nonaligned Afghan state.
^ New York Times, 1 A p ril 1988, p. 5.
47New York Times, 8 A p ril 1988, p. 1, 4.
^ New York Times, 15 April 1988, p. 1
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The Geneva agreement stipulates the fo llow ing four conditions 
regarding the Soviet w ithdrawal of forces from  Afghanistan:
1) The Afghans and Pakistanis w ill re fra in  from  any form of interference 
in each others affa irs.
2) A ll refugees w ill be allowed to return safely to Afghanistan.
3) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. guarantee Afghanistan's future non-aligned 
status.
4) The Soviet troop w ittidrawal w ill begin on May 15, and be concluded by 
November 15, 1988.
An analysis of this document reveals that contains only the most
general of details. There is no plan fo r the return of refugees, nor is
it  apparent that the Afghans or the Pakistanis, both backed-up by the ir
Superpower patrons, w ill re fra in  from in te rfe ring  in each others affa irs.
The Mujahideen continue to be armed in camps inside the Pakistan border,
and Soviet/Afghan agents have been accused o f destroying supply depots in
Pakistan. There is no agreement on the supply o f arms to either the
Kabul government by the Soviets, or to the rebels by the United States.
Apparently a ll that has been accomplished in this agreement is to
o ffic ia lly  confirm  the Soviet's decision to remove the ir troops. The
future o f Afghanistan is now in the hands o f the Afghan communists and
the Mujahideen.
^ The Spokesman-Review, 15 April 1988, p. 1.
Chapter V III 
Analysis and Conclusion
My sp irit w ill remain in Afghanistan, though my soul w ill go to 
God. My last words to you my son and successor, are: Never trus t the
Russians.
Rahaman Khan, Am ir of 
Afghanistan (1880-1901)
Answers to Project Questions
As stated in the introduction, this study has set out to 
accomplish two goals. The f irs t  goal is to identify  im portant aspects 
o f Soviet foreign policy toward Afghanistan prior to the 1979 invasion 
and to analyze the invasion w ith in  the h istoric context o f these 
policies. Four operational questions were presented to provide fo r the 
basis o f this analysis. The f irs t goal can now be reached by providing 
answers these questions.
A Case o f Russian Imperialism ?
Although the exact motives behind the Soviet decision to invade 
Afghanistan may never be known, one widely held in te rpre ta tion  views 
the Soviet action the latest stage in the age-old process o f Russian 
imperialism. This pro ject has investigated Soviet foreign policy over 
the last 80 years in order to  assess the va lid ity  o f this view.
The Russians have always been interested in Afghanistan. They 
are concerned w ith  the p o litica l fortunes o f that nation in much the 
same way as the United States keeps watch on Mexico. The Soviets 
showed that, in the ir foreign relations w ith  Afghanistan prio r to  World 
War II, ideological pu rity  was o f secondary importance to  national
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interest. In the early period of relations, when the Bolsheviks active ly 
promoted world-wide revolution, they chose to establish normal d iplom atic 
contacts w ith  the Afghan monarchy. The Soviets did not promote 
revolution in Afghanistan, and went so fa r as to aid King Amanullah when 
he faced internal rebellion.
From the Soviet viewpoint, i t  was preferable to have a stable 
Afghanistan, controlled by a tr iba l monarch who active ly promoted good
relations, than an unstable nation whose alignment was uncertain. Prior
to the end of World War II the Soviet Union sought to maintain 
Afghanistan's h istoric  role as a buffer state between Russia and Great 
Brita in. D iplomatic, economic, trade and m ilita ry  relations were all 
kept to a minimal level as the Soviets maintained only sporadic .contact
w ith its southern neighbor.
Perhaps the best example o f the Soviet desire to uphold the status- 
quo is its reaction to the peasant rebellion in 1929. Bacha-i-Saquo, the 
peasant leader, was the perfect, ideologically-correct rebel as 
prescribed w ith in  Leninist revolutionary theory. Instead o f supporting a 
leader o f the peasant masses, the Soviets chose to support the King, 
apparently viewing Bacha as an ally whose tim e had not arrived in 
tradition-bound Afghanistan. The Soviets decided tha t the ir national 
interest was best served by helping to perpetuate the Afghan monarchy.
I f  the Soviets were planning to annex Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, 
this situation had presented them w ith  an ideal opportunity. Their 
decision not to  support the peasant revo lt refutes any early claims o f 
Soviet imperialism toward Afghanistan.
Other examples o f Soviet behavior also support this anti­
te rr ito r ia l in terpre ta tion. Although the Soviets did send troops into
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Afghanistan on two occasions in pursuit o f border-raiders, they also 
chose to engage diplom atic solutions to prevent future incidents. If 
Soviet intentions were purely based on te rr ito r ia l gain, they could have 
used these border incidents as an excuse to stage a large scale invasion.
In a ll border incidents, the Soviets withdrew the ir troops a t the request 
of the Afghan government. Eventually, the Soviets destroyed the bandits 
through a jo in t Afghan-Soviet venture which required a high degree of 
cooperation and coordination between the two nations.
Following World War II the level of Soviet-Afghan interaction 
increased slowly un til Khrushchev’s rise to power, commencing in 1953. 
Despite the massive amount of Soviet economic and m ilita ry  aid to 
Afghanistan in the fo llow ing years, i t  cannot be said that the Soviets 
controlled internal or external Afghan a ffa irs . The Soviet Union was 
Afghanistan's largest source o f aid, but many other nations, including 
the United States, independently pursued aid projects in Afghanistan. In 
many cases the Afghans were able to arrange fo r cooperation between the 
Superpowers, even in the depths o f the Cold War. The Afghans were also 
adept at the old game of "positive-neutra lity" and played upon U.S.- 
Soviet com petition in order to receive a proportionally larger amount o f 
aid than other nations.
Many analysts have pointed to the type o f aid which the Soviets 
provided Afghanistan as "proof”  o f long-held plans which fin a lly  came to 
pass in the 1979 invasion. Construction projects, such as bridges strong 
enough to support tanks, hardened roads and tunnels through mountain 
passes which could la te r be used to  fa c ilita te  the log istica l support of 
troops, and c iv ilian  and m ilita ry  airports to  be used by airborne 
elements o f an invasion are a ll c ited as overt m ilita ry  components o f
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Soviet a id .1 Khrushchev's memoirs plainly express the strategic 
dimensions which these projects held fo r the Soviet Union, yet, fo r a 
number of reasons, even these factors only weakly support accusations of 
a te rr ito r ia l in tent lurking behind Soviet aid projects.
The f irs t reason points to the fa c t that the United States was 
building s im ilar roads and bridges in Afghanistan. I f  the Soviet roads 
are to be interpreted as strategic devices fo r implementing te rr ito r ia l 
expansion, so must the American roads. In regard to bridges being bu ilt 
strong enough to support tanks, we must also look at the supply o f arms 
to the Afghans.
The Afghan government asked the U.S. fo r arms in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and were repeatedly turned down. The Afghans then turned to 
the Russians. The Soviets supplied the requested weapons, which included 
tanks and heavy transport vehicles. I t  would do the Afghans l i t t le  good 
to have heavy Soviet tanks fa lling  through weak bridges bu ilt by both the 
Soviets and Americans. Thus, the Soviet construction projects cannot be 
viewed solely as strategic elements in a Soviet master-plan because they 
also are im portant to Afghan security interests. Also, these bridges 
were used on a daily basis in the mundane function o f fa c ilita tin g  trade, 
communications, and economic development w ith in  Afghanistan. I f  the 
bridges, roads and airports had been bu ilt, and the Afghans were not also 
provided tanks, trucks and airplanes, then a de fin ite  case fo r u lte rio r 
Soviet motives could be made. However, this was not the case in 
Afghanistan and proponents o f this argument present a weak case.
In regard to trade and economic relations, there is no doubt that 
the Soviets were Afghanistan’s primary partner and benefactor. The
1For example, see Thomas Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 25
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Soviets completely dominated trade w ith  Afghanistan and were the major 
market fo r Afghan goods. The Soviets were also prim arily responsible fo r 
helping to develop Afghanistan's p rim itive  economy. Soviet economic 
dominance would have continued even i f  PDPA had fallen, and i t  is like ly  
that economic relations w ill continue even i f  the Mujahideen come to 
power. The simple fac t remains that the USSR is the only economically 
feasible trading partner to which the Afghans have access. A fte r 
hostilities die down, business relations w ill most like ly return to 
normal.
Soviet involvement in Afghan m ilita ry  matters was necessarily 
extensive in ligh t of the need to tra in  Afghan personnel in the use and 
maintenance of sophisticated Soviet equipment. Many o f Afghanistan's 
o ffice rs  were pro-Soviet and had been trained in the USSR. Some of these 
o fficers supported or aided in the communist coup, were members o f the 
PDPA, and active ly  supported the policies o f the new regime in 1978. 
However, the ir lack o f support fo r the Soviet Union was revealed in the 
complete breakdown o f the Afghan armed forces fo llow ing the Soviet 
invasion. I f  the number o f desertions, mutinies and outright attacks on 
Soviet personnel by Afghan troops is any re flec tion  o f Soviet contro l 
over the Afghan m ilita ry , then it  is apparent that the Soviets inspire 
only negligible amounts of loya lty  among Afghan forces.
The communist movement in Afghanistan was no doubt influenced by the 
Soviets, but there is no evidence to  suggest tha t the Soviets wished to 
destabilize h is to rica lly  friendly relations by instigating a communist 
take-over. When the PDPA took contro l, they did so w ithout Soviet aid.
The PDPA and its  various factions had not been considered as serious 
threats to the Daoud regime and when they managed to take power, the
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Soviets were as uninformed about their leaders as were other governments. 
Increased Soviet support o f the PDPA helped lead to the ir intervention in 
1979, but intervention was not overtly  planned prior to the PDPA coup.
Two points o f international law and an element o f Soviet foreign 
policy were used to jus tify  the invasion. They cannot, however, be 
interpreted as part of a premeditated Soviet plan fo r invading 
Afghanistan. A rtic le  51 of the U.N. Charter has been used by many 
nations in previous e fforts  to support allies -  leg itim ate or otherwise.
The 1978 Treaty o f Friendship was signed before i t  became apparent that 
the communist regime was in real danger o f fa lling . This trea ty  was part 
o f the proposed Soviet South Asia Security System which had been 
formulated in the 1960s to counter CENTO and SEATO. The Brezhnev 
Doctrine became important because i t  applied to Afghanistan, but only 
a fte r Afghanistan became socialist in 1978.
Therefore, i t  is clear that the underlying cause o f the 1979 
invasion was not simply a m atter of trad itiona l Russian te rr ito r ia l
expansion. The Soviet Union did not have a long-standing master plan fo r
the domination o f Afghanistan which was fu lfille d  by the 1979 invasion. 
D iplom atic, economic, trade and m ilita ry  relations between the two 
countries steadily increased from  1919 to 1979, and the Soviets played an
im portant role in Afghan a ffa irs . Yet, there is no hard evidence to
indicate that Soviet policies in Afghanistan were anything more than the 
normal exchange o f relations between two friend ly nation-states.
The Question o f M ilita ry  Intervention
The Soviet Union and Afghanistan have engaged in approximately 80 
years o f international relations. Both countries have undergone m ultip le 
changes in leadership and policies. The question arises whether the 1979
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invasion is consistent w ith  pervious Soviet foreign policies toward 
Afghanistan, or should the invasion be viewed as a fundamentally new 
phase in relations?
According to Leninist theory, war is a viable tool in state policy.
Wars are inherently po litica l acts which are pursued fo r po litica l 
purposes. The fo llow ing quote from the tex t, Soviet M ilita ry  Policy, 
provides a description o f the Soviet view o f war:
The fundamental communist view maintains that a ll wars are by 
defin ition po litica l acts because they are waged by the belligerents to 
achieve specific aims. Lenin wrote: 'The ruling class also determines 
policy in war. War is in its entire ty po litics; i t  is the continuation 
by this class o f the pursuit o f the same aims by other means.'
Consequently, 'the warring states form ulate the po litica l aims of the 
war. The nature of the po litica l aims decisively influences the conduct 
o f the war,' tha t is the scale and intensity of the war.
Thus, the use o f m ilita ry  power is a po litica l act which is used to 
gain po litica l ends. We should therefore view the Soviet invasion, and 
w ithdrawal, as actions taken to achieve p o litica l goals. The Soviet use 
o f m ilita ry  power is seen as one element in the ir policy o f "corre lation 
o f forces.” M ilita ry , economic and po litica l elements are a ll viewed as 
equally im portant. Apparently the Soviets miscalculated in regard to 
these components when they decided to invade Afghanistan.
Some commentators claim  that the Soviet decision to send troops into 
Afghanistan was consistent w ith s im ila r decisions in 1925, 1929 and
2
V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, Vol. 25, p. 19. C ited by V.D. Sokolovskii, 
ed., Soviet M ilita ry  Strategy trans. by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon 
Goure, and Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewoods C liffs : Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.
109. O rig ina lly published by the M ilita ry  Publishing House of the 
M inistry o f Defence o f the USSR.
^Colonel G.A. Fedorov, "The Nature o f Wars and Their Causes," in 
Marksizm-Leninizm o voine i arm ii [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army], 
Voenizdat M inisterstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, Moscow, 1961, p. 43. C ited in 
Ibid.
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1930.4 This is fa r from  the tru th . The 1925 and 1930 "invasions" were 
unplanned pursuit actions directed against bandits, and both incidents 
were settled d ip lom atically shortly thereafter w ith  terms which consented 
to Afghan wishes. The level of Soviet involvement in the 1929 invasion 
remains unclear. This "invasion" went completely counter to ideological 
writings, and troops were withdrawn when Ammanullah fled to India. Thus, 
Soviet m ilita ry  intervention in Afghanistan prior to 1979 was minimal, 
and cannot be interpreted as setting a h istoric precedent fo r the 1979 
invasion.
Previous to 1979, the Soviets were confronted w ith numerous changes 
in the Afghan government. Amanulluh, the pro-Soviet king, was replaced 
by Bacha-i-saquo, the peasant-bandit-Islamic fundamentalist. Bacha was 
ousted by Nadir Shah who lessened Soviet influence and normalized 
relations w ith  Brita in. Nadir was succeeded by his son Zahir who 
remained neutral. Zahir handed power to Daoud who intensified Afghan- 
Soviet interaction. Daoud was removed by Zahir when he became too 
influentia l, and then Zahir turned the monarchy in to a constitutional 
monarchy which remained pro-Soviet. Daoud replaced Zahir in a coup, 
changed Afghanistan into a republic, and again intensified ties w ith  the 
Soviet Union. Daoud was replaced by the leader o f the Afghan communists, 
Taraki, who was deposed by his fellow-communist Amin. These governments 
represented a wide varie ty o f d iffe ren t leaders who attempted to 
instigate substantial changes in the Afghan system.
In a ll o f these instances o f change in Afghan governments, the 
Soviets reacted in s im ila r fashion. They supported the new Afghan 
leaders because Soviet interests were maintained. The break w ith
4See Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 9-19.
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historical Soviet policy toward Afghanistan occurred w ith  the 
interjection o f ideology into the equation. Instead o f le tting  the PDPA 
government fa ll to the country-wide opposition, and working w ith  the new 
Afghan leaders (as they had in the past), the Soviets were ideologically 
bound under the Brezhnev Doctrine to support any communist government 
which was threatened.
Soviet involvement in internal Afghan a ffa irs  was never overly 
necessary because the Afghan leaders, whoever they might be, had 
generally looked toward the Soviet Union in a favorable, i f  not friendly, 
fashion. The Afghan leadership changed many times throughout the 20th 
century, and the Soviets seemed w illing to work w ith  anyone, as long as 
they remained pro-Soviet. Soviet strategic interests were continually 
served by each successive Afghan ruler. Before 1978, when the PDPA 
entered the scene, the respective ideologies o f the various Afghan rulers 
had played an insignificant role in the Soviet view o f Afghanistan.
Therefore, the question o f consistency must be answered in the 
negative. The Soviet decision to intervene m ilita r ily  was not consistent 
w ith previous Soviet policies toward Afghanistan. These inconsistencies 
are most clearly re flected in the increased degree w ith  which the PDPA 
government relied on the Soviet Union to remain in power, the willingness 
o f the Russians to  extend such aid, and the introduction of ideology into 
the foreign policy equation.
Post-Invasion Goals and Methods
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in order to n u llify  those factors 
which they perceived as threatening: the rising tide o f Islamic 
fundamentalism, ins tab ility  on the ir southern border, and the possibility 
o f collapse o f an a llied Socialist government. In order to achieve
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these goals the Russians instigated m ilita ry , economic and po litica l 
solutions. The Soviets in itia lly  hoped that a massive show of m ilita ry  
force would in tim idate  the internal Afghan opposition fo r a long enough 
period which would allow new economic and social policies to take place 
and be accepted. The Soviets attempted to garner popular support by 
changing the character of the PDPA government to appear both trad itiona l 
and Islamic, and by moderating the radical reform  policies which had 
driven the people to rebellion. Thus fa r, a ll policies have failed.
They have fa iled fo r one simple reason: the Afghan populace hates the 
Russians and wants them to leave.
What is equally im portant in the analysis o f post-invasion policies 
is a b rie f review of some potentia l policies which were not pursued by 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. Even though 120,000 troops is a very large 
number, i t  soon became obvious that a much larger force would be needed 
to dominate Afghanistan m ilita r ily . The fac t tha t the Soviets have not 
increased the size o f the ir forces to a point where they completely 
controlled Afghanistan, indicates that they did not plan to subjugate the 
country by m ilita ry  means.
Neither have the Soviets taken any action which would indicate they 
were planning to  stay in Afghanistan permanently. The fabled "never 
ending Russian quest fo r a warm water port," as postulated by many 
geopolitical strategists, has not been supported by Soviet policies in 
Afghanistan. The Soviets have not attempted to increase Afghanistan's 
strategic capabilities by extending Soviet railroads into Afghanistan.
These railroads have bordered northern Afghanistan since the early 1900s 
and the Soviets have never attempted to extend them into Afghanistan. 
Such a plan would be the most logical strategic approach to  eventually
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gaining a warm-water port in the Indian Ocean. The simple fac t tha t the 
Soviets would risk a d irect confrontation w ith the United States by 
moving troops into Iran or Pakistan seems to discount Afghanistan as a 
leg itim ate pathway to such a goal.
And last, but not least, the simple fac t tha t the Soviet Union has 
decided to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan severely damages the 
va lid ity  o f geopolitical theories which view Soviet foreign policy as 
expansionary in nature. In the case o f Afghanistan it  would now appear 
to be a moot po in t.5
What is the Basis o f Policy Toward Afghanistan ?
Soviet foreign policies are based in M arxist-Leninist w riting .
Foreign policies are modified as each new Soviet leader provides his own 
interpretations of Marx and Lenin and adds to the ever growing body o f 
communist thought. In the West communist ideology is often perceived as 
a dogmatic, non-changing philosophy which was defined by Engels, Marx and 
Lenin. This view is simply false. As leadership changes occur in the 
Soviet Union, so do Soviet policies.
Despite the numerous Soviet leaders who have maintained relations 
w ith  Afghanistan, and many changes in the character o f Soviet foreign 
policy over the years, relations between the two countries exhibited a 
remarkable amount o f s tab ility  from  1919 to 1979. However, two important 
elements o f Soviet ideology have had far-reaching effects on Soviet- 
Afghan relations. These are the Brezhnev Doctrine and perestroika.
I t  would appear as o f this date, (May 10, 1988), that the Soviets 
w ill begin the ir o ffic ia l w ithdrawal five  days hence as outlined in the 
Geneva Treaty. There has been sporadic reports that troops have already 
begun to leave Afghanistan and there are no indication that the Soviets 
plan to reverse the ir decision.
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In one respect both of these elements of Soviet policy are 
remarkably sim ilar. They are both po litica l statements which provide a 
basis fo r interpreting the po litica l situation in foreign countries.
Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, opposition in Afghanistan was defined as 
outside aggression. Under perestroika the very same opposition is viewed 
as an internal Afghan problem. It  would appear as i f  perestroika has 
replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine as the ideological basis fo r the Soviet 
interpretation of the Afghan situation.
Thus, Brezhnev's orig inal claim , that Soviet troops would come home 
when they no longer are needed, has not beenreversed. I t  has been 
fu lfille d  by Gorbachev's decision to view the Afghan problem in a 
completely d iffe ren t ligh t. It was a po litica l decision to invade 
Afghanistan, and a po litica l decision to pull out. I f  interpreted in 
this way, Soviet foreign policy has remained consistent toward 
Afghanistan because it  has remained w ith in  its ideological 
constraints.
Looking at Soviet policies from  a non-ideological perspective 
reveals some inconsistencies. The two most obvious inconsistent policies 
are the decision to invade in 1979 and the reversal o f tha t decision in 
1988. The Soviets attempted to implement many changes in Afghanistan and 
explored many policy in itia tives, but they were never able to confront 
the Mujahideen w ith  any policy that was e ffec tive  in threatening the ir 
popular support among the Afghan populace. From this perspective i t  
would appear tha t the Soviets did not have a consistent policy toward 
Afghanistan. In fac t, they apparently suffered from a complete lack of 
consistent, e ffective  policies which could adequately address and correct 
the s ituation in Afghanistan.
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Future Ramifications
The second goal of this project was to speculate upon the future 
ram ifications which the Soviet withdrawal w ill have on relations w ith 
Afghanistan and Soviet foreign policy in general. Obviously Soviet- 
Afghan relations w ill be under tremendous strain a fte r the Soviets 
withdraw. In my opinion, the Afghan communists w ill be defeated w ith in a 
year a fte r the Soviet pullout. The next Afghan government w ill no doubt 
attem pt to cease all ac tiv ities  w ith the USSR. Although hatred fo r the 
Soviet Union w ill run deep among Afghans fo r many years, (possibly 
centuries -  the Afghans s t i l l  hate the British), i t  is most like ly  that 
they w ill be forced to in te ract w ith the Russians soon a fte r a new 
government is formed. The fa c t remains that Afghanistan is a p rim itive  
country. Its small industries and agricu ltural production are a ll 
re lian t on the Soviet Union fo r survival. The Afghans w ill need a market 
fo r the ir goods, and the only substantial market which exists is that 
provided by the Soviet Union.
I t  would be foolish fo r  the Afghans to active ly so lic it large 
amounts o f foreign assistance from  other nations. I t  was just this sort 
o f "outside interference," and perceived threat to Soviet security which 
led to the Russian invasion in the f irs t place. There is nothing to keep 
the Russians from  again invading i f  they fee l threatened. Afghanistan 
remains in the Soviet sphere o f influence, and despite Afghan hos tility  
toward the Russians, the two nations w ill continue to in te ract even a fte r 
the war is over.
In regard to Soviet foreign policy in general, the w ithdrawal may 
have a number o f effects. I t  would appear as i f  the Soviet Union w ill 
become more to lerant o f changes in allied Socialist governments. The
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realization that the Soviet Union is not a ll-powerfu l, even in its own 
sphere o f influence, has become apparent. This does not mean that the 
Soviets w ill give up the ir dominant position in Eastern Europe. I f  some 
internal po litica l changes do occur they w ill be to lerated, but open 
rebellion would not be acceptable.
Before getting involved in future intervention, the Soviets are 
like ly to investigate the costs and possibilities o f success very 
closely. Following defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. has been hesitant to 
commit its forces to combat. Americans have realized that m ilita ry  
dominance does not necessarily mean po litica l v ic to ry . The Russians have 
learned a sim ilar lesson in Afghanistan. Without popular consent, a 
revolutionary government has l i t t le  chance o f success. The Soviets have 
always realized this fac t, but, in the case o f Afghanistan, they refused 
to adhere to the ir own revolutionary theories.
The Soviets may also begin to realize that a ll anti-Soviet movements 
are not necessarily inspired by the Chinese or the United States. The 
U.S. may have learned this lesson in Iran, and the Soviets have sim ila rly 
discovered the revolutionary power of Islam in Afghanistan. Instead of 
the Americans looking fo r a Red under every bed, and the Russians seeing 
a CIA operative on every corner, both nations are starting to realize 
that there are more players in the game o f world politics.
The greatest challenge which the Soviet Union may face in the 
immediate fu ture is not one o f outside aggression, but rather the 
continuing dilemmas raised by competing internal forces. Changes in the 
economy, new po litica l freedoms, and the increasingly vocal supporters of 
various nationality groups (including Moslems) w ill test the 
surv ivab ility  o f new Soviet leadership to the utmost degree.
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Conclusion: The Soviet/Afghan War -  A Lesson in Living History
"I am in a d if f ic u lty  to know what to do w ith  the 
country now we have got it ."
-General Sir Donald Steward, brigade commander 
during the British punitive expedition.
2nd Anglo/Afghan War, 1879.
There exists a fam ilia r adage which states "Those who refuse to 
study history are doomed to repeat i t ."  Quite often this statement is 
used inappropriately to compare a contemporary situation w ith  an event in 
history. It would appear, however, that in the case o f Soviet 
involvement in Afghan affa irs during the 1980s, the lessons learned by 
the British in the three Anglo-Afghan Wars o f the nineteenth century were 
lost on the Russians. Although there are many differences between 
British and Russian involvement in Afghan a ffa irs, the s im ila rities are 
remarkable.
As seen in chapter two, the F irst Anglo-Afghan War was started when 
the Afghan leader Dost Mohammed incurred the wrath o f the B ritish by 
partaking in a small degree of independent behavior. The British 
overreacted, sent in the troops, and installed the ir own puppet -  Shah 
Shuja. Although they possessed complete dominance in m ilita ry  firepower, 
and had all of the resources o f the British Empire to back them, the 
B ritish were unable to defeat the incredibly resolute and dogged 
persistence o f the Afghans. Eventually the British w ithdrew a fte r 
suffering te rrib le  losses. The Afghans, though not completely 
victorious, provided ample warning o f the ir tenacity and complete 
intolerance o f foreign invaders -  no m atter what the odds. The British
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suffered sim ila r defeats in the 2nd and 3rd Anglo-Afghan Wars a fte r 
unwisely choosing to again intervene in Afghan affa irs.
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from  1979 to 1988 is a modern 
version of the same story. The Soviets were the dominant economic, 
po litica l and m ilita ry  force having influence over Afghan a ffa irs. They 
remained dominant only when they exerted influence from  w ith in  the ir own 
borders. The Soviet's a b ility  to manipulate events w ith in Afghanistan 
ceased as soon as they became d irec tly  involved in Afghan internal 
a ffa irs. The Afghans always postpone figh ting  among themselves when a 
common enemy enters the scene. As soon as the Russians depart, the 
Afghan c iv il war, which began as a fig h t among Afghans in 1978, w ill 
resume u n til one faction gains the upper hand. The Afghans reacted in a 
trad itiona lly  predictable fashion, and i t  is more than like ly  that they 
w ill rebel in the fu ture i f  ever confronted w ith s im ilar foreign 
intervention in the ir country.
With the advantage o f hindsight, i t  would appear tha t the Soviets' 
major error came in the ir fa ilu re  to control the ir over-zealous southern 
comrades in the early stages o f the new communist regime. I f  they had 
exerted more control over PDPA policies, and institu ted social changes at 
a extremely graduated pace, the c iv il war may never have erupted. I t  
became obvious that the level o f control the Soviets maintained was 
lim ited  both before and a fte r the 1979 invasion. The Afghan communists 
were as independent as the ir fe llow  countrymen in re jecting too much 
foreign influence.
Afghanistan is a land-locked nation w ith  a small population, scant 
resources, p rim itive  economic and po litica l systems, and a intransigent 
desire to remain that way. Any country which forgets this basic
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assessment and attempts to in terfere w ith Afghanistan's unique traditions 
is bound to learn the same painful lessons in flic ted  upon the British and 
Russians.
-  End -
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